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Abstract 
 
Why do we see such high levels of civil resistance in authoritarian regimes? Recent studies 
indicate that the vast majority of nonviolent uprisings take place in dictatorships (Chenoweth 
and Lewis 2013b; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). An issue that has been offered scant 
attention in this debate is the considerable institutional diversity that exists among 
authoritarian regimes. This thesis sets off to explore this topic and clarify the effects of 
political institutions on nonviolent uprisings. Based on previous work on authoritarian 
institutions and survival, I identify the effects restrictions on political parties as a particularly 
fruitful subject for investigation. I argue that the level of restrictions on political parties in 
dictatorships serves as a key determinant of the opposition’s willingness to pursue regime 
change through conventional channels of participation, as opposed to nonviolent direct 
action. This ‘channeling effect’ is neither linear nor constant. Dictatorships face varying 
levels of opposition and differ in their ability to co-opt opposition. Moreover, dictatorships 
experience different patterns over time, depending on the type of institutions that are 
established. As such, authoritarian regimes should exhibit predictable differences in their 
ability to prevent nonviolent uprisings. 
Using data on nonviolent uprisings between 1973 and 2006, I run a series of logistic 
regression models to test these claims empirically. I explore the effects of three different 
levels of institutionalization - no parties, a single party or several parties - on the risk of a 
nonviolent uprising. I find that single-party regimes run a significantly higher risk of a 
nonviolent uprising than both no-party and multiparty autocracies, while no-party regimes 
and multiparty autocracies face virtually the same likelihood of an uprising. Furthermore, I 
find that the effect of regime duration is significantly higher in multiparty autocracies than in 
other autocracies. While the risk of an uprising decreases over time in no-party regimes, and 
remains fairly stable in single-party regimes, this risk increases significantly over time in 
multiparty autocracies. Thus, political institutions do appear to channel contention, but their 
ability to do so is highly conditional.  
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1   Introduction 
 
Montesquieu observed that, at birth of new polities, leaders mold institutions, 
whereas afterwards institutions mold leaders. 
Robert Putnam (1993: 26). 
 
More than four years have passed since the wave of popular uprisings that hit the Arab world 
in 2011. Ever since, multiple reporters and scholars have attempted to explain the rapid 
unraveling that took place during the so-called Arab Spring. Yet, even with the benefit of 
hindsight, significant confusion remains as to how the revolutions could unfold (Chenoweth 
and Stephan 2014). After all, the uprisings brought down some of the most entrenched and 
repressive dictatorships in the Middle East (Svolik 2012). 
This brings me to the general empirical puzzle motivating this thesis: why do we see such 
high levels of civil resistance in authoritarian regimes? As Erica Chenoweth and Maria 
Stephan (2011: 66) have demonstrated in their seminal book, “Why Civil Resistance Works”, 
the “vast majority of nonviolent campaigns have emerged in authoritarian regimes […] where 
even peaceful opposition against the government may have fatal consequences”. However, 
despite the fact that later studies have reaffirmed this finding, none have systematically 
addressed its implications or explored this pattern any further (Butcher and Svensson 2014; 
Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b; Cunningham 2013). What I suggest here is that the finding 
merits further exploration given more recent insights on authoritarian regimes. 
In particular, a burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes has highlighted the 
considerable institutional heterogeneity among dictatorships. As Gandhi and Przeworski 
(2006: 1) contend, 
 
Dictatorships are not all the same. Some are purely autocratic: a single man or a 
clique rules, unconstrained by any institutions. In contrast, some dictatorships 
exhibit the full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. 
 
Several scholars have come to believe that authoritarian regimes are categorically different in 
terms of structure and behavior, and that these differences have empirically observable 
implications (e.g. Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Svolik 2012). Here, I mean to 
build on these insights, and investigate whether institutional differences among dictatorships 
affect the likelihood of nonviolent uprisings.  
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The broader subject of this thesis is therefore the effect of political institutions on the 
mobilization of nonviolent uprisings. Specifically, I wish to address the effects of restrictions 
on political parties on the risk of nonviolent campaigns. By restrictions on political parties, I 
refer to the distinction between dictatorships that permit no parties, a single party, or several 
parties. I label these regimes no-party regimes, single-party regimes, and multiparty 
autocracies, noting that some authors (e.g. Geddes 1999) also use the term single-party 
regimes to capture all dictatorships with dominant parties. Each of these three levels of 
restrictions of political parties represents different levels of institutionalization (low to high). 
Significant scholarship has addressed the inner and outer workings of single-party 
regimes (e.g. Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008b; Smith 2005), as well as the dynamics of 
competitive autocracies (e.g. Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002b). 
Recent studies have also started to address the effects of political party restrictions on 
outcomes such as coup d’états, repression, and popular uprisings (e.g. Frantz and Kendall-
Taylor 2014; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012). Thus, there is already a considerable literature that 
I can lean on that appears to carry particular relevance for nonviolent campaigns. Also 
Chenoweth (2015: 367) has noted the potential relevance of restrictions on political parties 
for nonviolent mobilization, labeling it “an area ripe for future research”. Thus, I mean to 
explore the following research question: 
 
Research question: What is the effect of restrictions on political parties on the likelihood of 
nonviolent uprisings in authoritarian regimes? 
 
Overall, the argument presented here is that the level of restrictions on political parties serves 
as a key determinant of the opposition’s willingness to pursue regime change through 
conventional channels of participation, as opposed to nonviolent direct action. This argument 
stems from the observation that dictators typically rely on greater levels of institutionalization 
to counter stronger opposition movements (e.g. Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). More 
specifically, I postulate that the effect of permitting more parties is neither linear nor 
constant. Instead, it is conditioned on two factors: (1) the threat of internal disruptions within 
the ruling coalition, and (2) the proximity to the last regime change. Hence, I identify single-
party regimes as particularly prone to nonviolent uprisings because the internal power-
sharing dynamics of these regimes make them liable to ‘underinstitutionalize’ in the face of 
stronger popular opposition. Conversely, I identify multiparty autocracies as particularly apt 
at co-opting key segments of the opposition that otherwise would be inclined to engage in 
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nonviolent action. Crucially, this feature of multiparty autocracies makes them no more likely 
to experience uprisings than no-party regimes, despite the fact that no-party regimes typically 
face weaker opposition movements. Finally, I suggest that the stabilizing properties of 
permitting multiparty autocracies should decline over time. As such, the effects of regime 
duration should be higher in multiparty autocracies than in other autocracies, which tend to 
experience more instability at the initial stages of their tenure. The general implication of 
these arguments is that dictatorships should exhibit predictable differences in their ability to 
avoid nonviolent uprisings. 
In my empirical analysis I find significant support to back all of these claims. The results 
show that single-party regimes experience a significantly higher risk of nonviolent campaign 
onsets than both multiparty and no-party autocracies, and the differences appear to be quite 
substantial. Furthermore, the risk of a nonviolent campaign onset is virtually identical in no-
party and multiparty autocracies, and remains insignificant throughout all of the model 
specifications. Finally, the results also reveal that the effect of regime duration of nonviolent 
uprisings is higher in multiparty autocracies than other autocracies. Whereas the risk of a 
campaign onset decreases over time in no-party regimes, and remains relatively stable in 
single-party regimes, multiparty autocracies experience a much higher risk of campaign onset 
over time.  
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to a growing literature on the onset of nonviolent 
campaigns (e.g. Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015; Dahl, Gates, Gleditsch, and González 2014). 
Studying the initiation of nonviolent campaigns is valuable for several reasons. First, 
nonviolent campaigns have been shown to be highly successful in removing incumbent 
governments from power (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Compared to armed campaigns, 
nonviolent uprisings are much more likely to lead to democratic transitions, democratic 
consolidation and subsequent periods of civil peace (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; 
Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Moreover, popular revolts have also become increasingly 
common the last few decades, and now constitute the most prevalent mode of 
nonconstitutional leader exit in authoritarian regimes (Kendall–Taylor and Frantz 2014). 
Thus, the potential of nonviolent campaigns to usher into more profound political change 
justifies an attempt to explain them. 
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1.1 Central Concepts 
 
To facilitate reading, I will first clarify the main terminology of the thesis. These concepts 
include: nonviolent resistance campaigns, political regimes, political institutions, and 
dictatorship. 
 
1.1.1 Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns 
The substantive focus in this thesis is on the onset of nonviolent campaigns over regime 
change. Here, I will use the terms nonviolent campaigns, civil resistance campaigns, 
nonviolent uprisings, nonviolent conflict and unarmed insurrections interchangeably. These 
events are forms of non-routine direct action, which denote activities outside normal political 
channels and in violation of what is sanctioned by the state (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; 
Sharp 1973). They are nonviolent in the sense that they are performed by unarmed civilians, 
who do not use or threaten to use physical force (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 418). They can 
encompass both acts of omission, whereby people refuse to do something the authorities’ 
orders require (e.g. tax boycotts and sit-ins), and acts of commission, whereby people do 
something authorities seek to prevent (e.g. strikes or illegal demonstrations) (Sharp 1973).  
By campaigns, I refer to “a series of observable, continuous, purposive tactics or events in 
pursuit of a political objective” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 14). Campaigns are therefore 
distinct from protests, which are often singular events and represent only one of the many 
tactics that may be represented in nonviolent campaigns. They are typically coordinated 
events, organized by a central leadership comprised of activists, public figures, and civilians 
(Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 2). In the present inquiry I focus in particular on campaigns 
that aim to overthrow the existing regime. These campaigns pursue what Chenoweth and 
Stephan label maximalist goals, and constitute some of the most intense forms of civil 
resistance. 
 
1.1.2 Political Regimes and Political Institutions 
Following Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 38), I define political regimes as “the sets of 
procedures that determine the distribution of power.” 2 I capture differences among regime 
types by in first instance differentiating between democracies and authoritarian regimes, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Note, however, that I will occasionally use ”the regime” to refer to the incumbents rather than regime types. 
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then by separating autocracies according to some of their most prominent institutional 
attributes. 
Political institutions are themselves nested within political regimes. According to an 
influential definition, institutions “are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North 1990: 3). Political institutions make up ‘the rules of the game’, 
proscribing who can engage in politics and how. First, they constrain behavior in the form of 
rules and regulations; they establish procedures to detect variations from the rules and 
regulations; and finally, they constrain the way in which the rules and regulations are 
specified and enforced through the establishment of moral, ethical, and behavioral norms. 
Thus, institutions can range from highly abstract notions, such as constitutional principles, to 
actual organizations, such as political parties, trade unions or the military. They include 
formal features, like the judiciary, as well as informal customs such as lobbying and 
patronage (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 40). Here, I focus on a more formal aspect, 
namely restrictions on political parties. In particular, I distinguish between regimes that 
formally or de facto allow for none, single, and multiple parties. 
 
1.1.3 Dictatorship 
The term dictatorships has several connotations (see e.g. Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012), and I 
am not going to enter any full-fledged discussion of its meaning here. Throughout the thesis, 
I will use the terms authoritarian regimes, autocracies and dictatorships interchangeably. In 
contemporary usage, the term is usually conceptualized as the opposite of democracy. Yet, 
even if we accept this criterion, defining dictatorship is by no means a straightforward 
exercise. First, there is disagreement as to whether democracy is a continuous or dichotomous 
variable (e.g. Adcock and Collier 2001; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Second, there is 
disagreement as to whether democracy should be defined according to the existence of 
particular institutions (procedural definition) or according to some underlying principles 
(substantive definition) (Beetham 1999; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Third, we 
also see disagreement on which particular traits that should be included in these definitions 
Knutsen (2011). As such, all approaches have their distinctive benefits and drawbacks, and 
no single index or categorization is withheld problems with reliability or validity (Cheibub et 
al. 2010; Munck and Verkuilen 2002).  
Here, I concur with Adcock and Collier (1999) and Hadenius and Teorell (2005) that 
choosing between different democracy indices is first and foremost a matter of the research 
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question at hand, and should be guided by their theoretical and empirical underpinnings. To 
facilitate a particular focus on institutional variations within authoritarian regimes, I believe it 
is appropriate in my case to draw a discrete cutoff point between democracies and 
authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, there are compelling reasons for separating democracies 
from dictatorships on the basis of a substantive rather than a procedural definition. According 
to procedural conceptions of democracy, dictatorship is defined exclusively on the absence of 
certain institutions, typically competitive elections (e.g. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and 
Limongi 2000; Schumpeter 2013). This approach may be problematic when studying the 
effects of political party restrictions, particularly in the case of dictatorships with multiple 
parties. Many multiparty autocracies hold elections that appear reasonably competitive and 
even occasionally result in alternations in office (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013). 
However, if the elections are fraught with obstacles for the opposition in the period leading 
up to the balloting, it seems questionable whether voters can exercise a free choice. Thus, 
labeling these cases as democracies could seriously mask the electoral irregularities that take 
place in these regimes (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). In fact, so-called competitive 
authoritarian regimes have received significant scholarly attention in recent years, and often 
display dynamics that are highly divergent from most democracies (e.g. Diamond 2002; 
Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002). As such, excluding these cases from the list of 
dictatorships may potentially discard a lot of relevant information. 
According to proponents of substantive definitions of democracy, institutions are 
necessary but not sufficient to characterize a regime as democratic. As Knutsen (2011: 57) 
contends, lists of institutional attributes “do not identify what democracy is, but rather 
identity crucial elements of what a functioning democracy requires”. Hence, the embodiment 
of democracy does not reside in the presence of particular institutional traits, but instead the 
respect and pursuit of some core principles, most notably popular control over public affairs 
on the basis of political equality (Beetham 1999: 90; Dahl 1972). Popular participation in 
decision-making is a fundamental aspect in most public depictions of democracy, and its 
absence has been argued to be a source of some of the most renowned campaigns of 
nonviolent action, including the Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa and the People 
Power Movement in the Philippines (Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005).  
In light of these considerations, I choose to draw the line between democracies and non-
democracies on the basis of David Beetham’s (1999) definition, and consider a country a 
dictatorship if it does not satisfy certain levels of political equality and popular control over 
decision-making. Basically, this implies that a country has to pass a determined threshold of 
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contestation and participation to qualify as a democracy; otherwise the regime is regarded as 
a dictatorship.3 The operational details of where to place this threshold will be outlined in 
Chapter 4.  
 
 
1.2 Plan of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 I review the scholarly debate on political 
institutions and popular mobilization, and identify the key knowledge gap motivating this 
inquiry. In Chapter 3 I present the theoretical framework, and derive a set of empirically 
testable hypotheses relating to the effects of political party restrictions on nonviolent 
uprisings. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative research design, and the properties of the 
logistic regression model, which I use to test these hypotheses.  The results of this analysis 
are reported in Chapter 5, along with robustness checks and measures of fit. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are offered in Chapter 6. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 By deciding a specific cutoff-point, the original definition is transformed from a continuous definition to a 
dichotomous one, which allows me to study dictatorships in isolation. 
	  8	  
2   Literature review 
 
No clapping is possible without two hands, no quarrel without two people, and no 
state without two entities: the rulers and the ruled. 
Mahatma Gandhi.4 
	  
Research on nonviolent resistance campaigns has grown considerably in the last few years, 
particularly following the publication of Chenoweth and  
’s (2011) book on the subject (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Cunningham 2013; Shellman, 
Levey, and Young 2013; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014; Svensson and Lindgren 2011). 
As of yet, however, the literature on nonviolent campaigns is still in its infancy. It is dwarfed, 
for instance, by the literatures on revolutions (e.g. Goldstone 2001; Goodwin 2001; 
Huntington 1968; Kuran 1989; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1993) and civil wars (e.g. Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009; Hegre, Ellingsen, 
Gates, and Gleditsch 2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Lai and Slater 2006; Peceny, Beer, 
and Sanchez-Terry 2002). Hence, important questions remain unanswered regarding the 
causes and dynamics of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 415).  
In particular, we know relatively little about the initiation of nonviolent campaigns 
(Butcher and Svensson 2014; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b; Dahl, Gates, Gleditsch, and 
González 2014). Yet, there do exist vast literatures on the emergence of social movements 
(e.g. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998) and revolutions (e.g. 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010), and a growing literature on popular uprisings (e.g. 
Gandhi 2008; Kendall–Taylor and Frantz 2014; Svolik 2012). All of these concepts are 
closely related to nonviolent campaigns and deal with the broader concept of popular 
mobilization. This chapter will therefore first review the lessons from the literature on civil 
resistance, and then proceed with a review of the most relevant lessons from the literatures on 
social movements, revolutions and authoritarian survival. I will concentrate in particular on 
the findings that concern the effects of political institutions on popular uprisings. I argue here 
that the literature on authoritarian survival is especially relevant for investigating the 
association between political institutions and nonviolent campaigns in authoritarian regimes. 
Crucially, the literature attempts to nuance and disaggregate the concept of authoritarian 
regimes while also addressing the effects of political institutions on popular insurrections. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Cited in Roberts and Garton Ash (2009: 375). 
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Based on insights from this literature, I identify the effects of restrictions on political parties 
as a particularly fruitful area for research. 
 
 
2.1 Theories of Civil Resistance 	  
In many ways, Gene Sharp’s (1973) seminal work, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, laid the 
theoretical groundwork for modern accounts of nonviolent resistance with his theory of 
power. The premise of the theory is that the power of the government is fundamentally 
conditioned on the obedience and cooperation of the ruled. As Sharp (1973: 16) writes, “[the] 
most single quality of any government, without which it would not exist, must be obedience 
and submission of its subjects […] Obedience is the heart of political power”. Thus, 
reminiscent of the words of Mahatma Gandhi stated in this chapter’s preamble, the logic of 
nonviolent action is to deprive leaders of their main source of power: the acquiescence and 
obedience of the ruled. Once people actively remove their consent or cooperation, a regime’s 
capacity to rule begins to crumble (Roberts and Ash 2009; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973).  
As Schock (2013: 279-280) points out, a key insight from Sharp’s study “is that violence 
is not required to topple powerful and repressive regimes. If a sufficient number of people 
refuse to obey or engage in actions that support the regime for a sufficient amount of time, 
then its power may be undermined or perhaps eliminated.” Hence, regardless of a regime’s 
brutality and coerciveness, active disobedience or refusal to cooperate will eventually make a 
regime unable to rule (Schock 2005: 37-38). Crucially, it is along these lines Chenoweth and 
Stephan (2011: 221) argue that nonviolent conflicts take place and succeed “against 
democracies and non-democracies, weak and powerful opponents, conciliatory and repressive 
regimes” and that “conditions shape – but do not predetermine – the capacity for a nonviolent 
resistance to adapt and gain advantage under even the direst of circumstances”. Accordingly, 
the nonviolent resistance approach assumes that context ultimately cannot constrain the 
mobilization of nonviolent action. Instead, nonviolent action will often be most desirable in 
the most repressive and authoritarian circumstances (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). 
In general, the assumption that conditions do not dictate the outcomes of nonviolent 
campaigns have led civil resistance scholars to predominantly concentrate on explaining the 
success of nonviolent campaigns rather than their onset. In fact, until Chenoweth and Lewis 
(2013) published an article where they explicitly compared the onset of nonviolent and 
violent campaigns, it had commonly been assumed that the sources of nonviolent and violent 
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campaigns were broadly identical (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 32). According to Nepstad 
(2011: 16), “[reviewing] the literature reveals that the causes of violent and nonviolent 
revolutions are generally the same, but armed and unarmed struggles employ different 
strategies and have distinct dynamics”. Studying the political conditions that precipitate 
nonviolent conflict has therefore received scant attention.  
However, the limited attention to nonviolent campaign onset is not just the result of a lack 
of theoretical interest. Just as much it is a reflection of methodological decisions. As Schock 
notes,  
 
The predominant research method used in the study of civil resistance has been 
the case study of movements, campaigns, or streams of contention. Case studies, 
of course, are invaluable and may provide deep insight. Nevertheless, the field is 
characterized by selection bias in the sense that most studies have focused on 
single successful cases. We lack comparative studies that focus on multiple cases 
and compare and contrast successful and unsuccessful campaigns of civil 
resistance (2013: 268). 	  
Thus, comparative assessments of nonviolent campaigns have traditionally been few. Indeed, 
among the comparative case studies that look at the emergence of nonviolent conflict, none – 
as far as I am aware - have systematically considered the role of political institutions (e.g. 
Ackerman and DuVall 2001; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005; Stephan 2009).  
Only recently have we started to see more systematic large-N studies on nonviolent 
campaigns. The publication of Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) book has spurred a sharp 
increase in the number of quantitative studies of nonviolent resistance (e.g. Asal, Legault, 
Szekely, and Wilkenfeld 2013; Butcher and Svensson 2014; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; 
Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b; Cunningham 2013; Kaplan 2013; Shaykhutdinov 2010; 
Shellman et al. 2013; Sutton et al. 2014; Svensson and Lindgren 2011). Like Chenoweth and 
Stephan these studies are concerned with comparing nonviolent and violent campaigns. They 
have focused on factors such as the effectiveness and success of nonviolent resistance 
compared to violent resistance (e.g. Svensson and Lindgren 2010; Shaykhutdinov 2010) and 
armed and unarmed movements’ prospects for democratization (e.g. Celestino and Gleditsch 
2013). Most importantly, some of these studies have also started to empirically map the onset 
of nonviolent campaigns (Asal et al. 2013; Butcher and Svensson 2014; Chenoweth and 
	   11	  
Lewis 2013; Cunningham 2013; Dahl et al. 2014). Interestingly, they reveal a clear 
divergence in the determinants of nonviolent and violent campaign onsets.  
The first quantitative study to systematically explore the determinants of nonviolent 
campaign onset was published by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013). First of all a preliminary 
study, the article was intended to illustrate how common predictors of civil war onset have 
very different coefficient estimates in the case of nonviolent campaigns. Replicating Fearon 
and Laitin’s (2003) study of civil war onset, Chenoweth and Lewis find only one common 
determinant for the onset of unarmed and armed insurgencies: population size. Otherwise the 
remaining predictors for civil wars are either completely reversed or insignificant for 
nonviolent campaigns. The only significant predictors of nonviolent campaigns are flatter 
terrain and more authoritarian regimes. This last finding is important, however, as it confirms 
Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011: 66-67) original suggestion that nonviolent campaigns tend 
to emerge in more authoritarian settings than campaigns of violent resistance. 
Cunningham (2013) performs a comparable investigation into the determinants of self-
determination disputes. Analogous to Chenoweth and Stephan (2013) she finds that 
nonviolent campaigns, as compared to conventional politics, are more likely to occur in less 
democratic contexts. This finding she attributes to the existence of institutional channels. As 
she writes, “[democracies] generally provide greater opportunity for aggrieved groups to seek 
redress through conventional political channels. As such, democracies are more likely to be 
more responsive to citizen demands and grievances than non-democracies” (Cunningham 
2013: 295). 
Similarly, Butcher and Svensson (2014) also find a negative association between the level 
of democracy and nonviolent campaign onset, further corroborating Chenoweth and 
Stephan’s (2011) original finding. Like Cunningham, they suggest that democracies are less 
likely to experience nonviolent conflict because they channel grievances through formal 
institutions. However, they also show that anocracies - the class of intermediate regimes 
between consistent autocracies and democracies – have the highest likelihood of experiencing 
nonviolent conflict. This finding, they suggest, may be due to either of the following: (1) 
anocracies make mobilization easier while reducing the threat of severe repression, (2) 
anocracies allow for some popular mobilization without meeting societal demands for 
change, or (3) the finding is an artifact of middle-range regimes being contaminated by a 
measure of political violence in the Polity IV index (Butcher and Svensson 2014: 16). This 
third suggestion is important. It points to a set of criticisms against the Polity scale that are 
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relevant for all of the previous findings on the association between autocratic regimes and 
nonviolent uprisings.  
Crucially, all of the aforementioned publications use the Polity scale for measuring 
regime attributes. The Polity index is a combined index of the level of autocracy and 
democracy in a country, ranging from -10 to 10, where 10 is the most democratic. Although 
frequently used in political science in general, the index has been increasingly questioned as 
appropriate for studying political conflict (Fjelde 2010). First, as indicated above, the Polity 
index has been considered inappropriate because the measure includes endogenous 
components related to political violence. As such, anocracies are partly defined by the 
presence of political violence (Vreeland 2008). Second, questions have been raised as to 
whether a single scale is suitable for identifying regime characteristics. According to Fjelde 
(2010: 198), “[t]he use of a one-dimensional and aggregate index [...] neglects qualitative 
differences between regime types”, as “the additive nature of the Polity scale implies that 
very different configurations of authority structures can underlie the same Polity score”. 
Thus, the Polity index is more concerned with the level of ‘democraticness’ in a country than 
variations in institutional configuration, thereby effectively reducing authoritarian regimes to 
a residual category (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). Thus, if we are to explain why nonviolent 
campaigns are more likely in authoritarian regimes, we obviously have to take into account 
the institutional heterogeneity among authoritarian regimes. I return to this point later. 
Another problem is the fact that none of the studies mentioned above feature political 
institutions or regime attributes as their main point of interest. Consequently, these authors 
have made few attempts to elaborate the association between authoritarian regimes and 
nonviolent campaign onsets. As of yet, no theoretical account on the effect of political 
institutions on nonviolent campaigns is available. In part, this is because nonviolent 
resistance scholars have typically turned to other theoretical traditions for insights on the 
emergence of mass uprisings. In particular, the onset of mass uprisings has historically been 
the domain of social movements and revolutions scholars.  	  	  
2.2 Theories of Social Movements and Revolutions 	  
As noted by Shock (2013: 280), scholars of social movements and revolution study several of 
the same phenomena as civil resistance scholars, but there has generally been a lack of 
engagement between the respective research traditions. Social movements scholars have for 
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instance been particularly concerned with the mobilization of protests, which except for riots 
are predominantly peaceful. Similarly, apart from the fact that revolutions can also be violent, 
modern conceptions of revolutions correspond closely to the understanding of nonviolent 
campaigns outlined in the previous chapter (see Goldstone 2001 for review).5 Thus, these 
literatures are worth closer inspection, particularly in light of their greater attention to 
contextual variables than the civil resistance literature (Schock 2013).  
One of the focal differences between civil resistance research and research on social 
movements and revolutions is the relative emphasis on the role of agency versus structure. As 
noted previously, scholars within the civil resistance literature have typically highlighted the 
role of agency, emphasizing how a people’s collective and active removal of consent 
eventually makes a ruler unable to rule (e.g. Sharp 1973). In contrast, scholars of social 
movements and revolution have tended to provide more structure-oriented explanations of 
mass mobilization. Theories of revolution have for instance devoted considerable attention to 
the role of economic, political, and demographic change in altering class relations and state 
structures to produce revolutions (e.g. Goldstone 2001; Skocpol 1979). Similarly, theories of 
social movements have emphasized the importance of mobilizing structures and the political 
context in determining the mobilization of social movements (e.g. McAdam, McCarthy, and 
Zald 1996; Meyer 2004).6 These accounts of mobilization thus differ markedly from the more 
bottom-up explanations provided by scholars of nonviolent resistance. 
In particular, political opportunity approaches are prevalent within both research on social 
movements and revolutions. Political opportunity approaches argue that the mobilization and 
success of movements depend on the opening and closing of opportunities created by the 
structure of the political order. They explicitly address the effects of contextual variables on 
popular mobilization. As Meyer (2004: 126) contends, “[t]he key recognition in the political 
opportunity perspective is that activists’ prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing 
supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent”. Political opportunity structures 
are thus “consistent dimension of the political environment which either encourage or 
discourage people from using collective action” (Tarrow 1998: 18). 
‘Political opportunity structures’ is a ubiquitous concept though. It is given all sorts of 
meanings in individual case studies in the literatures on social movements and revolutions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Goldstone’s (2001: 142), for instance, define revolutions as “effort[s] to transform the political institutions and 
the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied  
6 According to Schock (2005: 28), ”mobilizing structures are the networks through which the mobilization of 
tangible resources, people, and organized collective action occurs.”  
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and captures both formal and informal features of the political context (McAdam et al. 1996: 
23-31; Schock 2005; Tarrow 1998: 19-20).7 Still, four variables in particular are commonly 
associated with political opportunities: (a) increasing popular access to the political system, 
(b) divisions within the elite, (c) the availability of elite allies, and (d) the state’s capacity and 
propensity for repression (Goodwin 2001; McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 2004; Schock 2005; 
Tarrow 1998). Crucially, several of these dimensions – most importantly the extent of 
political openness - can be considered in light of the institutional structure of the regime. 	  
2.2.1 Political Institutions and the Mobilization of Social Movements  
Within the literature on social movements several relationships have been suggested 
regarding political opportunities and protests in democracies. Peter Eisinger (1973) (1973) 
and Charles Tilly (1978), for instance, posited a curvilinear relationship: neither full access 
nor its absence produce the highest frequency of protests. According to Tilly, extensive 
political openness discourages protests because less costly, more direct routes of influence 
are available. Conversely, more repressive authorities make groups unable to develop the 
requisite capacity to mobilize protests. Others have suggested that the opening or constriction 
of opportunities provoke extrainstitutional mobilization (e.g. McAdam 1999; Meyer 2004; 
Tarrow 1989). The problem with these theories is that they are mainly tailored to challenges 
in developed democracies (Meyer 2004: 132; Schock 2013: 280). Consequently, there has 
traditionally been limited attention to whether these insights are applicable to authoritarian 
regimes.  
That said, in recent years, there has been an increasing interest in applying social 
movements theory also to challenges in non-democratic and democratizing regimes (Adler 
and Webster 1995; Bermeo 1997; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Collier and Mahoney 
1997; Goodwin 2001; Schock 2005; Tarrow 1998). For instance, based on a macro-analysis 
of one hundred political challenges from 1786 to 1996, Jeff Goodwin (2001) finds that 
political opportunities are probably even more relevant for the emergence of social 
movements and revolutions in authoritarian regimes than in democracies.8 Also Schock 
(2005: 29) suggests that “political opportunities may be even more important for challenges 
in nondemocracies than in democracies, since opportunities for dissent are less common and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Sidney Tarrow (1998: 19-20), for instance, defines political opportunities as “consistent – but not necessarily 
formal or permanent – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious 
politics”. 
8 A similar conclusion is reached in a later publication (Goodwin 2011). 
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therefore any signs of political opportunity are likely to generate opposition”. Similarly, 
Tarrow (1998: 77-78) argues that political protests may be provoked by the expansion of 
popular access in authoritarian regimes, especially if a regime agrees to hold elections.  
Yet, apart from some preliminary tests by Goodwin (2001, 2011), systematic large-N 
studies of the effects of political opportunities on protests have been few (Goodwin 2011; 
Meyer 2004). Consequently, the effects of political institutions on protests in non-democratic 
regimes has received scant attention in the literature on social movements (Bratton and van 
de Walle 1997). Partly this is because most analyses of social movements have been 
conducted through case studies. Little research has systematically examined the impact of 
contextual variables on protests in general (Goodwin 2011; Schock 2013). Moreover, the 
case studies that focus on the association between political openness and political protests 
(e.g. Eisinger 1973; McAdam 1999; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1989, 1998; Tilly 1978), typically 
do not operationalize access to the political system in terms of formal institutional features 
per se, but rather in terms of de facto access to the political system (Meyer 2004). Recent 
studies on social movement mobilization in authoritarian contexts, like the ones by Tarrow 
(1998) and Goodwin (2001), have also focused primarily on the contraction or expansion of 
political opportunities and political access rather than more formal features of the political 
system like restrictions on political parties or the form of leadership selection. 
One notable exception is Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) study of democratization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Employing a politico-institutional approach, the authors study the 
effects of institutional pluralism and elections on political protests in 47 Sub-Saharan African 
countries in the decade between 1985 and 1994. Through quantitative assessments they find 
that political protests were most likely to erupt in single party regimes, followed by 
multiparty regimes and regimes that banned political parties, which mostly consisted of 
military oligarchies. Bratton and van de Walle also found that the timing of protests was 
significantly related to the degree of historical experience with political competition.9 As they 
observe, “[t]he longer a country’s institutional experience with competitive party systems, the 
sooner that prodemocracy protest was likely to break out” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 
146).  
As far as I know, no comparable study of political protests has been done featuring a 
global sample. Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) book was among the first studies to 
systematically test theoretical arguments about different kinds of dictatorships in general. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Political competition was here operationalized in the form of an index recording the years under multiparty, 
one-party, and no-party rule. 
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However, their work has helped inspire a burgeoning of quantitative research on the effects 
of dictatorial types and institutions (e.g. Gandhi 2008; Geddes 1999), democratization (e.g. 
Hadenius and Teorell 2007) and violent conflict (e.g. Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 
2002). I address this literature in section 2.3.  	  
2.2.2 Political Institutions and Revolutions 
Unlike theories of social movements, research on revolutions has historically tended to focus 
on contention in developing countries (e.g. Skocpol 1979). Particularly contextual 
explanations that emphasize the relationships among state authorities, elites, and popular 
groups have garnered attention in the field. For instance, several case studies highlight the 
resilience of fiscally and militarily sound states with united elites to revolution from below 
(Goldstone 2001: 146; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989: 497). Political opportunities like newly 
called elections (e.g. Bunce and Wolchik 2006) and succession crisis following the retirement 
of a long-standing ruler (e.g. Hale 2006) are also argued to heighten the likelihood of 
revolution. Importantly, the attributes of authoritarian regimes have received significant 
attention. Several case studies highlight the vulnerability of exclusionary regimes like 
colonial regimes and personalist regimes (Goldstone 2001; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; 
Snyder 1998). Others emphasize the relative immunity of democracies and inclusionary 
authoritarian regimes to revolutionary transformations (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989: 495-
496). According to Goodwin and Skocpol (1989: 495), 	  
Revolutionary movements, history suggests, typically coalesce in opposition to 
closed or exclusionary, as well as organizationally weak (or suddenly weakened), 
authoritarian regimes. By contrast, multiparty democracies or quasi democracies 
[…] have not facilitated the growth of revolutionary coalitions. The ballot box 
[…] has proven to be the coffin of revolutionary movements. 	  
Again, the lack of access to the political system is highlighted as an important driver of 
mobilization. Yet, despite considerable attention to contextual variables in the literature on 
revolutions, there have been few attempts to systematically test these intuitions. Partly this is 
because there have been relatively few quantitative studies on revolutions in general 
(Knutsen 2014: 495; Schock 2013).10 A common contention is that revolutions are inherently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 One notable exception is Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's (2010) study of government finance and 
revolutions. Investigating the relationship between the level of nontax revenue and revolutionary attempts, the 
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difficult to predict (Kuran 1989). Also recent work on revolutions within the literature on 
contentious politics have been primarily conducted through case studies (Schock 2013).  
Studies that have addressed quantitatively the effects of regime type tend to focus on the 
onset of violent revolutionary activities rather than nonviolent uprisings (e.g. Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Typically, these studies have focused on Hegre et al. 
(2001) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) original finding that semidemocracies are more prone 
to civil war (Gleditsch et al. 2009; Goldstone et al. 2010), findings that later have been shown 
to be driven largely by the coding of the Polity scale (Vreeland 2008).11 Two interesting 
exceptions are the studies by Lai and Slater (2006) and Fjelde (2010). Applying categorical 
measures of regime type, both articles find that military regimes are particularly prone to 
political violence, while single-party regimes seem to be exceptionally resilient to armed 
challenges to their authority. Both of these studies build directly on insights from the 
literature on autocratic survival. Crucially, I also believe that this literature can help shed 
some new light on the association between political institutions and nonviolent uprisings. 
To summarize, the literatures on social movements and revolutions deal quite extensively 
with the effects of contextual variables on the initiation of popular mobilization, and offer 
considerable attention to the importance of political opportunities. However, despite the fact 
that several of these accounts also touch the effects of political institutions, they tend to be 
more generalized. However, political access appears to be a recurring theme. Yet, apart from 
in studies of violent rebellions, its role has not been systematically addressed in quantitative 
studies. 
 	  
2.3 Theories of Autocratic Survival 
 
Inspired by theories on revolutions and democratization, a growing literature has evolved that 
attempts to explain and assess the determinants of regime stability and democratization in 
authoritarian regimes. I refer to this literature as the literature on autocratic survival. What 
sets this research apart from previous studies on the same phenomena is the desire to 
empirically map the outcomes of different kinds of authoritarian regimes. After Barbara 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
authors find few significant determinants of revolutionary attempts apart from the number of revolutionary 
attempts in the previous year. They also test the association between the size of a regime’s winning coalition – 
the number of supporters the leader needs to stay in power - and revolutionary attempts, but find no significant 
relationship.  
11 Other authors have challenged these findings on the grounds that the Polity scale incorporates factionalism in 
the midrange of its two participation components (Cheibub et al. 2010; Gleditsch et al. 2010; Goldstone et al. 
2010; Vreeland 2008). 
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Geddes (1999) provided the first comprehensive empirical study of different types of 
dictatorships on a global scale, several quantitative studies of authoritarian regimes have 
followed suit (e.g. Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 
2014; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012; 
Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013). Until then quantitative studies of political regimes 
had mostly lumped autocracies into one category, contrasting them to democracies either 
through dichotomous or continuous measures. Consequently, dictatorships have often been 
left as a residual category, without considering the heterogeneity they display in terms of 
institutional configuration. As Geddes (1999: 121) emphatically makes clear, “different kinds 
of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy”. 
Autocracies have been shown to experience great variation in terms of outcomes such as 
regime durability (e.g. Gandhi 2008; Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012), 
democratization (e.g. Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010) armed 
conflict (e.g. Peceny et al. 2002; Weeks 2012), economic growth (e.g. Wright 2008), and 
property rights protection (e.g. Knutsen and Fjelde 2013). 
As a result of these endeavors, multiple regime typologies are now available as 
alternatives to the Polity scale. The three most frequently used measures are the 
classifications offered by Geddes et al. (2014), Cheibub et al. (2010), and Wahman et al. 
(2013) (hereafter GWF, CVG, and HTW). On the one hand, these subdivisions differ 
appreciably in terms of theoretical focus and coding criteria. For instance, while GWF and 
CVG classify dictatorships according to the social origins or characteristics of the ruling 
elites, HTW base their classification on the institutional attributes of authoritarian regimes. 
Moreover, GWF stand out given that they designate personalistic regimes as a separate 
regime category. On the other hand, the three subdivisions also share some distinct 
commonalities. All three classifications include both military regimes and monarchies. 
Moreover, both GWF and HTW give significant attention to party regimes, with GWF 
designating a separate category for dominant party regimes, and HTW separating between 
one-party and multiparty regimes. Given the frequent use of these three classifications, it is 
also evident that much theoretical attention has been geared towards these particular features 
of authoritarian regimes. 
Crucially, popular uprisings have also been one of the focal points of theoretical interest. 
In fact, until quite recently, the conventional understanding in the literature has been that 
mass uprisings are the main threat to a dictator’s rule (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; 
Boix 2003; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). These events correspond closely to 
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what I have referred to as nonviolent campaigns. Like nonviolent campaigns they are 
‘popular’ in the sense that they are civilian-based and carried out through widespread 
political participation (Schock 2005; Svolik 2012: 3-5). They are also maximalist in the sense 
that they aim to overthrow or significantly change an established authority. As such, they are 
often more sustained than mere protests or riots (Geddes 1999; Geddes et al. 2014).12 
Typically popular uprisings also include the use of nonviolent tactics (Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder 2015),13 and unlike revolutions, uprisings do not include armed confrontations 
(Geddes et al. 2014: 317). Thus, the term popular uprising arguably overlaps quite closely to 
the definition of nonviolent campaigns introduced in Chapter 1, and perhaps even closer than 
the broader terms social movements, protests and revolutions. It is therefore surprising that 
this literature has received such limited attention from civil resistance scholars (Chenoweth 
2015).  	  
2.3.1 Political Parties and Popular Uprisings 
All dictators face threats from the masses, and thus carefully have to balance against the 
majority excluded from power. As dictators by definition hold power without popular 
consent, they become vulnerable to popular challenges to their rule (Bueno de Mesquita, 
Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Svolik 2012). Yet, authoritarian regimes vary greatly in 
terms of the relative threat to their rule. While some face strong and pressing opposition, 
others seem largely invulnerable to popular challenges. To explain these differences, scholars 
of authoritarian politics have highlighted two central mechanisms: repression and co-optation 
(Fjelde 2010; Svolik 2012). Repression is pervasive in many authoritarian regimes, and has 
repeatedly been identified as one of the key ways that dictators preclude regime change (e.g. 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Boix 2003; Wintrobe 1998). Yet, autocrats do not remain in 
power solely through the use of coercion. Positive incentives are also argued to play a key 
role in soliciting cooperation. In return for compliance, the dictator promises potential 
opponents and the opposition offers of spoils such as power positions, rents or policy 
concessions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).  
A central claim in the literature on authoritarian survival is that the success of both 
coercion and co-optation strategies hinge on the institutional configuration of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Although scholars of authoritarian politics have mainly been concerned with uprisings against governments 
or political leaders, these campaigns could also pursue territorial goals like increased autonomy or secession, 
such as in the former USSR and Yugoslavia. 
13 While they may also include the use of violent tactics, armed confrontations with government authority are 
more commonly referred to as insurgencies (Geddes et al. 2014: 317). 
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authoritarian regime (e.g. Boix and Svolik 2013; Fjelde 2010; Geddes 1999; Hadenius and 
Teorell 2007; Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). In particular, the literature has 
devoted considerable attention to the role of political parties in precluding popular 
mobilization (e.g. Gandhi 2008; Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2010; Svolik 2012). Political parties 
are the most widespread instrument of authoritarian control in dictatorships, and have been 
singled out as especially effective at coopting both present and potential opposition (see 
Magaloni and Kricheli 2010 for review). Single and dominant party regimes also tend to 
maintain vast repressive apparatuses, and have been very successful in subordinating the 
military to political control (Peceny et al. 2002; Svolik 2012). In general, the effect of 
political parties has received significant attention in empirical studies of authoritarian 
survival (see also Boix and Svolik 2013; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012), and has also been 
noted in case studies of nonviolent resistance (e.g. Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005). Hence, this 
topic seems like a fruitful starting point for exploring the institutional determinants of 
nonviolent campaigns.  
Although political parties are widely conceived as important contributors to the survival 
of numerous dictatorships, there is nevertheless some disagreement as to exactly why 
political parties are such apt instruments of authoritarian control. In particular, much debate 
has centered on whether allowing a single party or allowing multiple parties provides the 
most effective means of co-optation. In large part, this contention stems from different 
opinions on who constitute the primary targets of party co-optation. To be specific, scholars 
typically specify different targets of co-optation depending on whether their theoretical focus 
is on the regime party or opposition parties. Regime-sanctioned parties have been argued to 
be significant in retaining the support of ruling elites (Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 
2010) and co-opting ideologically close segments of the population (Svolik 2012), while 
opposition parties have been noted as crucial in co-opting the external opposition, i.e. the 
population at large (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Depending on who are 
identified as the main targets of co-optation, we arrive at different suggestions regarding 
whether permitting one or several parties constitutes the best instrument of co-optation.  
If the primary target of co-optation is the ruling elite and ideologically proximate 
segments of the population, then dictatorships with single-party dictatorships are arguably 
superior in co-opting potential dissidents. Several authors have highlighted the relative 
immunity of dominant and single-party autocracies to internal splits (Boix and Svolik 2013; 
Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012). Regime parties are 
instrumental in enforcing power-sharing deals that prevent defections from both the dictator 
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and his allies. Regime parties entail both regular interaction and formal rules of interaction 
that increase transparency and facilitate the detection of the dictator’s noncompliance (Svolik 
2012). By controlling succession and access-to-power positions, party regimes give party 
cadres and ideologically proximate segments of the population the incentive to invest in the 
regime under the anticipation that they will eventually be promoted into rent-paying-positions 
(Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012). However, as Magaloni (2008) suggests, 
multiparty elections may undermine the credibility of these power-sharing deals by 
heightening the risk of an electoral split. Elite cohesion is thus more fragile in multiparty 
autocracies, as the dictator has to distribute more spoils to prevent defections. Consequently, 
the value of the private rents accrued to each party member decreases and therefore also the 
pay-offs from investing in the current regime (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Fjelde 2010). 
However, if the primary target of co-optation is the general opposition, then multiparty 
legislatures and elections provide important venues for dissent that are not available in single-
party regimes. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008), for instance, expect 
multiparty autocracies to be better at co-opting the opposition because they provide more 
effective forums for dealing policy concessions than countries with single-party legislatures. 
By allowing opposition parties, multiparty legislatures formalize the representation of regime 
opponents and reduce uncertainty over whether the opposition will be included in future 
bargaining with the regime. Similarly, Geddes has highlighted the role of opposition parties 
in co-opting the general opposition: 	  
Single-party regimes survive in part because their institutional structures make it 
relatively easy for them to allow greater participation and popular influence 
without giving up their dominant role in the political system. Most single-party 
governments have legalized opposition parties and increased the space for 
political contestation. (1999: 135) 	  
This suggestion is congenial to Schedler’s (2002) argument that multiparty elections 
encourage both rulers and the opposition to invest in these institutions. As the author writes, 
“once elections cross a hard-to-specify but real threshold of openness and competitiveness 
[…] elections stop being shams and start playing ‘enough of a role in the constitution of 
power’ to compel both rulers and opposition forces ‘genuinely to care’ about them” (Schedler 
2002: 38). They become “constitutive of the political game” (Schedler 2009: 387). By 
contrast, regimes that only allow one party do not encourage the opposition to invest in 
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political institutions to the same extent. Although single-party regimes are more inclusive and 
provide greater access to the political arena than regimes that ban political parties, they still 
do not institutionalize access like multiparty autocracies (Gandhi 2008).  
The key point to realize here is that these accounts are not necessarily as incompatible as 
some of the authors suggest (Magaloni 2008). Regime parties and multiparty competition 
may both be significant co-optation strategies, but directed at different audiences. Single-
party and dominant party regimes have been shown to be less vulnerable to elite defections 
and coup d’états than for instance competitive authoritarian regimes and military regimes 
(Geddes 1999; Svolik 2012). Yet, this does not necessarily make them more apt at soliciting 
the cooperation of the population at large. Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (2003, 
2010), for instance, suggest that regimes with broader ruling coalitions – typically multiparty 
regimes – are more susceptible to internal splits, but less prone to revolutionary attempts than 
regimes with smaller ruling coalitions (e.g. single-party regimes, monarchies and military 
regimes). Correspondingly, the literature reviewed above also suggests that the same 
mechanisms that make multiparty autocracies more prone to internal splits than single-party 
autocracies actually make them less likely to incite popular uprisings. Magaloni’s comment 
on the role of multiparty elections is telling:  	  
This course of action is not available in single-party regimes, where potential 
rivals can only attempt to challenge the dictator through violent means (e.g. by 
seizing power through a military coup, mounting a costly rebellion, or risking 
repression by organizing a subversive coalition or mobilizing one’s followers into 
the streets). Thus, where multiparty competition is allowed, potential rivals 
possess two alternative courses of action: engage in violence or compete for 
power through elections (this second option is less costly). (2008: 13) 	  
Thus, although multiparty competition heightens the risk of elite defections, it also provides 
the opposition and potential rivals with an alternative venue for mobilization that is far less 
costly than extralegal action. As Geddes et al. (2014: 327) contend, “Popular uprisings may 
be one of the few opposition strategies available […] where autocratic regimes have 
prevented the development of mass opposition party networks”. Hence, it can be argued that 
multiparty elections encourage both potential opponents and the opposition to challenge 
rulers through conventional channels rather than through a nonviolent uprising. 
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2.3.2 Empirical contributions 
As the label suggests, quantitative studies of authoritarian survival have predominantly 
focused on the survival of authoritarian regimes rather than their exposure to potentially 
regime-destabilizing threats. As such, regime change has been analyzed primarily through the 
use of quantitative techniques such as survival analyses or Markov chains (Gandhi 2008; 
Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010), 
which model the relative length of different regime types and their likelihood of regime 
transitions. The unit of analysis has therefore typically been the length of the tenure of 
authoritarian rulers, ruling coalitions or regimes. In terms of their findings, a majority of 
these studies have highlighted the resilience of single-party regimes and monarchies, as well 
as the relative instability of military regimes and multiparty autocracies (Hadenius and 
Teorell 2007; Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). 
Crucially, one cannot infer directly from these studies whether single-party regimes are 
less likely to experience popular uprisings. An important point made by more recent 
contributions within the literature is that popular uprisings have not – as has commonly been 
suggested - been the most frequent source of nonconstitutional leader exit in authoritarian 
regimes. Instead, the by far most prominent method of ousting leaders in the 20th century was 
coup d’états, i.e. the forced removal of authoritarian leaders by regime insiders (Goemans et 
al. 2009; Kendall–Taylor and Frantz 2014; Svolik 2012).14 By Svolik’s (2012: 5) estimates, 
only 11 percent of the nonconstitutional leader exits in authoritarian regimes between 1946-
2008 were due to popular uprisings. The comparative figure for coup d’états is 68 percent. 
Certainly, popular uprisings have become far more common the last few decades, and have 
been responsible for the majority of authoritarian leader exits the last two decades (Kendall–
Taylor and Frantz 2014). Nevertheless, the general implication is that the majority of the 
extant literature has not analyzed popular uprisings per se, and that we may find different 
results if we limit the analysis to nonviolent uprisings.  
Still, two studies stand out, and merit particular attention. The first study was conducted 
by Jennifer Gandhi (2008), and investigates the impact of the number of legislative parties on 
the length of chief executives’ tenures (see also Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).15 By right-
censoring deaths in office and controlling for coup d’états and civil wars, her analysis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Note that Svolik’s (2012) definition of coup d’états includes both removals by the military and other regime 
insiders. 
15 Her explanatory variable, Institutions, is an ordinal variable counting the number of legislative parties. The 
variable is coded 2 if the dictatorship has a legislature with multiple political parties, 1 if all legislative seats are 
held by the regime party, and 0 if either parties are banned or the legislature is closed. 
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provides a closer approximation to the effects of political parties on popular uprisings than 
some of the studies mentioned above. Importantly, her results reveal no significant 
relationship between the number of legislative parties and the length of tenure in office. 
However, according to Gandhi this does not constitute a null finding. Instead, it should be 
interpreted as a sign that political parties do have an effect on political survival, because 
dictators are able to respond with the appropriate levels of institutionalization to neutralize 
dissent. Thus, although regimes with higher levels of institutionalization face stronger 
opposition movements and are more dependent on cooperation, they still face no higher risk 
of rebellion. 
In another influential study, Milan Svolik (2012) investigates the impact of legislatures 
and political parties on authoritarian stability. Unlike the majority of previous accounts he 
also studies the impact of political parties on coups and uprisings separately. In the case of 
uprisings he finds a significant, albeit weak, association between the presence of political 
parties and the length of authoritarian ruling coalitions.16 Crucially, he attributes these 
findings to the ability of party regimes to institutionalize power-sharing, which he argues 
make them more capable of withstanding challenges from the masses. In particular, he 
highlights the role of strong regime parties in facilitating power-sharing and authoritarian 
control, and identifies single-party and dominant party regimes as the most durable regimes 
overall. 
Despite arriving at different conclusions, both authors suggest that political parties play 
instrumental roles in reducing the threats of popular rebellions. However, none of the studies 
reviewed above investigate whether party regimes are less exposed to popular uprisings in 
general. Although the onset of nonviolent uprisings is certainty different from the success of 
nonviolent uprisings, several of these insights should carry relevance for the mobilization of 
nonviolent movements, particularly those movements that aim for regime change. Gandhi’s 
account, for instance, in theory encompasses both successful and unsuccessful campaigns 
(2008: 143). Judging by the literature reviewed above, I also argue that her account holds 
particular promise for explaining the mobilization of nonviolent uprisings. Yet, based on the 
insights from Svolik (2012) and others, it seems doubtful whether we can expect such a 
uniform effect of the level of institutionalization on the risk of nonviolent uprisings. 
Moreover, none of the authors consider how regime duration plays into this calculation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Note that Boix and Svolik (2013) also briefly assess the impact of having political parties on the likelihood of 
popular revolts. Mainly their study is concerned with coup d’états. Their findings are nonetheless congenial to 
those in Svolik (2012). 
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Thus, in the next chapter I present a theoretical framework that attempts to combine these 
lessons with theoretical and empirical insights on nonviolent campaigns. 
To summarize, the literature on authoritarian survival provides more detailed discussions 
of the role of political institutions in authoritarian regimes than comparable discussions in the 
literatures on social movements, revolutions, and civil resistance. Thus, although the 
literature on authoritarian survival highlights some of the same factors as the literatures on 
social movements and revolutions - including the role of political access - the literature 
provides more specific explanations of the role of particular institutional traits. Furthermore, 
some of these lessons appear to carry particular relevance for explaining nonviolent 
campaigns, especially writings on political parties and co-optation. 
 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have reviewed the scholarly debate on political institutions and political 
mobilization, focusing in particular on the initiation of mass uprisings in authoritarian 
regimes. Following an inspection of the most relevant insights from the literatures on civil 
resistance, social movements, and revolutions, I identified the literature on authoritarian 
survival as a particularly fruitful reference point for studying civil resistance in authoritarian 
regimes. Specifically, I argued that some of the literature’s lessons on the effects of 
restrictions on political parties should carry direct relevance to the onset of nonviolent 
campaigns. These lessons relate particularly to the role of party co-optation, which is argued 
to be instrumental in channeling popular dissent. The next chapter will present a theoretical 
framework that builds directly on these insights. 
In conclusion, I want to stress the relevance of studying the determinants of nonviolent 
campaigns for scholars writing about social movements, revolutions, and authoritarian 
survival. As suggested here, these literatures have not only studied much of the same 
phenomena, but have also traced similar patterns and produced comparable insights. Hence, 
studying the mobilization of civil resistance can deepen our understanding of social 
movements, revolutions and authoritarian survival as well. 
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3  Theory 
 
Dictators are not in the business of allowing elections that could remove them 
from their thrones. 
Gene Sharp (2012: 6). 
	  
This chapter presents a theoretical framework for how political institutions affect the 
mobilization of nonviolent uprisings. In particular, I wish to address the effect of political 
parties on the propensity of civilians to engage in nonviolent uprisings in authoritarian 
regimes. As argued in the previous chapter, political parties and party regimes have been 
given extensive attention in the literature on authoritarian survival, but merit more attention 
in the case of nonviolent campaigns. Therefore, I opt for an integrative approach that draws 
on both research traditions to explain the association between autocratic regimes and 
nonviolent uprisings.  
The general argument presented here is that the level of restrictions on political parties 
serves as a key determinant of whether the opposition chooses to pursue regime change 
through institutional channels, as opposed to nonviolent direct action. However, this 
‘channeling effect’ is neither linear across different levels of institutionalization, nor constant 
over time. Dictatorships face varying levels of opposition and differ in their ability to co-opt 
opposition. Moreover, dictatorships experience different patterns over time, depending on the 
type of institutions that are established. Hence, authoritarian regimes should display 
predictable differences in their ability to prevent nonviolent uprisings. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. I start off by presenting the basic premises and 
theoretical backdrop of the theory. Next, I present two models: a general model and a 
conditional model. In the first model authoritarian rulers face a significant dilemma when 
confronted with a stronger opposition. Although permitting more political parties can be 
important in facilitating co-optation, allowing more than one party is also associated with a 
greater risk of internal defections. Thus, single-party regimes should be particularly reluctant 
to reform, and will tend to underinstitutionalize in the face of a stronger opposition. The 
second model provides an extension of the general model, and posits that the effects of 
political party restrictions are conditioned on the duration of a regime. It suggests that the 
stabilizing properties of allowing multiple parties should decline over time. The main 
implications of the two models are (1) single-party regimes face a higher risk of nonviolent 
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uprisings than both no-party and multiparty autocracies, and (2) the impact of regime 
duration should be higher in multiparty autocracies than in single-party and no-party regimes. 
 
 
3.1 Refinements to Civil Resistance Theory 
 
The key notion of Sharp’s (1973) theory of power – and much subsequent work within the 
literature on nonviolent resistance - is that active disobedience and refusal to cooperate will 
eventually make the regime unable to rule. No government can rule without the obedience 
and submission of its subjects (see also Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005, 2013). 
Though striking, scholars on authoritarian politics suggest that this assertion is overly 
simplistic. First, it ignores the extent to which regimes are dependent on cooperation and the 
relative strength of the opposition (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Second, regimes may vary 
in their ability to prevent mobilization and ensure cooperation (e.g. Svolik 2012). Several 
scholars suggest that these factors are intrinsically related (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
2010; Pepinsky 2014). The stronger the opposition, the more likely is the regime to respond 
with new measures to curtail its strength. Hence, to understand where and when the 
opposition is likely to mount a rebellion we have to factor in the effects of both regime 
capacity and opposition strength (Gandhi 2008). 
In general, the problem is not that civil resistance scholars do not recognize these aspects, 
but rather that they are largely left unaddressed. The importance of leverage is duly noted in 
the civil resistance literature (Schock 2013: 283). Leverage refers to “the capacity of a 
challenge to sever the opponents from the sources of power upon which it depends, either 
directly or through allies or third parties” (Schock 2013: 283). Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011: 45, 221), for instance, admit that it may be harder for civil resistance campaigns to 
achieve leverage vis-à-vis some regimes than others, noting the resilience of rentier states to 
domestic pressures.17 However, because civil resistance scholars are mainly concerned with 
the success of nonviolent movements, discussion has mostly revolved around how 
movements can take advantage of political, economic and moral dependence relations 
between the oppressors and the suppressed, rather than where movements can have more or 
less influence (Schock 2013). As such, it has been more important to show that revolutions 
can occur anywhere, rather than studying the extent to which they do occur anywhere. Partly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 By rentier states, they refer to regimes that “rely on external sources, including export sales in natural 
resources, tourism, and economic aid for a sizable portion of net income” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 45). 
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the focus on campaign success is also due to the literature’s privilege of agency over 
contextual factors (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 3). 
In particular, acknowledging that different regimes are more or less dependent on the 
opposition is crucial if we are to study the effects of political institutions on nonviolent 
uprisings. Otherwise, we risk committing serious methodological errors. For one, we ignore a 
potential endogeneity issue: the initial choice of political institutions in a country may be 
dependent on the strength of the opposition and the need for cooperation. In fact, this is a 
common claim within the literature on authoritarian politics. For instance, Gandhi and 
Przeworski’s (2006) main argument is that the level of institutionalization and the number of 
legislative parties in dictatorships is a direct response to the strength of the opposition and the 
need for cooperation. Similarly, Svolik (2012: 10-11) claims that military dictatorships tend 
to arise in circumstances when it is critical to suppress the opposition. As he notes,  
 
[M]any dictators do not have much leeway when deciding how much to rely on 
soldiers for repression. In regimes that face mass, organized, and potentially 
violent opposition, the military is the only force capable of defeating such threats 
(Svolik 2012: 10).  
 
Correspondingly, Powell (2012) has shown that military coup d’états become more likely 
with a rising level of mass threats.18 Thus, if we do not consider the initial strength of the 
opposition, we risk confounding effects of political institutions with effects of opposition 
strength.  
Furthermore, we risk inducing omitted variable bias. When considering the effects of 
regime type, for instance, discernible effects of institutions may in fact be attributable to 
other factors that affect the opposition’s strength and the opposition’s leverage against the 
regime, such as the level of manufacturing to GDP, the extent of urbanization or the level of 
mineral exports (Butcher and Svensson 2014; Dahl et al. 2014). Recognizing the potential 
effect of contextual variables is crucial if we are to establish any independent effects of 
political institutions. Accordingly, the fundamental question we have to ask is whether, once 
established, the institutional set-up of a regime has an independent effect on the probability of 
nonviolent campaign onsets. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Mass threats is operationalized as the presence of assassinations, purging of governmental officials, guerilla 
activity, protests, riots, and strikes as coded by Banks (2001). 
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3.2 Party-based Co-optation and the Threat of Rebellion 
 
In order to explain the dynamic between opposition strength, political party restrictions and 
nonviolent uprisings, I use the theory of Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008) as 
a theoretical backdrop. Their theory is particularly relevant for my purposes, given their focus 
on popular uprisings. The crux of this argument is that dictators respond to an increased level 
of mass threats with political parties, and that these institutions in turn help dictators 
encourage cooperation and thwart rebellion. The assumption is that parties emerge as a best 
response when there is a strong and polarized opposition. Dictators will be reluctant to rely 
on political parties because they widen the number of people eligible for sharing the spoils of 
office. Thus, when faced with weak opposition the dictator may see no need for political 
parties: the dictator can just as easily distribute spoils without these institutions. In contrast, 
when the dictator is more dependent on cooperation and faced with stronger opposition, 
dictators frequently rely on political parties to facilitate co-optation (Gandhi and Przeworski 
2006). Figure 3.1 provides an example of how this relationship can be modeled graphically. 
The figure shows that both the likelihood of mass rebellion and the degree of 
institutionalization are affected by the initial strength of the opposition. It suggests that while 
opposition strength has a direct and positive influence on the likelihood of an uprising it also 
has countervailing negative influence through its effect on the level of institutionalization. 
Note that in this simplified version of Gandhi and Przeworski’s (2006) model the need for 
cooperation is assumed to fall under the larger rubric of opposition strength: regimes that are 
less dependent on cooperation also tend to face weaker opposition.19 Otherwise, opposition 
strength is affected by factors such as the degree to which the opposition is organized, the 
stability of the regime, the level of repression and the international environment (Gandhi 
2008: 168). Crucially, Gandhi and Przeworski’s (2006) model posits that greater reliance on 
legislative parties serve to neutralize the initial increase in risk associated with confronting a 
stronger opposition. Thus, there should be no empirically discernible effect of the number of 
political parties on the likelihood of nonviolent uprisings. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This point is illustrated by again considering the example of rentier states. First, the population has only 
limited involvement in the production of wealth in these countries, which gives the opposition limited leverage 
vis-à-vis the regime. Second of all, these economies typically do not see the same level of organizational 
profusion as for instance countries that depend on manufacturing. The spread of organizations such as labor 
unions has been argued to be essential for mobilizing the opposition, but these are typically less frequent in 
rentier states (Butcher and Svensson 2014). 
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Figure 3.1 Gandhi and Przeworski’s (2006) model of political survival (a simplified version) 
 
The hypothesis that dictators respond with greater levels of institutionalization in the face of 
a powerful opposition is widely recognized in the literature on authoritarian survival (e.g. 
Boix and Svolik 2013; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Smith 
2005). Yet, as emphasized in Chapter 2, there are strong reasons not to expect a completely 
uniform effect of opposition strength on the level of party institutionalization. As Magaloni 
and Kricheli (2010: 127) note, the dictator will be reluctant to broaden institutional access to 
the regime when the elites’ threats to the dictator’s rule are credible. Because permitting 
opposition parties is associated with a higher risk of internal defections, dictators should be 
biased against reforms towards multiparty autocracy. In particular, if the threat of being 
replaced through a coup d’état has historically been larger than the relative threat of being 
deposed by a popular uprising, then this also suggests that single-party regimes will tend to 
‘underinstitutionalize’ in the face of a stronger opposition. Hence, we should be able to trace 
empirically discernible effects of the level of institutionalization on the likelihood of 
nonviolent uprisings.  
 
 
3.3 The Dictator’s Dilemma: Reform and Succumb 
 
This section presents the theoretical rationale for the main unconditional model, which 
identifies single-party regimes as particularly prone to nonviolent uprisings. I start with a 
simple model of popular uprisings, where I consider the role of three actors: the dictator, the 
ruling coalition and the opposition. The choice between violent and nonviolent tactics is 
discussed in the next section. The ruling coalition is composed of the dictator’s allies and 
make up the internal clique of the regime. It may include party members, military officers, 
family members, and other groups that are directly affiliated with the regime. The opposition 
is thus those segments of the population that are not directly affiliated with the regime, and 
Degree of 
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include both segments that are ideologically proximate and ideologically distant to the 
regime. 
Following Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008), I assume that no-party 
regimes, single-party regimes and multiparty autocracies differ in terms of their ability to co-
opt the opposition. Political parties are instrumental in mobilizing mass support. By including 
a larger group among the politically enfranchised, party regimes allow more people to have a 
say in politics, even if only in restricted forums (Gandhi 2008). Furthermore, by controlling 
the access to power, positions and rents through regime-sanctioned parties, party regimes also 
establish extensive patronage networks to attract those segments of the population that are 
ideologically close to the regime (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012). However, by 
legalizing opposition parties, multiparty autocracies also become more efficient at co-opting 
those segments of the population that are not ideologically proximate to the regime. Handing 
the opposition institutional autonomy serves to regularize political interaction and lowers 
uncertainty over whether the opposition will be included in future bargaining with the regime 
(Gandhi 2008). Crucially, it also gives the opposition a forum through which it can proclaim 
dissent and mobilize supporters without incurring the high costs that are associated with 
organizing a popular uprising, which often are met with harsh regime repression (Magaloni 
2008). 
Furthermore, I follow Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008) in assuming that 
dictatorships ban parties when the opposition is weak and that they allow political parties 
when the opposition is moderately strong or strong. Both maintaining elite cohesion and mass 
cooperation becomes more difficult as the opposition grows stronger. As Magaloni and 
Krucheli (2010: 137) note, “[m]ilitary officers are more likely to defect the regime if they 
perceive the masses of being capable of orchestrating a revolution, even a peaceful one.” 
Dictators therefore tend to rely on political parties under conditions that boost opposition 
strength, such as when a country is more dependent on domestic investments, less reliant on 
mineral exports and has historically had a lower level of repression (Gandhi and Przeworski 
2006; Wright 2008). Yet, these countries remain authoritarian because the opposition is not 
sufficiently strong to consolidate or push for a full transition to democracy (Levitsky and 
Way 2002: 60-61). The main exception to this pattern are military regimes, which frequently 
place severe restrictions on political parties, but tend to emerge when dictators are confronted 
with strong and polarized opposition (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012). 
Yet, I depart from Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008) in one crucial 
respect: I do not expect dictators in single-party regimes to automatically respond with 
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legalizing opposition parties in the face of a stronger opposition. Allowing opposition parties 
carries the risk of provoking internal defections, as potential opponents within the regime are 
presented with a peaceful venue for challenging the dictator (Magaloni 2008). This heightens 
tensions between the dictator and his ruling coalition, and increases the likelihood that the 
dictator will be removed, either through a coup d’état or through an election. As such, 
dictators will have an incentive to delay the broadening of political participation. As Bratton 
and van de Walle (1997) have observed in sub-Saharan Africa, “[democratic] transitions in 
Africa seem to be occurring more commonly from below” because rulers “resist political 
openings for as long as possible and seek to manage the process of transition only after it has 
been forced on them”. Similarly, Magaloni and Kricheli (2010: 127) have emphasized how 
“[the] dictator has an incentive to broaden his supporting coalition only when the opposition 
is powerful enough to threaten the stability of the regime”.20  
 
Table 3.1 Opposition strength, institutions, and the likelihood of popular uprisings 
 Degree of Institutionalization 
 Parties banned Single party Multiple parties 
Opposition strength Low Medium/High High 
Ability to co-opt opposition Low Medium High 
Likelihood of popular uprising Low High Low 	  
Table 3.1 summarizes these hypotheses. Unlike Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi 
(2008) I do not anticipate that dictators to automatically respond with a sufficient level of 
institutionalization to neutralize dissent, even if we assume that elections and the security 
apparatus enable the dictator to observe the relative need to institutionalize.21 The reason is 
that the dictator has to weight the relative loss in terms of internal cohesion against the 
relative gains of co-opting the opposition. The implication is that single-party regimes will 
tend to ‘underinstitutionalize’ in the face of a strong opposition. Therefore, single-party 
regimes face a higher likelihood of popular uprisings because their institutions are not 
designed to co-opt the ideologically distant opposition. In contrast, multiparty autocracies 
feature institutions that allow them to counteract the threat from a stronger opposition. 
Consider the case of Kenya’s nonviolent campaign from January 1990 until December 
1991. Before the uprisings, Kenyans had seen years of single-party rule under the leadership 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 My emphasis. 
21 This latter assumption is also somewhat optimistic, as regime insiders may be liable to understate the strength 
of the opposition if they secretly prefer political change (e.g. Kuran 1989). 
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of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). The country had been a de facto one party 
regime ever since the days of President Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), and became a de jure 
one in 1982, during the early years of President Daniel arap Moi’s tenure (Nepstad 2011: 97-
98). Following these restrictions, and later moves to expel party members that deviated from 
KANU positions in 1985, protests were soon starting to mobilize both in universities and 
churches. Nepstad (2011: 98) tells the story of how nonviolent action came to transpire in the 
lack of institutional channels to challenge the dictator: 	  
As Moi became increasingly dictatorial, those who sought change could not 
organize against him through institutional means since opposition parties were 
prohibited. Therefore, they had to find a free space where they could cultivate 
resistance and mobilize action. They found this space in universities and 
churches. (Nepstad 2011: 98) 	  
After having encouraged the opposition to boycott the 1988 elections, church leaders asked 
Kenyans in 1990 to emulate East Germany’s recent nonviolent revolution (Nepstad 2011: 
101). Following nearly two years of protests, and significant pressure from both domestic and 
international sources, Moi announced in December 1991 to legalize opposition parties and 
hold multiparty elections in 1992, which spurred the end of the uprisings (Nepstad 2011: 103-
104).  
Subsequently, the opposition began to organize through institutional channels and formed 
the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). Yet, internal divisions soon emerged 
based on ethnic tensions and class divisions, and FORD was consequently split into three 
parties. Despite winning popular majorities in the 1992 and 1997 elections, the opposition 
parties were unable to oust Moi from office. Each party remained determined to win the 
elections on their own accord (Nepstad 2011: 104-106). Thus, in spite of systematic 
government repression and harassment of the opposition, the opposition did not mobilize any 
new uprisings. Consequently, Moi was able to rule uninterrupted until he retired in 2002 
(Schedler 2002b: 106-108). When the opposition was finally able to unite and prevent Moi’s 
appointed successor, Uhru Kenyatta, from taking office, this was done through popular 
elections rather than non-routine direct action. 
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An equal pattern was found in Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) study of political 
protests over regime change in sub-Saharan Africa between 1985 and 1994.22 Their study 
revealed that such protests were most frequent in single-party regimes. As they argue, 
“because in practice single-party monopolies blocked or restricted the expression of popular 
preferences, citizens had little choice but to experiment with informal, even extralegal, modes 
of participation outside of official party or legislative channels” (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997: 144-145). Similarly, several years of civilian protests preceded the transition from a 
single-party to a multiparty autocracy in Taiwan (Solinger 2001: 33-34). As Schock (2005: 
119) observed in the case of The Tianmen Square Democracy Movement in China and the 
nonviolent uprisings against the Burmese military in the late 1980s, “nonviolent action may 
be the prevailing means by which an oppositional civil society asserts itself and then defends 
itself from state repression, thus promoting democratization”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure 3.2 A model of the relationship between opposition strength, institutions and the 
likelihood of nonviolent campaign onsets 
 
Furthermore, we also have to consider the possibility that institutions affect the relative 
strength of the opposition, and not just vice versa. Figure 3.2 displays this relationship 
graphically. For instance, in their study of protests in sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton and van de 
Walle (1997) found that party regimes encouraged much higher levels of pro-regime 
participation. Elections were a regular feature in most party regimes, even if most elections 
were primarily symbolic and served to endorse the ruling party’s candidates. Similarly, 
several leaders also promoted carefully orchestrated mass demonstrations as means of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 128-129) define protests as ”the frequency of mass actions directed at 
political goals. Qualifiying for inclusion are street demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, and riots. A mass action has 
a political purpose when protesters make explicit demands for changes in political rights or rulership. Political 
protests are thereby distinguished from mass actions drivene exculsively by economic grievances”. Arguably 
this definition is quite close to what I term governmental nonviolent campaigns, the main difference being that 
these protests are not necessarily as sustained and organized as campaigns, and that the latter excludes riots. 
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allowing citizens to let off steam. Yet, in the absence of political competition, increased 
political participation eventually caused frustration and encouraged citizens to pursue 
nonviolent action. As the authors argue, “desiring greater political competition, former voters 
and nonvoters therefore sought alternative channels of participation outside of elections. One 
such manifestation was protest action” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 142). Elections and 
public gatherings are noted as regular features of single-party regimes also outside Africa 
(Magaloni and Kricheli 2010: 129). Importantly, this argument carries the same implications 
as in Table 3.1. Unless the regime possesses the institutional means to channel a stronger 
opposition, then dictatorships should see a higher likelihood of a popular uprising with 
increased participation. 
 
Hypothesis 1 Single-party regimes run a higher risk of nonviolent campaign onset than both 
multiparty autocracies and no-party regimes. 
 
Finally, Gandhi and Przeworski’s (2006) model also suggests that the likelihood of an 
uprising should be no higher in multiparty autocracies than no-party regimes. The idea is that 
multiparty autocracies are able to respond with appropriate levels of institutionalization to 
neutralize the threat of a much stronger opposition. Thus, although dictatorships that ban 
parties face considerably weaker opposition movements than multiparty autocracies, no-party 
regimes have fewer means than multiparty autocracies to prevent protests from escalating 
into potentially regime destabilizing activities. This assumption appears plausible. 
On the one hand, permitting opposition parties gives a larger share of the opposition 
incentives to make their demands within dictatorial institutions rather than on the street. 
Participating in protests could lead dictators to revoke domestic groups’ privileged status and 
access to decision-making. As Lust-Okar (2005) has shown in the cases of Egypt, Jordan, and 
Morocco, opposition parties refrained from mobilizing the masses in times of economic 
crises, even though they possessed the means to do so. According to the author this was 
precisely out of fear that these groups would lose their status with the elites.  
Conversely, if party elites possess a significant political infrastructure for mobilizing 
dissent, expelling political parties should increase these groups’ incentives to rebel. This was 
evident in both the Philippines and Nepal, where opposition parties prevailed as underground 
organizations despite being banned under the constitution, and were instrumental in 
organizing the nonviolent campaigns that took place in 1986 and 1990 (Nepstad 2011: 110-
118; Schock 2005: 69-79; Teorell 2010: 111). This suggests that allowing multiple parties 
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could be important in sidelining reformist elites that otherwise would be inclined to mobilize 
an uprising (Nepstad 2011: 110-118; Schock 2005: 69-79, 121-125). 
Finally, we also have to consider that most transitions from no-party regimes have been to 
multiparty autocracies rather than single-party regimes (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). In the 
cases of Morocco and Jordan, for instance, moderate opposition groups were allowed formal 
access to the political system precisely as a means to split the opposition in periods of 
economic distress (Lust-Okar 2005). In both of these cases the transitions to multiparty 
autocracy came as direct transitions from no-party rule. Thus, although it appears likely that 
regimes respond with greater levels of institutionalization to neutralize popular dissent, it 
seems less likely that this route will involve transitions to single-party rule.23  
 
Hypothesis 2 Multiparty autocracies run no higher risk of nonviolent campaign onset than 
no-party regimes. 
 
3.3.1 Precluding Nonviolent Mobilization 
A possible objection to the hypotheses above relates to Hanne Fjelde’s (2010) discovery that 
single-party regimes experience a lower likelihood of armed conflict than multiparty 
autocracies. Given that I expect the reverse pattern for nonviolent campaigns, my hypotheses 
could potentially be at odds with her findings. To explain why we should expect single-party 
autocracies to be more exposed to nonviolent movements in particular - as opposed to violent 
methods of direct action – I therefore believe we should disaggregate our conception of the 
opposition. In particular, I suggest that we have to consider the roles of co-optation and 
repression in lieu of variations in actor constellations within the opposition. Once we take 
into account these variations it becomes more evident that multiparty autocracies should at 
least temporarily exacerbate collective action problems among groups that typically rely on 
nonviolent direct action. 
 
Actor Constellations, Co-optation and Nonviolent Uprisings 
Most studies of authoritarian survival and democratic transitions treat the opposition as a 
unitary actor (e.g. Fjelde 2010; Gandhi 2008). However, to grasp the dynamics of party co-
optation and nonviolent mobilization, I believe it is necessary to relax this assumption. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Data from Wahman et al. (2013), for instance, suggest that there were 26 transitions from no-party regimes to 
single-party regimes, and 68 transitions from no-party regimes to multiparty autocracies in the period 1972-
2006.  
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Different elements of the opposition may pursue very different and conflicting goals, may 
utilize completely different tactics, and may never come to terms with each other. For 
instance, according to Celestino and Gleditsch (2013: 390), “predominantly violent and 
nonviolent tactics tend to be used by different groups and often entail very different 
recruitment bases and opportunities for growth”. Similarly, Dahl et al. (2014: 5) observe that 
a group’s initial choice of nonviolent or violent tactics tend to be “remarkably stable”, and 
argue that group motives play a key role in a group’s initial choice of tactic, whether violent 
or nonviolent. Crucially, differentiating opposition groups is important here because the 
effectiveness of co-optation strategies may differ depending on the goals of the dissidents. 
First, as Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) note, compared to incumbent candidates, 
opposition candidates in multiparty autocracies primarily attract urban, middle- and upper-
class voters. Typically, these voters tend to be highly ideological, and strongly disagree with 
current policies (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Greene 2007). Importantly, nonviolent 
campaigns tend to recruit from the same group of citizens. According to Celestino and 
Gleditsch (2013) note, “Nonviolent campaigns are often urban phenomena, which recruit 
disproportionally from students, individuals of the middle classes, or included social 
segments”. Similarly, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) emphasize how political activism and 
democratic movements tend to concentrate in urban areas and rise in tandem with economic 
development.  
By contrast, incumbent candidates in single-party and dominant-party regimes are more 
likely to receive electoral support in rural areas than in urban areas (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 
2009). Especially in single-party regime we see that regime parties tend to maintain extensive 
patronage networks that reward loyal citizens and withdraw rents from those who defect 
(Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Smith 2005). As Magaloni and Kricheli (2010: 128) contend, 
these “punishment regimes” are “particularly effective at trapping poor voters into supporting 
the dictatorship, because their livelihood depends on state transfers”. In comparison, 
“[citizens] with alternative sources of income can better afford to make ‘ideological 
investments’ in democratization and oppose the regime.” These considerations become 
especially important given the fact that civil wars tend to be fought in the periphery, and that 
rebels are disproportionally recruited from the bottom income quartiles (Buhaug, Cederman, 
and Rød 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Thus, although single-party regimes may be more 
effective in co-opting groups that potentially could resort to violent tactics, they should still 
be less effective than multiparty autocracies in appeasing those opposition groups that 
typically resort to nonviolent tactics. 
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Furthermore, we also have to consider who are targeted for political inclusion in 
multiparty autocracies, as compared to single-party regimes. Apart from the political 
inclusion of opposition elites, multiparty autocracies also tend to include a broader diversity 
of labor interests in political bargaining with the regime (Kim and Gandhi 2010). Both are 
groups that have been noted as important in the organization and success of several 
nonviolent campaigns (Butcher and Svensson 2014; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005). 
Furthermore, there are several examples of political parties that have emerged from broad-
based social movements, such as the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco, the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan (Gandhi and 
Lust-Okar 2009). Conversely, radical segments of the opposition are typically not targeted 
for co-optation. Radical Islamist parties, for example, have for extended periods been legally 
proscribed in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria (Sivan 2000: 77). Crucially, as the cases of Egypt 
and Algeria illustrate, some of these movements have resorted to violence rather than 
nonviolence in the face of exclusion (Diamond 2010).  
Finally, other groups could conceivably have no interest in participating through 
nominally democratic institutions. Groups pursuing the radical transformation of society as 
whole – such as the transition to Communism or the imposition of Sharia law – may find it 
impossible to do so by any other means than armed struggle. For instance, the armed wing of 
the Communist party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA), pursued an 
explicit and agreed-upon strategy of armed insurrection to gain power. This contrasted with 
the reformist and progressive elements of the opposition, which mainly used nonviolent 
methods of resistance (Schock 2005: 67-69). While the People’s Power Movement soon 
dismantled after the ousting of President Marcos,24 the NPA continued fighting the new 
government and remain active today (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). 
 
Actor Constellations, Repression and Nonviolent Uprisings 
To reiterate, multiparty autocracies are distinct from democracies. Although formal 
democratic institutions are perceived to be the principal means of obtaining and exercising 
political authority, multiparty autocracies “violate those rules so often and to such an extent 
[…] that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy” (Levitsky 
and Way 2002: 53). Manipulation is a defining feature of multiparty autocracies. Unlike 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 A Second People’s Power Movement was first mobilized 14 years later to oust President Joseph Estrada, 
after allegations of massive fraud (Törnquist, Tharakan and Quimpo 2009: 200-202).
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elections in democracies, elections in these regimes are subject to extensive authoritarian 
control. 
Yet, manipulation in multiparty autocracies usually tends to take more subtle forms than 
the kind of repression witnessed in closed dictatorships (Schedler 2009: 385). For instance, 
dictatorships with lower levels of party institutionalization generally tend to have lower 
restrictions on civil liberties (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014; Gandhi 2008). By contrast, 
because multiparty autocracies usually face restrictions on the extrajudicial means available 
to eliminate subversive elements, they have tended to employ alternative tactics to 
manipulate the opposition (Levitsky and Way 2002). These tactics include formal measures 
that give the incumbent an unjust advantage, such as the radical rules of proportional 
representation in Nicaragua, or the majoritarian electoral rules in post-revolutionary Mexico 
and Zimbabwe under Mugabe (Schedler 2002a: 45, 2002b: 107). Crucially, one tendency is 
for multiparty autocracies to exploit ethnic and religious cleavages that previously had not 
been politicized (Snyder 2000). In Kenya, for instance, government-financed death squads 
were actively involved in fueling ‘tribal conflicts’ prior to the elections in 1992, something 
president Moi used as proof of his prophecy that multipartyism would lead to ‘tribal conflict’ 
(Brown 2001; Schedler 2002b: 108). Another prominent tactic is the harassment of 
opposition leaders and other members of civil society, such as the systematic violence against 
opposition candidates, civil society organizations and independent media outlets in 
Zimbabwe during the election in 2000 (Diamond 2002: 32; Schedler 2002a: 44). While some 
of these strategies lead to increased violence, they frequently also generate divided opposition 
movements (Lust-Okar 2005; Magaloni 2010).  
In general, nonviolent action against a government requires great numbers and hinges on 
the expectation that others will participate (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Thus, if a 
significant share of the opposition regard conventional channels as an attractive alternative to 
nonviolent action, or simply are unable to coordinate, major nonviolent campaigns should be 
less likely to mobilize. By contrast, most armed conflicts in multiparty autocracies tend to be 
of low intensity, involve small groups and are fought over territorial disputes. It is often less 
costly to target these groups than the liberal opposition, which typically have greater leverage 
towards the regime because they control key sources of economic activity (Celestino and 
Gleditsch 2013). Coupled with the higher likelihood of coup d’états, it is therefore hardly 
surprising that multiparty autocracies experience a higher likelihood of armed conflicts than 
dictatorships with single parties. Yet, as I have shown, this does not imply that multiparty 
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autocracies should be more prone to nonviolent conflict in general. However, what I have not 
considered so far is how regime duration factors into this calculation. 
 
 
3.4 When Does the Opposition Coalesce? 
 
Should we expect the effects of restrictions on political parties to be constant over time, or is 
it conceivable that the effects of these restrictions are conditioned on the proximity to the last 
regime change? This section presents the theoretical rationale for the main conditional model, 
which stipulates that the impact of political party restrictions on nonviolent conflict is 
conditioned on the duration of a regime. Manipulation may to some extent help authoritarian 
leaders remain in power and forestall democratization, as the Kenyan case illustrates. Yet - 
just as other forms of repression - manipulation also carries a risk of backfiring. The final 
suggestion I make here is that manipulation can only go so far before it backfires and serves 
to unite the opposition, a process that is commonly referred to by civil resistance scholars as 
“political jiu-jitsu”.25 This typically happens when electoral manipulation and oppression of 
the opposition becomes so blatant that opposition parties deem it impossible to achieve 
regime change without nonviolent action. In the literature these events are commonly referred 
to as ‘electoral revolutions’ (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Nepstad 2011: 11-12; Schedler 2009: 
388). These are events where activists nonviolently organize “to transform rigged electoral 
rituals into fair elections, thereby facilitating a transition from an illiberal to a more liberal 
government” (Bunce and Wolchik 2006: 6). Nonviolent action may be mobilized both before 
the balloting and to contest the final results. Examples include the nonviolent campaigns in 
Mexico, The Philippines, Indonesia and Peru, as well as the ‘color revolutions’ in Serbia, 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Bunce and Wolchik 2006: 5-6; Nepstad 2011: 13). 
Following Schedler (2002b), I suggest that the dynamics of electoral revolutions can be 
modeled as “nested games”, where “the game in the principal arena is nested inside a bigger 
game where the rules of the game themselves are variable” (Tsebelis 1990: 8). At the same 
time as the incumbents and the opposition compete in the electoral arena, they battle over the 
basic rules that shape the electoral arena. The opposition accept the rules of the electoral 
game as a temporary compromise, “a provisional truce contingent on current correlations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 According to Nepstad (2011: 15) political jiu-jitsu “denotes the paradoxical consequences that occur when 
regimes use coercive measures against an unarmed population. Brutal sanctions expose the regime’s 
viciousness, causing sympathy for the nonviolent resisters to increase and support for the ruler to decrease—
both domestically and internationally. 
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force and open to revision in the uncertain future (2002b: 109). Their acceptance of semi-
authoritarian elections is conditioned on their ability to win elections. Thus, even if the odds 
are deliberately stacked against the opposition, semi-authoritarian elections may involve 
sufficient uncertainty for the opposition to invest in them.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure 3.3 The Ambivalence of Multiparty Autocracy.26 	  
Yet, as Schedler (2002b: 114) notes, “opposition parties face the dilemma that democratizing 
the pre-democratic electoral game often goes hand in hand with legitimizing it”. 
Consequently, although elections may potentially be meaningful, participating in them also 
involves legitimizing authoritarian manipulation. While elections give opposition parties the 
opportunity to mobilize strength, they also confer the dictator with democratic legitimacy.  In 
the absence of meaningful institutional change or electoral gains this ambivalence is 
amplified. In the presence of overt manipulation, elections are in practice reduced to 
authoritarian façades (see Figure 2). It is under these circumstances the opposition is likely to 
unite in seeking alternative measures, either to directly overturn the dictator or to manage the 
ambivalence of elections (Schedler 2002b: 117). As Nicolas van de Walle (2006: 78) 
suggested when commenting on civilian protests in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, “[in] 
many cases, it was precisely the fact the elections were unwinnable that led the opposition to 
favor extralegal means to gain power.” 
Based on this logic, I expect the effect of permitting multiple parties to be conditioned on 
the time since the last regime change, and multiparty autocracies to become more prone to 
nonviolent uprisings over time. Importantly, this expectation contrasts with the common 
belief that established dictatorships are more capable of handling contention (e.g. Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003; Svolik 2009, 2012). According to this conception instability is what 
drives contention, and dictators become less exposed to contentious actions as institutions 
become consolidated. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015: 12), for instance, suggest that “the 
longer a regime remains in power, the less vulnerable the regime is to domestic challenges. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Note: This figure is partly based on a model by Schedler (2002b: 109). 
Authoritarian 
entrenchment 
Institutional 
ambivalence 
Democratic 
uncertainty 
	  42	  
This is because regimes that endure over generations may have a depressing effect on 
peoples’ expectations about the utility of nonviolent action in challenging the regime’s grip 
on power”. What I posit here is in many ways the exact opposite; it is not instability per se 
that drives nonviolent uprisings, but rather the fear that authoritarian rule will become 
consolidated and stable. Crucially, in the case of multiparty autocracies I expect this phase to 
be in the later stages of a regime’s tenure rather that the initial phase following regime 
change.  
After the transition to multiparty elections it may be hard to determine whether election 
failure is manufactured or due to the incompetence of the opposition, and the opposition will 
have few incentives to mobilize outside conventional channels (Schedler 2002a: 42). The 
opposition is likely to have limited experience with party politics, and may use some time to 
build sufficient infrastructure to challenge the dictator in the electoral arena (Schedler 2002b: 
106). As illustrated by the initial years of multiparty competition in the post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a myriad of different parties will contend for office 
and voters are likely to be highly uncoordinated (Enyedi and Bértoa 2011). In many cases, 
restricted access to media and public funds also make electoral mobilization difficult, as 
opposition parties are dependent on mobilizing sufficient support also outside the capital 
(Levitsky and Way 2002: 57-58; Schedler 2002a: 43-44).  
Furthermore, protesting results requires substantial resources and mobilization strength, 
and the opposition parties will have to supply credible information about the actual results to 
convince voters of fraud (Magaloni 2010). This message is unlikely to stir any major 
response if opposition parties are fragmented and the electoral margin is large. Even if the 
opposition is somehow able to monitor the results, their reports are unlikely to be 
broadcasted. Thus, as Magaloni (2010: 761) observes, “partially rigged elections for which 
there is no clear public signal about fraud make it hard for society to coordinate against 
potential dictatorial abuses”. Fearon (2011: 1676) reaches a similar conclusion, arguing “it is 
the commonly understood convention of holding elections at particular times according to 
known rules, not the electoral outcome itself, that provides a public signal for coordinating 
rebellion in the event that elections are suspended or blatantly rigged”. Hence, in the early 
years following a regime transition incumbents are not dependent on using significant 
coercion to stay in power; selective manipulation may be sufficient to prolong their stay 
(Levitsky and Way 2002). 
Eventually, however, voters become more coordinated, and some opposition parties attain 
a significant enough electoral presence to constitute genuine challengers for office. As 
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opposition parties gain experience and electoral presence, they are also more likely to be able 
to monitor results and broadcast them. If elections are then repeatedly revealed as shams and 
the opposition experiences prolonged periods without any meaningful moves towards 
democracy, then the opposition should be inclined to seek alternative measures to increase 
competition. Furthermore, as Levitsky and Way (2002: 59) contends, it is under such periods 
of serious democratic contestation that dictators are most likely to rely on overt manipulation; 
otherwise they risk electoral defeat. Yet, as noted previously, repression carries a high risk of 
backfiring, especially now that the opposition can utilize its increased electoral presence to 
mobilize greater numbers and exercise greater leverage. Under these conditions, combining 
electoral participation with nonviolent action may be the only means of achieving a full 
transition to democracy. One notable example is the wave of protests in the early 1980s and 
the mid-1990s against the dominance of PRI in Mexico, where the opposition actively 
combined electoral participation with post-electoral protests (Schedler 2002b: 117; Solinger 
2001). Similarly, the democracy movement in South Korea actively combined strategies of 
nonviolent action with electoral participation in the years preceding the transition to 
democracy in 1987 (Shorrock 1986; Solinger 2001). 
A prevalent alternative to the scenario outlined above is that opposition parties remain 
small and fragmented, and regime parties become able to cement their hold. Under such 
circumstances, voters typically become increasingly disillusioned by electoral politics, 
coming to view opposition parties as politically toothless or mere extensions of the 
authoritarian regime. Importantly, as the nonviolent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 
illustrate, such a development will often also generate a civilian response. For years the 
regime parties in Tunisia and Egypt had won a clear majority of parliamentary seats: 
repeatedly above 80 percent in Tunisia, and consistently above 70 percent in Egypt (Diamond 
2010).27  Under such circumstances multiparty autocracies come to resemble one-party 
regimes, which – as the theoretical framework stipulates – should be associated with a higher 
risk of nonviolent uprisings. Although these cases are not ‘electoral revolutions’, they 
nevertheless produce the same general expectation, namely that the probability of a 
nonviolent uprising in multiparty autocracies should increase over time. 
Conversely, in the case of non-competitive regimes, we should expect the fear of 
authoritarian entrenchment to generate more contention immediately following a regime 
change. After transitions to no-party regimes, dictatorship is quickly apparent, and the fear of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Figures also drawn from Wahman et al. (2013). 
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authoritarian consolidation is present from day one. Granted that the opposition is strong 
enough, it has incentives to mobilize immediately. This is more in line with the popular 
notion of how regime duration affects contentious politics (e.g. Chenoweth and Ulfelder 
2015). Military regimes, for instance, often face significant pressures to democratize, and 
have almost ceased to exist as anything more than a transitional type of rule (Diamond 2002: 
27). In no-party regimes longer duration is therefore often a source of stability for the 
incumbent rather than instability; it is a sign that the regime has successfully implemented 
authoritarian control. Monarchies that have established dynastic succession, for instance, 
experience remarkably long tenures and relatively few threats to their rule (Hadenius and 
Teorell 2007; Herb 1999). 
Finally, in single-party autocracies there are competing tendencies. On the one hand these 
regimes are unmistakably authoritarian. Following a transition the opposition may therefore 
have incentives to mobilize supporters before the regime consolidates authoritarian control. 
Yet single-party regimes are more inclusive than no-party regimes, and may constitute an 
improvement to previous practices (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Moreover, because the 
electoral practices in many one-party regimes also tend to boost opposition strength, the risk 
of popular mobilization may increase during their lifespan (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). 
It is therefore unclear when the opposition is most likely to mobilize in one-party regimes. 
Nonetheless, the general expectation is the same: with longer regime duration the risk of a 
nonviolent campaign onset in a multiparty autocracy should approach the risk of an onset in 
other autocracies. 	  
Hypothesis 3: The impact of regime duration on nonviolent campaign onsets is higher in 
multiparty autocracies than in no-party and single-party regimes. 	  	  
3.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have presented a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship 
between political institutions and nonviolent campaigns. Drawing on theories on authoritarian 
survival and civil resistance, I suggest that the interaction between opposition strength and 
political institutions play a key role in determining the risk of a nonviolent uprising. In 
particular, I make two novel propositions: (1) single-party regimes will tend to 
‘underinstitutionalize’ in the face of a stronger opposition, and (2) multiparty legislatures and 
elections are superior in coopting moderate segments of the opposition and are therefore 
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temporarily able to neutralize a greater threat of nonviolent revolution. The main implications 
are that (1) single-party regimes face a comparatively high risk of nonviolent campaign onset, 
(2) no-party regimes face a comparatively low and decreasing risk of onset, and (3) 
multiparty autocracies face a comparatively low but increasing risk of onset. Overall, the 
current framework suggests that institutions do matter with regards to nonviolent conflict 
because they provide different opportunities for channeling contention and precluding 
popular mobilization. In the next chapter I therefore proceed with presenting the research 
design, where I specify how these assumptions can be empirically tested. Table 3.2 provides 
a summary of the main hypotheses.  
 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 
Main effects H1: Single-party regimes run a higher risk of nonviolent campaign 
onsets than both multiparty autocracies and no-party regimes. 
 H2: There is no significant difference in the likelihood of nonviolent 
campaign onsets between multiparty autocracies and no-party 
regimes. 
Conditional effect H3: The impact of regime duration on nonviolent campaign onsets is 
higher in multiparty autocracies than in no-party and single-party 
regimes. 	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4   Research design 
 
In this chapter I develop a quantitative research design for testing the main expectations from 
Chapter 3, which suggest that the level of restrictions on political parties affect the 
mobilization of nonviolent uprisings. The purpose of the chapter is thus to bridge the gap 
between the theoretical framework and the empirical analysis. The chapter is organized as 
follows. First, I describe the main properties of the dataset and the operationalization of the 
dependent variable. Second, I present the logistic regression model, which is the statistical 
model employed in this study. Third, I discuss the operationalizations of the key independent 
variables and the specifications of the main regression models. Fourth, I discuss two 
methodological challenges that represent important threats to the validity of my results, 
namely endogeneity and missing data.  
 
 
4.1 Dataset and Dependent variable 
 
In order to test the hypotheses from Chapter 3 I rely on time-series cross sectional data with 
country-years as the unit of analysis. Country inclusion rests on membership in Gleditsch and 
Ward's (1999) list of independent nation states.  
The dependent variable is a binary indicator denoting whether a nonviolent campaign is 
ongoing in a given year (1) or not (0). Data on nonviolent campaigns are drawn from the 
Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data, version 2.0 (Chenoweth 
and Lewis 2013b), which records the annual incidence of major nonviolent and violent 
campaigns in the period between 1945 and 2006. NAVCO 2.0 is an updated version of the 
original dataset used in Chenoweth and Stephan’s study (2011), which was the first 
comprehensive cross-national dataset on all nonviolent campaigns. There exist no other 
relevant dataset with comparable coverage or reliability. The Domestic Conflict Event Data 
from Banks (2011) for instance, relies only on data from a single source – The New York 
Times - to code protest events. Moreover, protests are not necessarily sustained or intended to 
bring about regime change, which also rules out alternative sources such as the Social 
Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD).28 What I am interested in here is strategic nonviolence, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Although SCAD does specify categories for protests over elections, human rights and democracy, it focuses 
on protests which are not substantially in focus here. Moreover, the database also has limited coverage, only 
covering Africa and Latin America in the period 1990 to 2010. 
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which is distinct from singular events such as protests. The NAVCO data are unique in this 
respect, and also has the advantage that they are based on a specific sampling strategy and 
rigorous inclusion criteria.  
In NAVCO, nonviolent campaigns have been identified from a broad range of sources, 
and then verified through multiple expert surveys. The coding rules are also well specified 
and transparent. To be classified as nonviolent, “the campaign must have been prosecuted by 
unarmed civilians who did not directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of their 
opponent” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b: 418). The campaign must rely almost uniformly on 
nonviolent methods, such as protests, strikes, boycotts or mass noncooperation. Furthermore, 
a campaign has to meet two additional criteria to be included in the dataset: goals and 
participation. First, there has to be proof of “a series of coordinated, contentious collective 
actions with at least 1,000 observed participants” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b: 417).29 
Second, only campaigns that at one point or another held ‘maximalist’ goals of regime 
change, secession, or the removal of a foreign occupier qualify for inclusion. For simplicity, I 
here refer to campaigns over regime change as governmental campaigns, and campaigns over 
secession or the removal of a foreign occupier as territorial campaigns.30  
There are some potential issues concerning the coding of nonviolent campaigns, however. 
One issue is that the sample is biased toward successful campaigns. Campaigns that were 
defeated early on are underreported in the data. For instance, failed nonviolent campaigns 
may not be captured by the dataset due to extreme repression or limited news coverage, 
which would bias findings towards closed and repressive regimes. However, a similar 
underreporting bias exist also in the case of other contentious phenomena, such as armed 
conflicts (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b: 420). This bias is to some extent ameliorated by 
applying a high participation threshold. The general implication is that any findings will only 
be applicable to ‘major’ campaigns that have a high level of sustained participation over time. 
Second, the inclusion criteria may be overly conservative: human rights movements for 
instance are excluded from the dataset. However, given that the substantive focus here is on 
regime change in a more narrow sense, I believe this more conservative approach is justified 
in my case. Third, coding campaign goals relies more on subjective evaluations than most of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 To be specific, a contentious event with 1,000 participants only qualifies as a campaign if it is “followed 
within a year by another contentious event with 1,000 observed participants claiming the same goals and there 
must be evidence of coordination across those events” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 417). 
30 This is basically equivalent to the approach used in UCDP/PRIO’s coding of armed conflicts, where a 
contested incompatibility may concern government and/or territory (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, 
Sollenberg, et al. 2002).  
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the other coding aspects in NAVCO, which can compromise reliability. Yet, this is a 
common concern in most quantitative assessments of political phenomena. Fourth, the coding 
of regime change may be biased towards more democratic regimes. For instance, this would 
be the case if nonviolent campaigns are systematically excluded from the data precisely 
because they take place in regimes that allow multiparty competition. This could critically 
compromise the validity of any findings regarding the association between political 
institutions and nonviolent campaigns. Nevertheless, I do believe that Chenoweth and 
Stephan’s (2011) definition of regime change is sufficiently broad to ease any doubts. 
According to the authors, regime change “indicates a goal of overthrowing the state or 
substantially altering state institutions to the point that it would cause a de facto shift in the 
regime’s hold on power” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013a) They thus focus on cases where a 
movement aims to overthrow the existing regime, which is consistent with the theoretical 
focus here.  
Overall, the operationalization of nonviolent campaigns thus corresponds closely with the 
theoretical conceptualization presented in the previous chapters, which is important with 
respect to content validity. The main concern in this respect is that the theoretical stipulations 
presented in Chapter 4 are primarily related to governmental campaigns, and not territorial 
campaigns. Yet, it has been suggested that similar mechanisms as those specified for 
governmental campaigns may also be applicable to territorial campaigns. Cunningham 
(2013), for instance, mentions how the lack of institutional political channels could provoke 
nonviolent campaigns in self-determination disputes. Running the analyses both with and 
without territorial campaigns is therefore important to determine whether the theoretical 
stipulations have any broader relevance outside governmental campaigns. Hence, I will run 
regressions using both the full sample, and a sample that excludes territorial campaigns. 
In the present analysis I will compare nonviolent campaigns against the baseline “no 
event”, instead of comparing nonviolent and violent campaigns. The rationale for doing so is 
mainly theoretical, as I am primarily concerned with the initiation of nonviolent campaigns. 
However, there is also the methodological concern that nonviolent campaigns and violent 
campaigns – as operationalized by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) – may not be directly 
comparable. In contrast to nonviolent campaigns, violent campaigns are not included on the 
basis of the number of participants involved, but rather the number of battlefield-related 
deaths. Thus, it is questionable whether a threshold of 1,000 participants is analogous to a 
threshold off 1,000 battle deaths. I therefore believe a binary dependent variable is the most 
appropriate operationalization of the dependent variable, rather than a categorical variable 
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that includes both “non-events” and violent campaigns.31 Nevertheless, I also run robustness 
checks with multinomial logit models (see Appendix D). 
In order to collect country-years with no major nonviolent campaigns, I record all 
instances with available regime data but no nonviolent campaigns as “non-events”. For this 
purpose I use the Authoritarian Regimes Data Set, version 5.0 (Wahman et al. 2013), as a 
baseline dataset. This requires transforming the original observations from campaign-year 
observations to country-year observations, similar to Butcher and Svensson (2014) and Dahl 
et al. (2014). The alternative is to identify groups that have been involved in conventional 
politics, but unfortunately there exists no such data that cover governmental disputes (Dahl et 
al. 2014: 32).32  
 
Figure 4.1 Frequency of nonviolent campaigns by year, 1945-2006 
	  
Note: The figure shows the number of campaigns, not country-years. The category 
“All nonviolent campaigns” includes both governmental and territorial campaigns. 
 
The resulting dataset covers a total of 193 countries and 5,943 country-year observations in 
the period between 1972 and 2006. The dataset is restricted to this period mainly because 
data on regime characteristics – including the main independent variables – starts in 1972. 
However, as figure 4.1 shows, relatively few campaigns (19) would be added by extending 
the study to 1960, which is the first year that I have data on all the control variables and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Butcher and Svensson (2014), for instance, use a dependent variable with three outcomes: (1) no major 
challenge to the regime, (2) a violent resistance campaign, or (3) a nonviolent resistance campaign. 
Cunningham’s (2014) operationalization of the dependent variable includes four outcomes: (1) largely 
conventional politics, (2) nonviolent campaign, (3) large-scale civil war, and (4) both nonviolence and civil war. 
32 Cunningham (2013), for instance, have used such an approach for her study of self-determination disputes, 
drawing data from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) Peace and 
Conflict Report (Marshall and Gurr 2003). However, there exists no comparable data for governmental disputes.  
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alternative regime measures. This leaves 244 country-years with ongoing nonviolent 
campaigns, of which 171 are country-years with governmental campaigns, 67 are country-
years with territorial campaigns, and 6 are country-years with both. 33 
 
 
4.2 Statistical Model 
 
The main focus of this thesis is the onset of nonviolent campaigns. As the dependent variable 
is dichotomous, I have chosen to rely on a logistic regression to perform the empirical 
analyses. In terms of estimating binary outcome variables, the logistic regression model has 
some notable advantages over the standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. First, it 
assumes that the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables is 
nonlinear, forcing the predicted values to range between 0 and 1. This avoids the problem of 
nonsensical predictions common to the OLS model, which may produce negative predicted 
values or values greater than one (Long 1997: 39). Second, the relationship between the 
dependent variable and key independent variables may not be linear. For instance, as I argue 
in the theoretical framework, it seems unrealistic to assume that the effect of regime duration 
on the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset is constant across different values of 
regime duration. Instead, the logistic model assumes an S-shaped relationship between the 
independent variables and the probability of an event, which allows the effects to vary over 
different levels of the independent variables (Long 1997: 39-40). The main difference 
between the OLS model and the logistic regression model thus lies in the assumption of the 
functional form of the true population regression function. The OLS model works from the 
assumption of a standard normal distribution function. In contrast, the logit model works 
from the assumption of a cumulative standard logistic distribution function, defined in terms 
of the exponential function: Pr 𝑌 = 1 𝑋!) = exp  (β!𝑋!)1+ exp  (β!𝑋!) 
 
where the probability of the event, Y = 1, given a set of coefficients and covariates, β! and 𝑋!, 
are attained by taking the exponentiation of the log odds divided by 1 plus the log odds (Long 
1997: 51; Stock and Watson 2012: 429-436). The logistic regression model is therefore 
expressed in terms of log odds (or logit) rather than probabilities. A coefficient estimate   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Only three countries experienced both governmental and territorial campaigns in the same year: China 
(1989), Indonesia (1997) and Nigeria (1993-1995) 
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Figure 4.2 Nonviolent cam
paigns around the world, 1945-2006. 
Note: W
orld geography as of 2008. 
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should thus be interpreted as the expected change in the log odds of a nonviolent campaign 
onset, given a one-unit increase on the relevant independent variable, holding the other 
independent variables constant. However, aside from giving a general indication of the 
direction and strength of an effect log odds have no intuitive interpretation (Long 1997: 49). I 
therefore supplement regression tables with calculations of predicted probabilities to make 
the results more accessible. 
Alternatively, one could also use the probit regression model, which address the same 
problems noted above. Because the two models tend to produce very similar results, choosing 
between one estimator and the other is usually a matter of convention (Stock and Watson 
2012: 436).34 In my case I have chosen to rely on logit regressions, as they are more 
commonly used within the literature on nonviolent conflict and political science in general. 
As the robustness checks in Chapter 5 shows (Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D), the two 
estimators produce close to identical results. 
Finally, because the statistical model is estimated on time-series cross-section (TSCS) 
data, ordinary logit and probit models are bound to be problematic. Both the temporal and 
spatial properties of TSCS data are likely to violate assumptions that error terms are 
uncorrelated and have the same variance; observations may be correlated across time 
(temporal autocorrelation) or geographical units (spatial autocorrelation), and the variances 
within different countries are unlikely to be identical (Stock and Watson 2012: 368-369). In 
OLS, autocorrelation and panel-level heteroskedasticity both lead to biased standard errors, 
but do not affect the parameter estimates. In the case of ordinary logit and probit models, 
however, heteroskedasticity is likely to generate both inconsistent standard errors and 
incorrect parameter estimates (Kennedy 2003: 268). To address potential autocorrelation and 
panel-level heteroskedasticity, I therefore implement the following measures. First, I rely on 
robust standard errors clustered on each country, which has been shown to have excellent 
properties in dealing with both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (e.g. Beck and Katz 
1995).35 To tackle temporal autocorrelation, I also include a lagged dependent variable. 
Spatial autocorrelation is further addressed by including two neighborhood variables in all 
the extensive models. Finally, I also include decade and region dummies in the most 
extensive models to control for additional temporal or regional trends. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Both models rely on maximum likelihood estimation. The main difference the two estimators is that the 
probit model specifies a moderately different cumulative distribution function.  
35 Admittedly, Beck and Katz’s (1995) article deal with “panel-corrected” standard errors rather than clustered 
robust standard errors. However, the properties of these two methods are by and large the same (King and 
Roberts 2014). 
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4.3 Operationalizations of the Independent Variables 
 
This section looks at the choice of empirical indicators for testing the theoretical propositions 
in Chapter 3. Choosing indicators that best reflect the theoretical concepts under study is 
crucial with regards to measurement validity (Adcock and Collier 2001). Accordingly, I 
account for the choice of independent variables, and present the set of control variables 
included in the study.  
 
4.3.1 Degree of institutionalization 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, no consensus exists on how to operationalize authoritarian 
regimes. No single index or categorization is withheld problems with reliability or validity 
(Cheibub et al. 2010; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Ultimately, the choice of measure 
depends on the specific research question in mind, and evaluations of how latent variables 
can best be measured empirically (Adcock and Collier 2001). Here, I rely on a modified 
version of Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) original typology of authoritarian regimes to 
separate between different dictatorships (Wahman et al. 2013).  
 
Figure 4.3 The number of autocracies in the world, 1972-2006 
 
 
The authors first separate democracies and dictatorships by drawing a threshold of 7 on a 10-
point scale created by taking the mean values of the Freedom House and Polity scores (both 
normalized to range between 0 and 10). All countries with a democracy score below 7 are 
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classified as authoritarian.36 Subsequently, they classify authoritarian regimes according to 
three different modes of accessing and maintaining political power: (1) hereditary succession, 
or lineage, (2) the actual or threatened use of military force and (3) popular elections and 
related party structure. Figure 4.3 shows the frequency of autocracies in the world in the 
period under study. 
This typology thus corresponds quite closely to the original typology introduced by 
Geddes (1999). However, Hadenius and Teorell (2007) make two distinctions, which are 
particularly important for my analysis. First, the authors separate party-based regimes in  
which only one party is permitted from party-based regimes where one or more opposition 
parties are allowed. This distinction is essential if we are to test the theoretical stipulations 
offered in the previous chapter. Second, unlike Geddes, Hadenius and Teorell do not treat 
personalist regimes as a separate category. Instead, they argue that personalism is a 
continuous trait more or less present in all regimes (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 149). This 
avoids confounding effects of personalism with what is really due to a country’s institutional 
infrastructure (Lai and Slater 2006: 115). Moreover, as Knutsen and Fjelde (2013: 101) note, 
“it is difficult to objectively operationalize and score personalism, particularly since the basis 
of power relations within the regime and control over political processes are inherently 
difficult to observe”. Instead, the main categories in Hadenius and Teorell’s classification 
rely on ‘observable’ formal institutional characteristics to a larger extent, which should 
improve reliability. 
The focus on the institutional setup of regimes also has important merits in terms of 
content validity. A common approach in the literature has been to identify regimes based on 
the characteristics or social origins of ruling elites. Geddes et al. (2014), for instance, classify 
regimes according to the identity of the leadership groups rather than formal institutional 
characteristics. Similarly, Cheibub et al. (2010: 84) separate dictatorships according to the 
characteristics of “the inner sanctums where real decisions are made and potential rivals are 
kept under close scrutiny”. By contrast, the classification in the Authoritarian Regimes Data 
Set is “based on the institutions on which [ruling] elites rely on in order to regulate the access 
to and maintenance of public authority” (Wahman et al. 2013: 21). Arguably, this makes 
Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) framework more suited to the current analysis than alternative 
conceptualizations. After all, the theoretical argument proposed in Chapter 4 relate primarily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Note that the threshold for democracy has been lowered from 7.5 since the original edition of the 
Authoritarian Regimes Data Set (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). 
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to how different regimes maintain political control and how the degree of access to 
institutional venues affect the opposition’s incentives for nonviolent action. 
A final consideration that has guided the choice of Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) 
framework over alternative classifications is the requirement that electoral regimes hold 
regular popular elections for parliament or executive office. Cheibub et al. (2010), for 
instance, also separate regimes with one party, multiple parties or no parties. However, they 
do not demand that a regime holds regular elections to be classified as a multiparty regime. 
As specified in the theoretical framework, multiparty elections are one of the main features of 
that make multiparty autocracies less prone to nonviolent campaigns. In the absence of 
multiparty elections we should not expect the permission or existence of multiple parties to 
have such a dampening effect. Nevertheless, for the skeptical reader I will run robustness 
checks with Cheibub et al.’s (2010) categorizations. Using their data also allows me to test 
whether the results hold with a procedural definition of democracy. 
Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) original classification thus separate six main categories of 
authoritarian regimes: monarchies, military regimes, no-party electoral regimes, single-party 
regimes, multiparty autocracies and other autocracies. One potential caveat with this 
approach is the danger of collapsing multiple, conceptually distinct dimensions of 
dictatorships onto a single typology. As Svolik (2012: 32) notes, such typologies tend to 
separate ‘types’ that are “neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive and often ask 
for difficult classification judgments that weigh incommensurable aspects of authoritarian 
politics”. For instance, several military regimes hold both single-party and multiparty 
elections. In order to address this problem, I use two alternative dimensions from Wahman et 
al.’s (2013) data: one for the level of party institutionalization, and one for the level of 
military involvement in politics. The first dimension constitutes the main explanatory 
variable, and separates between three different levels of restrictions on political parties: a 
regime may either (0) formally or de facto ban political parties, (1) allow one party, or (2) 
allow several.37  The second dimension controls for regimes with high levels of military 
involvement in politics (see elaboration in section 4.3.3). Both measures are lagged by one 
year to reduce endogeneity. Given the limited number of nonviolent campaigns overall, 
specifying separate dimensions also has clear advantages in terms of utilizing the available 
data. If the independent variable is too fine-grained, we risk problems with empty cells – a 
problem that may be particularly acute when applying a binary dependent variable. Fewer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The two last categories are drawn from the onep and mul dummies in Wahman et al.’s (2013) dataset. Those 
dictatorships that scored 0 on both categories were used to construct the last category of no-party regimes. 
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Table 4.1 Degree of Institutionalization by Region, 1972-2006 
 Degree of Institutionalization 
Region Parties banned Single party Multiple parties Total 
     
Sub-Saharan Africa 436 (12%) 451 (13%) 481 (14%) 1,368 (39%) 
Middle East/ North Africa 356 (10%) 121 (3%) 149 (4%) 626 (18%) 
Asia 250 (7%) 189 (5%) 294 (8%) 733 (21%) 
Latin America/ Caribbean 125 (4%) 38 (1%) 221 (6%) 384 (11%) 
Eastern Europe/ ex-U.S.S.R. 4 (<1%) 197 (6%) 176 (5%) 377 (11%) 
Western Europe/ North America 5 (<1%) 5 (<1%) 8 (<1%) 18 (<1%) 
Total 1,176 (33%) 1,001 (29%) 1,338 (38%) 3,515 (100%) 
Notes: Listed by number of country-year observations. The region categories are based on Knutsen and Fjelde 
(2013). 	  
categories ameliorate this problem, and also make sure that the data are more evenly 
distributed. As Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4 show, no-party regimes, single-party regimes and 
multiparty regimes are all quite widely distributed across space and time. 
 
Figure 4.4 Restrictions on Political Parties by Year 
 
Notes: Overall distribution of individual categories in parentheses. Observations: country-years. 	  
When combined with data from NAVCO 2.0, the new dataset covers 191 countries in the 
period between 1972 and 2006.38 143 of these countries were registered as authoritarian at 
one point or another. In total, 64% of the 5,943 country-year observations had an 
authoritarian government. Figure 4.5 compares the respective levels of institutionalization by 
Polity and Freedom House scores. No-party and single-party regimes tend to be more 
authoritarian and repressive, whereas multiparty autocracies tend to fall somewhere between 
democracies and the group of closed regimes on all dimensions. However, there is 
considerable variation within each category, especially among multiparty autocracies. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The dataset starts in 1972 because their coding is dependent on data from the Freedom House Index, which 
are only available in the period 1972-2010. 
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Figure 4.5 Degree of Institutionalization by Polity and Freedom House scores 
	  	  
	  
	  
Note: The line inside the boxes represent median values, the edge of the boxes represent the 25th and 75th 
percentiles, the whiskers represent the lower and upper adjacent values, and the dots represent outliers. 
 
 
4.3.2 Regime Duration 
To test whether there are certain conditions that make multiparty autocracies more likely than 
other autocracies to experience nonviolent campaigns, I include a separate variable for 
Regime duration. To test for a conditional effect this variable is interacted with the level of 
restrictions on political parties. Regime duration counts the number of years since the last 
regime change or since independence. The variable is backdated to 1960. A regime change is 
recorded if a country experiences a transition from any of the seven original categories in 
Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) framework. It is possible that the effect of a marginal increase 
in regime duration is larger the shorter the brevity of a regime, as regimes tend to become 
more resilient to threats over time (e.g. Svolik 2009, 2012). I therefore follow Knutsen 
(2014), and specify the variable as log of (regime duration +1)t-1 to focus on the marginal 
increase in regime duration. Figure A.1 in Appendix A compares the distribution of the 
untransformed and transformed regime duration variable for autocracies. Overall, the main 
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expectation is that the interaction between multiparty autocracy and proximity to regime 
change should be positive. 
Admittedly, it is not given that a logarithmic transformation of the regime duration 
variable gives the best possible specification, although a concave function seems more 
appropriate than a linear one. An alternative operationalization would be to construct a decay 
function where the effect of regime duration is expected to decline exponentially over time 
(Fjelde 2010; Hegre et al. 2001). Thus, to make sure that the assumptions regarding the 
functional form of the variable do not bias the results I substitute the original variable with a 
decay function as an alternative specification (see Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D). The 
results are robust to the choice of specification. 
Note also that the short time coverage (1960-) on Regime duration is also potentially 
problematic, as it can conflate the risk of nonviolent uprisings in some of the longer-lasting 
regimes with dictatorships that have been less durable. However, because I am concerned 
with the effects of changes in the institutional structure of regimes, as opposed to the effects 
of leadership changes (e.g. Cheibub et al. 2010; Geddes et al. 2014; Svolik 2012), the current 
data arguably provide the best alternative. 
Although regime duration is included in the conditional models, I do not include it as a 
control variable in the remaining models. The rationale is that including the variable may 
control for effects that are of substantive interest. Recall that the theoretical framework 
stipulates that regime duration can be a proxy for two different, but related, tendencies: 
political instability and authoritarian entrenchment. Some regimes may be particularly 
disposed to nonviolent campaigns in the early faces of their tenure, and it may seem 
reasonable to control for this effect. However, if other regimes experience a greater 
likelihood of nonviolent campaigns at later stages of their tenure, then it is ill-advised to 
control for this tendency as it may introduce post-treatment bias, i.e. controlling away the 
consequences of a variable (King and Zeng 2007). 
 
4.3.3 Control variables 
As noted previously, the present inquiry seeks to investigate whether we can discern any 
independent effect of political institutions on the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns in 
dictatorships. Thus, when seeking to explain the effect of an explanatory variable, X, on a 
dependent variable, Y, it is essential to control for the variable, Z, that potentially disturbs the 
association between X and Y. This is to avoid the problem of omitted variable bias, which 
	   59	  
occurs when a variable that is correlated with both the dependent and the independent 
variable of interest is left out of the analysis (Stock and Watson 2012: 222). In this section, I 
present the control variables that I include in my main models.  
I specify a baseline model, which includes only a restricted set of covariates that have 
commonly been used in previous studies of contentious politics: military regimes, GDP per 
capita, urbanization, natural resource revenues, population size, as well as a measure for 
temporal dependence. These controls also include some of the variables that are of key 
theoretical interest apart from the explanatory variables. A more restricted model obviously 
has clear advantages in terms of communicability. Furthermore, there is also the concern of 
adding variables that do not belong, which may reduce the precision of the coefficient 
estimates (Stock and Watson 2012: 358-359). Omitted variable bias always has to be 
weighed against the risk of collinearity (Schrodt 2014). 
However, logistic regression models are particularly sensitive to omitted variable bias, 
even when these variables are unrelated to the independent variables in the model (Kennedy 
2003: 268; Mood 2010). As Mood has shown, omitted variable bias in logistic regressions 
has the effect of giving coefficient estimates that are significantly biased towards zero.39 
Thus, the potential gains in efficiency from a more restricted model may come at the expense 
of committing type II errors, i.e. the failure to reject a false null hypothesis. In the remaining 
analyses I therefore estimate more extensive models specifying additional covariates that may 
be significantly confound the relationship between political institutions and nonviolent 
campaign onsets. I present these variables below. 
 
Baseline Model 
As emphasized previously, a particularly important control variable is the level of military 
involvement in politics. Crucially, a higher level of military involvement could 
disproportionally affect the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns in countries with different 
levels of restrictions on political parties. Unlike other no-party regimes, military regimes that 
ban political parties tend to emerge in conditions with a strong and polarized opposition 
(Magaloni 2008: 11-12; Svolik 2012: 10-11). Unlike other multiparty regimes, military 
regimes that allow opposition parties are more likely to rely on violent repression than 
cooptation (Fjelde 2010) and reserve large domains of authority from public influence 
(Magaloni 2008: 17). Thus, no-party regimes and multiparty autocracies with high levels of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Note that these problems ”also apply to coefficients from probit and most other models using non-linear link 
functions” (Mood 2010: 80). 
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military involvement may run a much higher risk of nonviolent campaigns than their civilian 
counterparts. I therefore use the dummy variable mil from Wahman et al.’s (2013) dataset to 
control for military regimes.  Figure A.2 in Appendix A shows the distribution of political 
parties by military involvement in politics.  
In order to proxy opposition strength, I include three variables: GDP per capita, 
urbanization and natural resources. As argued in Chapter 4, it is important to control for 
important determinants of opposition strength if we are to parcel out independent effects of 
political institutions. Thus, first, I control for the effects of a country’s income level by 
including Gleditsch’s (2002) estimate of Real GDP per Capita. The variable is log-
transformed and lagged by one year. Economic development has repeatedly been suggested 
as a source of opposition strength. Observing the high correlation between income and 
democracy, several proponents of modernization theory (e.g. Boix and Stokes 2003; Lipset 
1959) have advanced the claim that economic development has a causal impact on the 
likelihood of a democratic transition. Similarly, Butcher and Svensson (2014) has found a 
strong and positive association between the level of manufacturing to GDP and the likelihood 
of nonviolent campaigns. Economic modernization may increase the relative strength of 
groups that are likely to participate in nonviolent campaigns, such as the urban middle class 
or organized labor (Ansell and Samuels 2010). Alternatively, higher income may alter the 
expected material benefits from different regime types (Boix 2003).  
Second, I control for the level of urbanization in a country by including a one-year lagged 
measure on the share of people living in urban areas from the World Bank (2012).  
Nonviolent campaigns are often urban phenomena (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013). Dahl et al. 
(2014), for instance, show a strong relationship between the level of urbanization and the 
likelihood of nonviolent conflict. Studies of revolutions have also shown a similar 
relationship (e.g. Knutsen 2014). It is also unclear whether a higher income level should 
increase the risk of nonviolent campaign onset in the absence of urbanization (Dahl et al. 
2014).  Thus, both indicators of economic development should be included in the analysis.40 
Third, I also control for income from natural resources by including a one-year lagged 
variable for the total value of oil and gas production from Ross (2013).  As suggested by 
Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008), countries rich on natural resources 
typically face a lower need for cooperation and weaker opposition, both factors that lead to a 
lower levels of institutionalization and impede popular mobilization. Others have also noted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Here, I am not too concerned with the point estimates of these controls, and thus do not consider it a problem 
if the inclusion of both variables yields more uncertainty in the individual estimates of income and urbanization.  
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the high resilience of “rentier states” to popular mobilization (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
2010; Diamond 2010). The distribution of rents from oil and gas production may also provide 
and alternative instrument of cooptation (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Because the 
original variable from Ross is highly skewed, I transform the variable to per capita values and 
test the natural log of the variable, similar to Wright (2008). 
Finally, I control for two additional variables in the baseline model: population size and 
ongoing campaign. Population size is generally found to be a strong determinant of 
revolutions, and nonviolent campaigns in particular (Butcher and Svensson 2014; Chenoweth 
and Lewis 2013b; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Cunningham 2013). Data on population are 
drawn from the United Nations Statistics Division (2014). The variable is log-transformed to 
reduce the impact of very large populations. Furthermore, to facilitate a special focus on 
nonviolent campaign onsets in particular, I control for whether there was a nonviolent 
campaign in the previous three years, as nonviolent campaigns may exhibit some degree of 
path dependence. This approach is congenial to the approach taken by Cunningham (2013). 
Temporal dependence is a frequent issue when dealing with binary dependent variables in 
time-series cross-section data, and may lead to incorrect parameter estimates (Beck, Katz, 
and Tucker 1998). There are several alternative approaches to modeling time dependence 
(see e.g. Carter and Signorino 2010), but the solution chosen here seems to fit the data quite 
well: within the period covered no individual campaigns have recurred after an lapse of more 
than three years. According to the NAVCO 2.0 data, all of the 16 cases of recurrence after a 
break of more than three years are cases of new campaigns emerging rather than old ones 
reemerging.  Recognizing that there may be some additional temporal effects associated with 
having had a previous campaign, I also run robustness checks with a log-transformed 
measure of time since last campaign and a decay-function of the proximity of nonviolent 
conflict for the extensive models. The findings remain robust to these alternative 
specifications (see Table D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D). 
 
Extensive models 
In the remaining models I also control for a range of other covariates that may, potentially, 
affect the onset of nonviolent campaigns. First, diffusion effects have repeatedly been argued 
to be a common source of democratization and nonviolent uprisings (e.g. Beissinger 2007; 
Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013). Nonviolent campaigns tend to be 
geographically and temporally clustered (see Figure 5.1 and 5.2), notable examples being the 
regional diffusion of nonviolent campaigns in Eastern Europe in 1989, as well as the 
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uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010-2011. It has also been suggested that 
greater linkages with democratic states may make nonviolent uprisings more likely by 
increasing the opposition’s support base for mobilization (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013). I 
therefore control for a country’s proportion of democratic neighbors and whether a 
neighboring country had a nonviolent campaign. I created these variables by combining 
regime-type data with contiguity data from the CShapes dataset (Weidmann, Kuse, and 
Gleditsch 2010).41 I consider all countries within 500 km of a state’s borders as neighbors.42 
Second, most communist regimes received material and institutional support from either 
Moscow or Beijing, which may explain their resilience to nonviolent campaigns (Svolik 
2012: 113). I therefore include a dummy variable for communist leaders from the Cheibub et 
al. (2010). Third, polarization may also heighten the likelihood of a nonviolent campaign by 
intensifying the contention between the ruling coalition and those excluded from power 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Svolik 2012). Alternatively, polarization may make it harder 
for the opposition to unite (Schedler 2002b). I therefore control for a country’s ethnic and 
religious composition by including the measures on ethnic and religious fractionalization 
from Alesina et al. (2003).43 Fourth, there is also the possibility that ongoing civil wars could 
decrease the likelihood of a nonviolent campaign. I therefore control for civil wars by using 
the data on violent campaigns from NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b). Both the 
neighbor variables and the variables for communist leaders and civil war are lagged by one 
year. 
An additional concern is whether to control for military capacity or not. Many single-
party regimes maintain substantial armies (e.g. Fjelde 2010), and controlling for military 
capacity may make single-party regimes appear more prone to nonviolent campaigns than 
they really are. However, large military forces are also common in dominant party regimes, 
and are therefore not confined to single-party regimes (Svolik 2012: 165). Furthermore, it 
could be argued that the tendency for single-party regimes to have exceptionally large 
militaries is primarily due to the totalitarian nature of many communist single-party regimes. 
Data on military personnel from the Correlates of War project (Singer 1988), for instance, 
reveal a substantial difference between communist and non-communist single party regimes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41  I want to thank Marianne Dahl for helping me construct these variables. 
42 In the case of Islands with no neighbors within the specified range I use the regional proportion of 
democracies (adjusted to exclude a country’s own campaigns) for the democratic neighbors variable and code 
the neighboring campaign variable as 0. 
43 The two variables denotes the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not 
share a certain characteristics, in this case either ethnicity or religion. 
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with the former on average boasting armies ten times as large as the latter. These data also 
show that multiparty autocracies tend to control somewhat larger armies than non-communist 
single-party regimes.44 Given that communist regimes only make up 35% of the single-party 
regimes, it appears justified to run a separate model controlling for the number of military 
personnel. I therefore include a lagged and log-transformed measure of the number of 
military personnel from the National Material Capabilities Data version 4.0 by the Correlates 
of War Project (Singer 1988). 
Finally, to control for additional temporal and regional effects I also run separate models 
including decade and region dummies. The region dummies are based on Knutsen and 
Fjelde's (2013) classification, and are categorized as follows: (1) Western Europe with North 
America plus Australia and New Zealand, (2) Eastern Europe and (ex-) Soviet Union, (3) 
sub-Saharan Africa, (4) Asia and the Pacific, (5) Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and 
(6) Latin America and the Caribbean. I leave the final category as the reference category. 
Table 4.3 and 5.4 provide descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the main 
models. Because the main regression models exclude democracies at t-1, the descriptives are 
restricted to autocracies only to be more informative.45 I provide the same data for all regimes 
in Appendix A (see Table A.1 and A.2), as well as frequency tables of the region and decade 
dummies (see Table A.3 and A.4).  
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 1973-2006, autocracies only 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Missing 
Ln Regime durationt-1 2.188 0.973 0 3.850 3430 0 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 7.901 1.119 4.889 13.237 3362 68 
Urban populationt-1 41.177 22.876 2.716 100 3265 165 
Ln Natural resourcest-1 0.305 0.718 0 4.502 3178 252 
Ln Populationt-1 8.764 1.781 4.149 14.100 3375 24 
Democratic neighborhoodt-1 0.237 0.256 0 1 3408 22 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.518 0.260 0 0.930 3251 179 
Religious fractionalization 0.427 0.247 0.002 0.860 3274 156 
Ln Military personnelt-1 3.562 1.761 0 8.466 3328 102 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The respective means of communist and non-communist single party regimes were 822,000 military 
personnel and 82,000 military personnel. Multiparty autocracies had on average 112,000 military personnel.  
45 Democracies are included in the final robustness checks (see Appendix D).  
	  64	  
Table 4.3 Frequency tables for binary variables 1973-2006, autocracies only 
Variable 0 1 Total Missing 
Nonviolent campaign onset 3226 204 3430 0 
No-party regimet-1 2275 1155 3430 0 
Single-party regimet-1 2439 991 3430 0 
Multiparty autocracy-1 2146 1284 3430 0 
Democracyt-1 0 0 0 0 
Military regimet-1 2542 888 3430 0 
Neighboring campaign t-1 2511 898 3409 21 
Communist t-1 3062 361 3423 7 
Civil wart-1 2802 628 3430 0 
 
 
4.4 Methodological challenges 
 
Although the framework presented so far should be well suited for testing the hypothesized 
effects of political institutions on nonviolent campaign onsets, two potential sources of bias 
remain that merit particular attention. The first methodological challenge concerns the causal 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. The second 
challenge relates to problems with missing data. Both represent important threats to the 
validity of my results.  
 
4.4.1 Endogeneity 
One of the key threats to the validity of the present inquiry relates to the problem of 
establishing the causal relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable. This problem is also referred to as the problem of endogeneity, which arises when 
an independent variable is correlated with the error term. The practical implication of 
endogeneity is that coefficient estimates become biased, and it becomes hard to determine the 
causal direction between two variables (Stock and Watson 2012: 461-462). The problem of 
endogeneity is a substantial issue when analyzing both the origin and effects of political 
institutions. Przeworski (2004) goes as far as suggesting that regime types are epiphenomena, 
and thus the conditions that foster their creation, rather than the regimes themselves, should 
be the subject of inquiry. Endogeneity is also likely to be prevalent when studying the effects 
of political institutions on nonviolent campaigns. First, there is the previously noted problem 
of omitted variable bias: findings on the association between political institutions and 
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nonviolent campaigns may be driven by the underlying influence of opposition strength. This 
should complicate any causal inferences regarding the effects of political institutions. Second, 
there is the problem of reverse causality: several transitions to multiparty autocracies have 
been direct consequences of nonviolent campaigns (e.g. Greece in 1974 and Poland in 1989). 
Not accounting for this tendency could lead one to conclude that multiparty autocracies are 
more prone to nonviolent campaigns than what they really are.  
The ideal solution to the endogeneity problem would be to run a so-called instrumental 
variables regression, which is commonly used to determine whether a relationship between 
two variables is causal or not (see e.g. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). However, this 
approach depends on identifying an instrument that is both correlated with the explanatory 
variable and exogenous to the dependent variable, which is genuinely hard to find (Stock and 
Watson 2012: 463). I therefore rely on two alternative measures to retain the exogeneity of 
the independent variables to nonviolent campaigns. First, I try to control for some of the most 
relevant sources of opposition strength, such as the level of economic development and 
natural resource revenue. This arguably provides more comparable conditions for testing 
whether there are independent effects of political institutions on nonviolent campaigns. 
Second, I lag all time-varying covariates by one year. This is a common way of addressing 
endogeneity, as it empirically delineates cause and effect (see e.g. Hadenius and Teorell 
2005). Admittedly, these solutions do not eliminate the potential endogeneity problem 
altogether.46 However, this is where the strength of the theoretical framework comes into 
play: if the association between political institutions and nonviolent campaigns is entirely 
endogeneous, then we should expect multiparty autocracies to have a higher likelihood of 
nonviolent campaigns than no-party and single-party regimes. Otherwise, we arguably have 
evidence of “the channeling effect” hypothesized in Chapter 4. 
 
4.4.2 Missing data 
A final issue applicable to the majority of quantitative research on authoritarian politics is 
problems with missing data. Missing data are pervasive, as dictatorships are both more liable 
to misrepresent or obstruct data collection, and often constitute the most difficult conditions 
to collect data (Honaker and King 2010). Sample selection bias can potentially be a grave 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For instance, lagging the covariates may not be sufficient if current values on both the dependent variable and 
the independent variables are highly autocorrelated with past values (Knutsen 2011: 168). Furthermore, it is 
practically inconceivable to control for all relevant variables related to opposition strength. 
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threat to causal inferences, as it typically lead to both inconsistent and biased estimates 
(Stock and Watson 2012: 360). 
Here, I have taken careful measures to avoid missing data by identifying sources with 
comparatively wide coverage. Nevertheless, some of these indicators still lack data, 
particularly the variables on urbanization, oil and gas value, and fractionalization (see Table 
5.2). Consequently, about 11% of the country-year observations are left out through listwise 
deletion in the main extensive models, including 14% of the country-years with nonviolent 
campaigns.47 In general, this is a relatively modest amount of missing units compared to what 
has been common in quantitative work on authoritarian politics (e.g. Boix and Svolik 2013; 
Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012). As such, missing data arguably pose only a moderate threat, and 
I therefore employ listwise deletion in the main analyses. 
Still, although the level of missingness is relatively modest, there is no guarantee that 
listwise deletion will not bias the results. For listwise deletion to be appropriate, the 
researcher must assume that data are missing completely at random (MCAR); whenever it is 
possible to predict the probability that a cell is missing, this assumption is violated. This is 
often an overly optimistic assumption, particularly in panel data (King, Honaker, Joseph, and 
Scheve 2001: 50-53).48 In my case, this assumption does not seem to hold. Data on individual 
countries are lacking altogether, and there seems to be a pattern in which countries are 
lacking data. As Table 4.3 shows, a considerably higher number of single-party regimes lack 
observations on one or several of the control variables (see also Table A.5 in the Appendix). 
These regimes have about 18% missing observations, compared to 8,5% and 8,6% in no-
party and multiparty autocracies. Moreover, a majority of the campaign-years left out through 
listwise deletion took place in single-party regimes. As such, the remaining sample may be 
biased towards single-party regimes.  	  
Table 4.4 Missing observations by level of institutionalization 
 No-party regime Single-party regime Multiparty autocracy 
Non-events 95 (94,9%) 161 (90,5%) 101 (91,8%) 
Campaign-years 3 (3,2%) 17 (9,5%) 9 (8,2%) 
Note: Listed by number of country-year observations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Listwise deletion involves removing entire country-year observations if one or more variables have missing 
data. 
48 Instead, multiple imputation relies on the less strict assumption that the data are missing at random (MAR), 
which means that a cell can be predicted by the observed data, but not (after controlling for these observations) 
the remaining missing data (King et al. 2001: 50-53). 
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To guard against potential bias, I therefore run additional tests where missing data have been 
replaced with predicted data. For this task, I rely on Amelia II software from Honaker and 
King (2010) to perform “multiple imputations” of the missing units.49 The idea of this 
technique is to use the available information from the observed portions of the data to predict 
the empty cells. This is done multiple times in order to construct ‘completed’ data sets where 
the observed values are the same, but the missing values are filled in with different 
imputations (Honaker and King 2010: 561). Multiple imputation has the obvious advantage 
of generating more data, which lead to greater efficiency and potentially ameliorate bias. 
Moreover, the method relies on the less strict assumption that the data are missing at random 
(MAR), rather than MCAR. This basically means that a cell can be predicted by the observed 
data, but not (after controlling for these observations) the remaining missing data (King et al. 
2001: 50-53). The assumption is impossible to test on the basis of the data alone, but 
becomes more credible if one includes more information in the imputation model (Honaker 
and King 2010: 564).  
Here, I impute values for the following six control variables (all of which are continuous 
variables): Natural resource revenue, Urban population, Ethnic fractionalization, Religious 
Fractionalization, GDP per Capita, and Population. For the imputation process, I include all 
the variables from the main models, most of the variables from the robustness checks, as well 
as some additional variables that should aid imputation.50 Following the recommendations of 
Honaker and King (2010) I also include leads and lags of the independent variables, as well 
as two polynomials of time interacted with each cross-sectional unit to capitalize on possible 
trends in time. Furthermore, I include a ridge prior at 5 percent to tackle convergence 
problems associated with high missingness and high correlations among the covariates.51 
Accordingly, I estimate five datasets, which are then collapsed into one. Summary statistics 
for the imputed variables are shown in Table 4.5. Figure A.3 in the Appendix also compares 
the densities of the imputed values to the distribution of the observed values for all 
observations. Overall, the distributions on the imputed variables are very similar to the 
distributions on the original variables. Still, the imputations of some of the missing values are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 These imputations were estimated in R. 
50 These variables included Alesina et al.'s (2003) measure on linguistic fractionalization, Fearon's (2003) 
measure of ethnic fractionalization, the Polity index by Marshall et al. (2014), a measure of the level of 
Manufacturing to GDP from the UN Statistics division, and three measures from the World Bank on the level of 
fuel exports, total land area, and the mortality rate for children under 5. All variables can be found in the Quality 
of Government’s basic dataset (Dahlberg et al. 2015). Due to computational difficulties I have restricted the 
number of variables used for imputation to 50 variables (excluding year and GWNO code). 
51 This measure became necessary if the polynomials of time interacted with the cross-sectional units are to be 
included in the model (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2014: 23). Otherwise, the imputation model will not run. 
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quite different from the remaining sample. Yet, this is to be expected when different types of 
regimes are associated with different levels of missingness (Honaker, King and Blackwell 
2014: 30). 	  
Table 4.5 Summary statistics of the imputed data, autocracies only 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Missing 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 7.901 1.119 4.889 13.237 3430 0 
Urban populationt-1 41.532 22.622 2.716 100 3430 0 
Ln Natural resourcest-1 0.309 0.695 -0.351 4.502 3430 0 
Ln Population 8.768 1.776 4.149 14.100 3430 0 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.513 0.256 0 0.930 3430 0 
Religious fractionalization 0.426 0.243 -0.029 0.860 3430 0 	  
As a final note of caution, it should be emphasized that multiple imputation is not necessarily 
a perfect remedy for missing data. First, if observations are systematically missing on several 
indicators for certain countries, then the available data may be too scarce to provide reliable 
estimates of the missing observations. A number of communist single-party regimes, for 
instance, lack data on numerous development indicators, and imputations are therefore less 
likely to hit the mark. Second, imputations obviously challenges the scientific principle of 
making causal inferences on the basis of real-world phenomena (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994: 219-220). Nevertheless, multiple imputation does provide a valuable asset for assessing 
the validity of inferences from the observed data. 
 
 
4.5 Summary  
 
In this chapter I have presented the properties of the quantitative research design used to test 
the theoretical stipulations in Chapter 3. The purpose of the chapter has been to bridge the 
gap between the theoretical framework and the empirical analysis. I have argued that relying 
on logistic regressions of a binary dependent variable provides the best way of testing my 
hypotheses. These analyses will be run on a dataset covering 3,515 country-year observations 
with authoritarian regimes in the period between 1973 and 2006. Among these observations, 
205 were country-years with ongoing nonviolent campaigns. The next chapter therefore 
proceeds with the empirical results. 
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5   Results 
 
In this chapter I present the results from the empirical analysis. The theoretical framework 
suggested three hypotheses related to the impact of political institutions on nonviolent 
uprisings. First, I expect single-party regimes to have a higher probability of nonviolent 
campaign onset than both no-party and multiparty autocracies. Second, I suggest that 
multiparty autocracies run no higher risk of nonviolent conflict than no-party regimes. Third, 
I expect the effect of regime duration to be higher in multiparty autocracies than in other 
dictatorships. This chapter will test each of these propositions. 
The empirical analysis will proceed in three stages. First, I start with a simple descriptive 
analysis of the data. Next, I present the multivariate regression results from the conditional 
and the unconditional models. Finally, I assess the empirical fit and robustness of the main 
models. 
The findings offer support for all three hypotheses, albeit primarily in the case of 
governmental campaigns. I find that single-party regimes experience a higher likelihood of 
nonviolent campaign onset than both no-party and multiparty autocracies, and the differences 
in probability appear to be quite substantial. In particular, the difference between permitting 
one party and permitting several parties is found to be especially robust. I also find that no-
party and multiparty autocracies experience virtually the same probability of nonviolent 
conflict, a pattern that remains practically unchanged throughout all of the model 
specifications. Finally, I find that the impact of restrictions on political parties is highly 
conditioned on the proximity to regime change. Whereas the probability of campaign onset 
decreases over time in no-party regimes, and remains relatively stable in single-party 
regimes, multiparty autocracies experience a much higher risk of onset over time. 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Before embarking on the main analyses, it is useful to have a preliminary look at the data. 
Simple plots and cross-tabulations are necessary to get a good grasp of the data, and may also 
help in avoiding inferential errors (Achen 2005: 338). First, I consider the bivariate 
association between nonviolent campaign onsets and the level of restrictions on political 
parties. Table 5.1 displays the frequency of nonviolent campaign onsets for the three main 
categories of authoritarian regimes under study in the period between 1973 and 2006. At first 
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glance, the data seem to give only weak support for the idea that single-party regimes are 
more prone to nonviolent uprisings. Multiparty autocracies actually have the highest 
frequency of nonviolent campaigns overall, with 7,4% of country-year observations featuring 
nonviolent campaigns. This is somewhat higher number of campaigns than in single-party 
regimes (6,8%) and a considerably higher number than in no-party regimes (3,7%). 
Commensurate with previous findings, the table also shows that the vast majority of 
nonviolent campaigns took place in authoritarian regimes (86,5%).  
 
Table 5.1 Frequency of nonviolent campaign onsets by degree of party institutionalization 
 Country-year 
observations 
Percentage of 
observations 
Number of campaign 
onsets 
Onsets/Country 
year obs. 
No-party 1,155 20.08 43 (11) 0.0372 (0.0172) 
Single-party 991 17.23 67 (61) 0.0676 (0.0769) 
Multiparty 1,284 22.32 95 (68) 0.0740 (0.0583) 
Non-autocracy 2,322 40.37 32 0.0134 
Notes: Figures in parentheses denote the respective frequencies and fractions when military regimes are 
designated as an independent category. All variables are lagged by one year. 	  
Yet, these figures can be somewhat misleading. Table 5.2 compares the total number of 
nonviolent campaigns in military and civilian regimes. It shows that military regimes have a 
noticeably higher frequency of nonviolent campaign onsets (7,3%) than civilian dictatorships 
(5,5%). As such, once we take into account the level of military involvement in politics, a 
different pattern is revealed for the main regime categories (see figures in parentheses in 
Table 5.1). Among civilian dictatorships, single-party autocracies feature the highest 
frequency of nonviolent campaigns, followed by multiparty autocracies and no-party 
regimes. Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 5.1, this pattern is particularly pronounced 
for governmental campaigns. 
 
Table 5.2 Frequency of nonviolent campaign onsets by military involvement in politics 
 Country-year 
observations 
Percentage of 
observations 
Number of campaign 
onsets 
Onsets/Country 
year obs. 
Military 888 15.44 65 0.0732 
Civilian/Other 2,542 44.19 140 0.0551 
Non-autocracy 2,322 40.37 32 0.0134 
 
Overall, Hypothesis 1 (H1) therefore seems to receive some preliminary support; both 
multiparty autocracies and no-party autocracies appear to experience fewer nonviolent 
uprisings than single-party regimes. On the other hand, the descriptive statistics offer little 
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support for Hypothesis 2 (H2). In all cases, dictatorships with no parties have a considerably 
lower frequency of nonviolent campaigns than multiparty autocracies, although the ratio of 
governmental campaigns to territorial campaigns is much higher in these regimes than in 
multiparty autocracies. Obviously these figures display correlations rather than causations, 
and therefore have to be treated with some caution; the associations may not hold once we 
apply more sophisticated statistical models and control for potentially confounding variables, 
such as the level of rents derived from natural resources. 
 
Figure 5.1 Nonviolent campaigns by incompatibility and regime type 
 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 (H3) postulates a positive interaction between regime duration and 
multiparty autocracies. The impact of multiparty autocracies relative to other autocracies 
should be conditioned on the duration of regimes. Figure 5.2 displays a pattern that is 
partially compatible with this assertion. The figure presents six histograms of the duration of 
authoritarian regimes, comparing the timing of nonviolent campaign onsets for no-party, 
single-party and multiparty autocracies. The top row shows the distribution of all country-
years, while the bottom row displays only country-years with ongoing campaigns. Each 
column corresponds to the three different regime types. By comparing the relative 
distribution of campaigns by regime duration to the overall distribution of country-years one 
gets an idea of (1) the relative timing of onsets, and (2) the relative frequency of campaigns 
in a given period. I have restricted all histograms to a maximum duration of 40 years, as there 
are very few autocracies registered outside this interval (about 1,3% of autocracies). As can 
be seen from row three, a very high proportion of nonviolent campaigns in multiparty 
autocracies occur in later stages of a regime’s tenure. In fact, about 59% of the nonviolent 
campaigns in multiparty autocracies occurred in regimes that had lasted more than ten years, 
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even though only 27% of all multiparty autocracies lasted that long. In comparison, 67% of 
nonviolent campaigns in no-party autocracies occurred within ten years of a regime change.  
Yet, Figure 5.2 also shows that a large number of single-party regimes experienced 
nonviolent campaigns at a relatively mature stage. In part, this is due to the wave of 
nonviolent uprisings that took place at the end of the Cold War. For instance, in the period 
between 1989 and 1991, a total of 15 single-party regimes experienced nonviolent 
campaigns. The comparative figure for multiparty autocracies is seven countries. Moreover, 
one also has to take into account that the proportion of long-standing single-party regimes is 
much higher than the proportion of old multiparty autocracies. Although 72% of nonviolent 
campaigns in single-party autocracies occurred in regimes that had lasted more than ten 
years, this category contains 50% of all single-party regimes. Clearly this calls for further 
testing. In the next section I therefore proceed with the results from the main analyses. 
 
Figure 5.2 Distribution of nonviolent campaigns by regime duration, 1973-2006. 
No-party regimes (n=1155) Single-party regimes (n=991) Multiparty autocracies (n=1284) 
   
  
 
 Note: The row with “Campaign-years” displays the distribution of country-years recorded with non-
 violent campaigns. The number of campaign-years in each distribution is 43 (no-party regimes), 57 
 (single-party regimes), and 95 (multiparty autocracies). 
 
 
5.2 Multivariate Regression Results 
 
This section presents the results from the main regression models, testing the association 
between restriction on political parties and the onset of nonviolent campaigns in authoritarian 
regimes. I start off by considering the two unconditional hypotheses, H1 and H2, which relate 
to the general likelihood of nonviolent campaigns in autocracies with different levels of 
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institutionalization. Next, I move on the conditional model, where I interact regime type with 
regime duration to test hypothesis H3. As explained in Chapter 4, all estimates are based on 
logistic regression models of authoritarian regimes between 1973 and 2006. Moreover, all 
time-varying covariates are lagged by one year to maintain some overall exogeneity from the 
dependent variable. Finally, all regression models are estimated in STATA 13.1. 
 
5.2.1 Institutions and the Onset of Nonviolent Campaigns 
Table 5.3 and 5.4 presents the results from the unconditional models. The first two “baseline 
models” consider the effect of institutions with only a restricted list of covariates. These 
covariates include the three explanatory variables, as well as six control variables, namely 
military regime, GDP per capita, oil and gas value, urban population, population, and 
previous campaign. The last three “extensive models” include an additional set of control 
variables. Table 5.3 reports the results when single party is set as the reference category, and 
Table 5.4 summarizes the main results with alternating reference categories. 
In Model 1 I run the baseline model for all nonviolent campaigns, both governmental and 
territorial. The theoretical framework suggests that autocracies with one party should be 
significantly more likely to experience nonviolent campaign onsets than both no-party and 
multiparty autocracies. This expectation finds only limited support in the first model. On the 
one hand, the coefficients do show the expected signs: both the coefficients for multiple 
parties and no parties are negative when single-party regimes are set as the reference 
category. Yet, with respective p-values of 0.17 and 0.14, none of the associations are 
significant at conventional levels. The level of uncertainty surrounding the estimates is 
simply too high to provide assurance that they are statistically different from zero. Moreover, 
comparing the effects of single party with the effects of military regime also suggests that 
other institutional traits may be more important.52  
On the other hand, all of unconditional models support the notion that multiparty 
autocracies face a comparable risk of onset to no-party regimes, and thus seem to confirm 
H2. When multiparty autocracies are specified as the reference category, the coefficient for 
no parties is close to zero and far from significant throughout all of the models. Moreover, 
the models provide no consistent estimate of the direction of the coefficient. Overall, the first 
model therefore seems to lend credence to Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The regime variables do seem to have a stronger effect than for instance Population size, but this is simply 
because the former are dichotomous measures while the latter is continuous. Unless two measures specify the 
same range, the sizes of the coefficients are not going to be directly comparable. 
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(2008) hypothesis that dictators are able to respond with the appropriate level of 
institutionalization to level dissent. Crucially, however, the remaining models do not. 
 
Table 5.3 Dictatorial institutions and the onset of nonviolent campaigns 
 Single party ref. category 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
No partiest-1  -0.517 -0.580 -0.966** -1.032*** -1.229*** 
 (0.380) (0.388) (0.398) (0.391) (0.407) 
Multiple partiest-1  -0.445 -0.610* -0.971** -1.064*** -1.146*** 
 (0.302) (0.314) (0.404) (0.396) (0.414) 
Controls      
Military regimet-1 0.605** 0.605** 0.590* 0.769** 0.528* 
 (0.249) (0.286) (0.308) (0.311) (0.293) 
Ln GDP per  0.305 0.313 0.130 0.340 0.212 
  capitat-1 (0.228) (0.234) (0.222) (0.226) (0.305) 
Ln oil and gas  -1.342*** -1.374*** -1.692*** -1.743*** -1.534* 
  valuet-1 (0.408) (0.438) (0.610) (0.651) (0.834) 
Urban pop.t-1 0.014 0.017* 0.022** 0.0282*** 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Populationt-1 0.306*** 0.213** 0.370*** 0.836*** 0.464*** 
 (0.105) (0.102) (0.099) (0.164) (0.106) 
Democratic    0.666 0.478 -0.329 
  neighborst-1   (0.572) (0.592) (0.662) 
Neighboring    0.612** 0.672** 0.607** 
  campaignt-1   (0.279) (0.285) (0.280) 
Ethnic    0.568 0.180 0.176 
  fractionalization    (0.610) (0.585) (0.634) 
Religious    -1.182** -1.473*** -1.560*** 
  fractionalization   (0.562) (0.534) (0.554) 
Communistt-1   -0.747 -0.317 -0.882 
   (0.557) (0.586) (0.661) 
Civil wart-1   -0.736** -0.656** -0.600* 
   (0.318) (0.317) (0.314) 
Previous  3.534*** 3.552*** 3.433*** 3.392*** 3.362*** 
  campaign (0.247) (0.262) (0.250) (0.249) (0.266) 
Ln military     -0.559***  
  personnelt-1    (0.152)  
Intercept -9.649*** -9.197*** -9.514*** -13.40*** -8.590*** 
 (1.589) (1.643) (2.114) (2.367) (2.390) 
Log-likelihood -418.73 -381.64 -361.03 -353.61 -348.24 
AIC 855.45 781.28 752.07 739.21 742.48 
Observations 3,095 3,066 3,010 2,959 3,010 
Countries 128 128 127 127 127 
Region dummies no no no no yes 
Decade dummies no no no no yes 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models. Model 1 features all nonviolent campaigns, while the 
remaining models exclude territorial campaigns. Data are from 1973-2006 in all models. Clustered 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.4 Summary of main results: Dictatorial institutions and the onset of nonviolent 
campaigns 
Restrictions on  
Party Organization 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
Single-party vs. multiple  0.445 0.610* 0.971** 1.064*** 1.146*** 
   parties (0.302) (0.314) (0.404) (0.396) (0.414) 
Single party vs. no party 0.517 0.580 0.966** 1.032*** 1.229*** 
 (0.380) (0.388) (0.398) (0.391) (0.407) 
Multiple parties vs. no  0.072 -0.030 -0.004 -0.032 0.083 
   party (0.377) (0.412) (0.415) (0.409) (0.414) 
Notes: Presents the same results as in Table 6.3, only with alternating reference categories. Estimates for the 
control variables are not reported because they are identical to the ones in Table 6.3. Data are from 1973-2006 
in all models. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model 2 runs the same baseline model, but excludes the 29 country-years with only 
territorial campaigns.  As can be seen from Table 5.3, both the terms for No parties and 
Multiple parties show stronger effects, particularly the latter. Moreover, with a p-value of 
0.052, the estimate for Multiple parties is now significant at the 10%-level and very close to 
being significant at the 5%-level. Although the estimate for No parties still fails to reach 
significance at conventional levels, the results nevertheless indicate that even a simple 
baseline model diverges considerably from Gandhi and Przeworski’s (2006) expectations. 
The results show that single-party regimes are indeed more prone to governmental 
campaigns, particularly when compared to multiparty autocracies. The effect of allowing 
only one party is now comparable to having a military regime. Surely the results are still 
associated with a considerable level of uncertainty. Yet, moving on to the extensive models 
suggests that this uncertainty is by and large the product of an underspecified model.  
Model 3 presents the full unconditional model, including all the main control variables. 
The results offer clear support for H3: single-party regimes are significantly more likely than 
both no-party regimes and multiparty autocracies to experience nonviolent campaign onsets 
(both estimates are close to being significant at the 1%-level). The impact of having a single 
party is also comparatively strong. For instance, it is greater than the effects of neighboring 
campaign(s), which has commonly been argued to be a powerful determinant of nonviolent 
campaign onset (e.g. Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2006).53 Furthermore, the results 
also suggest that the dampening effect of having multiple parties is just as strong as the 
conflict inducing effect of having a single party. Otherwise, we would expect multiparty 
autocracies to have a higher risk of onset than both single-party and no-party regimes 
(Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 This association also hold if we drop the one-year lag on neighboring campaign (not displayed). 
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Because repressing the opposition is commonly suggested as an alternative to co-opting 
them (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Wintrobe 1998), it is useful to consider the 
differences between regime types when their repressive capacity is held constant. Model 4 
therefore tests the effect of controlling for the number of military personnel, which can be 
used as a proxy for for repressive capacity.  The results in column 4 in Table 5.3 show that 
larger militaries have a very significant effect in terms of deterring nonviolent mobilization. 
Moreover, controlling for military personnel also leads to a somewhat stronger and more 
significant difference between single-party regimes and the other two regime categories. 
Arguably, this is indicative of a stronger institutional effect of multiparty elections than what 
can be observed from the raw data. The reason why we see a greater difference between 
single-party regimes and no-party regimes is probably because party regimes typically 
maintain larger armies (Svolik 2012: 165).  However, because there is some discussion as to 
whether large repressive apparatuses are constitutive parts of single-party regimes or not (see 
e.g. Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012), I refrain from including military personnel in 
the remaining analyses. Otherwise, I risk introducing post-treatment bias. Finally, including 
region and decade dummies in the model only substantiate the findings in Model 3. The 
estimates for no parties and multiple parties in Model 5 display even stronger effects and are 
now both significant at the 1% level. In fact, once we control for region-specific effects and 
temporal trends, Model 2 also proves highly supportive of H1 (see Table B.1 in Appendix B 
for the complete models).  
In order to better gauge the substantive impact of these effects, Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3 
presents changes in predicted probabilities calculated from Model 3.54 The table displays how 
we should expect the risk of campaign onset to vary when each independent variable is 
allowed to vary from its 10th to 90th percentile for continuous variables and from 0 to 1 for 
dichotomous variables while holding all other variables constant at their mean or median. 
Figure 5.3 provides visual representation of these changes along with measures of 
uncertainty. The diamonds in the figure show the raw change in the risk of campaign onset as 
a state moves between percentiles for a given variable, while the whiskers represent 90% 
confidence intervals. 
First, we see that the likelihood of campaign onset varies considerably from single-party 
to no-party and multiparty autocracies. While no-party regimes and multiparty autocracies 
both have a 0.8% annual predicted probability of a campaign onset, the probability of onset in  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 I used Clarify from King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) to obtain these predictions. 
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Table 5.5 Predicted probabilities of nonviolent campaign onset 
 10th percentile 90th percentile %Change ΔP 
No-party regimet-1 0.80 0.80 0.7% 1.01 
Single-party regimet-1 0.80 2.10 161.9% 2.62 
Military regimet-1 0.80 1.50 86.6% 1.87 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.71 1.02 43.4% 1.43 
Ln urban populationt-1 0.73 2.76 267.4% 3.67 
Oil and gas valuet-1 1.19 0.19 -83.6% 6.10 
Populationt-1 0.37 1.60 332.7% 4.33 
Democratic neighborst-1 0.71 1.02 44.4% 1.44 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.80 1.48 84.1% 1.84 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.68 0.94 38.4% 1.38 
Religious fractionalization 1.24 0.57 -54.3% 2.19 
Communistt-1 0.80 0.35 -42.8% 1.75 
Civil wart-1 0.80 0.40 -50.0% 2.00 
Notes: The table shows the predicted probabilities of a nonviolent campaign onset for the 10th and 90th percentile 
values of the given variable, all other covariates held at their mean (continuous measures) or modal values 
(dichotomous measures). When calculating the respective scores for no-party and single-party regimes the other 
party restrictions variables were held at zero. %Change refers to the relative change between the 10th and 90th 
percentile. ΔP denotes the ratio of the highest predicted probability to the lowest for each variable. All 
probabilities have been multiplied with 100 to ease interpretation. Estimations are based on Table 6.2, Model 3. 
 
single-party regimes is 2.1%. Thus, moving from the multiparty or no-party autocracy 
category to the single-party autocracy category almost triples the likelihood of nonviolent 
conflict. The overall low baseline probabilities reflect that nonviolent campaigns are rare 
events. This is similar to other analyses of rare dependent variables, such as civil wars and 
coup d’états.55 The relative increase in risk associated with a move to single-party autocracy 
is nevertheless quite substantial. Furthermore, this is most likely a conservative estimate. For 
instance, basing the predictions on Model 5 suggests that single-party regimes are 3.1 times 
more likely than multiparty autocracies to experience a campaign onset. In sum, these results 
provide strong support for both H1 and H2. 
Second, we also see that the impact of institutions is larger than the majority of the 
control variables. The only variables that have a larger effect than restrictions on political 
parties are Urban population, Oil and gas value, and Population. The fact that these 
covariates display such large effects is generally consistent with previous work and my 
theoretical expectations. However, note that the magnitude of these effects is to a large extent 
a product of comparing countries with low and high values on the respective variables, and to 
a lesser extent due to the dynamic processes of urbanization, increases in natural resource 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 King and Zeng (2001), for instance, argue that logistic regressions with binary dependent variables tend to 
underestimate the probabilities of events in the case of rare events data. Thus, the current estimates are likely to 
be too small. 
	  78	  
revenue and population growth.56 Arguably, this suggests that the influence of institutions on 
the risk of nonviolent uprisings may be even larger than what can be read from comparing 
these numbers alone.  
 
Figure 5.3 The substantive impact of institutions on the onset of nonviolent campaigns 
 
Notes: Values show first difference (FD) estimations (!) with 90% confidence intervals (|---|).  
Estimations are based on Table 6.2, Model 3. 
 
 
5.2.2 Conditional effects: Institutions and Regime Duration 
Table 5.6 tests the conditional hypothesis H3, which stipulates that the effects of restrictions 
on political parties depend on the duration of a regime. In particular, I expect the interaction 
between multiparty autocracy and regime duration to be positive when multiparty autocracies 
are compared to autocracies that ban opposition parties. To investigate this assumption I 
present three models, all of which are extensions of Model 3 in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The first 
model adds only Ln Regime duration to the full model, while the last two models include one 
or several interaction terms. 
Model 6 tests the consequences of including Ln Regime duration in an unconditional 
model. As can be seen from column one in Table 5.6, the term for Ln Regime duration is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 In fact, a change from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile is hardly realistic in any of these cases, and 
may overestimate the impact of these variables. For instance, the increase in risk associated with a move to 
single-party autocracy is comparable to the risk associated with a move from the 20th to the 85th percentile on 
Population and a move from the 20th to the 82nd percentile on Urban population (the ratio (ΔP) between the 
lowest and the highest predicted probability in these two examples were 2,63 for Population and 2,64 for Urban 
population). Yet, no comparable leaps in population size or the level of urbanization have happened in the 
period under study. 
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positive and significant at the 5%-level, indicating that nonviolent uprisings becomes more 
likely over time. We also see that including Regime duration in the regression model both 
reduces the coefficient size for Single party and causes the term to lose significance (p-value 
of 0.12) when Multiple parties is specified as the reference category. Without further inquiry, 
these results could be interpreted as proof that nonviolent campaign onsets are less likely 
under conditions of political instability. Following this line of reasoning would suggest 
multiparty autocracies have a lower probability of nonviolent conflict partly because they are 
more disposed to political instability. However, if the theoretical stipulations in Chapter 3 are 
correct these results should instead be due to the different effects of regime duration on the 
risk of nonviolent conflict in multiparty autocracies, as compared to other autocracies. 
Model 7 runs a first test of this argument, investigating whether we can discern any 
differences in the effects of regime duration between the three main regime categories. The 
idea is to examine to what extent the impact of regime duration in multiparty autocracies is 
different from the impact of regime duration in no-party and single-party regimes. If 
multiparty autocracies do not display a distinct trend, it may be inappropriate to compare 
multiparty autocracies against a baseline that includes both no-party and single-party 
regimes. Accordingly, Model 7 specifies Multiple parties as the reference category, and adds 
two interactions: one between No parties and Regime duration, and another between Single 
party and regime duration. The coefficient for the raw variable, Ln Regime duration, can now 
be read as the effect of regime duration on the likelihood of a campaign onset in multiparty 
autocracies. To interpret the interaction terms, we add the coefficient for the interaction term 
to the coefficient for the raw variable. For instance, the effect of Regime duration in no-party 
regimes is βLn Regime duration + βNo parties*regime duration. The constitutive terms for No parties and 
Single party should be read as the effect of these variables, as compared to Multiple parties, 
when Ln Regime duration is zero.  
As we can see, the coefficient for Ln Regime duration in model 7 is highly significant 
(1%-level) and more than twice the size of the coefficient for Regime duration in Model 6, 
indicating a strong effect of regime duration in multiparty autocracies. In comparison, the 
coefficient for No parties*regime duration is negative, strongly significant, and greater in 
absolute value than Ln Regime duration, which implies that the probability of a nonviolent 
campaign onset decreases over time in no-party regimes. The coefficient for Single 
party*regime duration is also negative, but is smaller and not quite statistically significant (p-
value of 0.13). This indicates that single party regimes become more likely to experience 
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nonviolent conflict over time, but that this increase is much smaller than in multiparty 
autocracies. 
 
Table 5.6 Interaction between political party restrictions and regime duration 
 (6) (7) (8) 
No partiest-1 0.074 2.668*** -1.018*** 
 (0.417) (0.774) (0.382) 
Single partyt-1 0.669 1.612 Ref. cat. 
 (0.424) (1.069)  
Multiple partiest-1 Ref. cat. Ref. cat. -3.340*** 
   (0.758) 
Ln Regime durationt-1 0.424** 0.936*** -0.111 
 (0.184) (0.265) (0.192) 
No parties*regime duration  -1.240***  
  (0.332)  
Single party*regime duration  -0.427  
  (0.404)  
Multiple parties*regime duration   1.050*** 
   (0.301) 
Controls    
Military regimet-1 0.466 0.472 0.505 
 (0.308) (0.312) (0.309) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.111 -0.017 -0.011 
   (0.219) (0.241) (0.238) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -1.663*** -1.494** -1.443** 
 (0.587) (0.629) (0.607) 
Urban populationt-1 0.018* 0.0192* 0.019* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Populationt-1 0.315*** 0.306*** 0.321*** 
 (0.097) (0.104) (0.103) 
Democratic neighborst-1 0.669 0.858 0.873 
 (0.609) (0.631) (0.629) 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.642** 0.602** 0.693** 
 (0.279) (0.266) (0.280) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.527 0.417 0.375 
  (0.601) (0.564) (0.563) 
Religious fractionalization -1.094* -0.932 -0.899 
   (0.561) (0.581) (0.578) 
Communistt-1 -0.856 -0.830 -0.636 
 (0.565) (0.585) (0.575) 
Civil wart-1 -0.752** -0.597* -0.624* 
 (0.340) (0.310) (0.321) 
Previous campaign 3.511*** 3.553*** 3.554*** 
 (0.262) (0.256) (0.258) 
Intercept -9.584*** -9.864*** -6.760*** 
 (1.956) (1.978) (1.944) 
Log-likelihood -354.72 -343.85 -345.82 
AIC 741.44 723.69 725.63 
Observations 3,010 3,010 3,010 
Countries 127 127 127 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models. Territorial campaigns are excluded and none 
of the models include region or decade dummies. Data are from 1973-2006 in all models.  
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5.4 Conditional effects of restrictions on political parties given regime duration 
 
Notes: The graph shows the conditional marginal effects of restrictions on political parties with all other 
covariates held at their mean (continuous variables) or modal values (dichotomous variables). 
 
Figure 5.4 displays these effects graphically. The figure shows how the predicted 
probabilities vary over time for the three main regime categories when all of the control 
variables are held constant at their means (for continuous measures) and modes (for 
dichotomous measures).57 To facilitate reading, I use the untransformed Regime duration 
variable.58 The graph lends clear support to the idea that the impact of regime duration is 
different in dictatorships with multiple parties. In these regimes, the risk of a campaign onset 
is very low following regime change, increases substantially over time, and even approaches 
the risk of onset in single-party regimes. In comparison, single-party regimes display a much 
flatter curve, while no-party regimes show a quite substantial negative trend. In sum, Figure 
5.4 seems to refute the idea that nonviolent campaigns become less likely under conditions of 
political instability. Otherwise, we would expect both no-party and single-party regimes to 
display positive curves. Furthermore, the graph also suggests that multiparty autocracies can 
be meaningfully contrasted with other autocracies in terms of the effects of regime duration. I 
therefore proceed with the main test of H3. 
Model 8 presents the main conditional model, where I interact Multiple parties with Ln 
regime duration. The model offers firm support for Hypothesis 3. As expected, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 I have restricted the graph to 30 years because of the scarcity of country-years and nonviolent campaigns in 
regimes that have lasted longer than this interval. 
58 Using the log-transformed variable of Regime change leaves somewhat greater substantial effects, but 
becomes harder to interpret because the variable shows relative rather than absolute increases in regime 
duration.  
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interaction term is positive and highly significant (1%-level), indicating that the risk of 
campaign onset in a multiparty autocracy, as compared to other autocracies, is highly 
conditioned on a regime’s duration. However, while the coefficient estimates provide 
evidence supporting my expectations, it is problematic to infer directly from these estimates 
whether the conditional effects will hold across a meaningful range of values. Following 
Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), I therefore plot the marginal effect of the primary 
independent variables over the conditional variable along with associated confidence 
intervals.  
 
Figure 5.5 Conditional effects of multiparty autocracy given regime duration 
 
Note: The graph shows the conditional marginal effects of restrictions on political parties with 90% confidence 
intervals. All other covariates are held at their mean or modal values (for categorical variables).  
 
The figure provides strong evidence of a relative increase in the probability of onset in 
multiparty autocracies. The effect of having multiple parties becomes statistically 
insignificant after about 15 years, and reaches the level of other autocracies after 25 years. 
Multiparty autocracies are thus significantly less likely than other autocracies to experience 
nonviolent campaigns for a relatively long interlude following regime change. Furthermore, 
the figure also lends convincing support that multiparty autocracies experience an absolute 
increase in the risk of onset over time. Admittedly, this increase is associated with a 
considerable level of uncertainty, making it hard to determine the magnitude of this effect. In 
large part, this is probably due to the relatively short duration of most multiparty autocracies, 
which generates more uncertain estimates for long-lasting regimes.  
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Estimating Model 8 with region and decade dummies only leads to a stronger coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term (see Table B.1 in Appendix B), and the association therefore 
does not appear to be driven by particular regional or time trends. All in all, the evidence 
presented here therefore leaves substantial support for H3, and it appears that the effect of 
permitting multiple parties is highly conditioned on the duration of a regime.  
Finally, the estimated effects for the control variables are as expected for a majority of the 
covariates. Yet, only a few are able to reach conventional levels of significance across all 
eight models. Among the three proxies for opposition strength, Oil and gas value is 
consistently and significantly associated with a lower risk of campaign onset throughout all 
of the specifications, although the effect from this variable becomes much more uncertain 
once we control for the MENA countries. Ln GDP per capita fails to reach significance in 
any of the models, and shows little sign of any effect. A possible explanation is that 
economic development has little effect in the absence of urbanization (Dahl et al. 2014). 
Consistent with previous studies, there appears to be a positive effect of the level of 
urbanization on the likelihood of a popular uprising (e.g. Dahl et al. 2014; Knutsen 2014). 
The term for Urban population fails to reach significance in some of the models, but this is 
most likely due to the high level of multicollinearity with GDP per capita.59 The direction and 
significance of the other control variables are of less interest here, and I therefore do not offer 
any substantive interpretation of these results. The next section will instead proceed with 
evaluating how well the main models fit the data and the robustness of the results. 	  	  
5.3 Model Diagnostics and Robustness  
 
5.3.1 Measures of Fit 
One fundamental test of the explanatory power of any independent variables is how much 
they contribute in terms of prediction. As Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) have 
demonstrated in the case of civil wars, the level of statistical significance may be a poor 
indicator of how much a variable will add in terms of predictive power. Although the main 
concern of this study has been investigative rather than predictive, the empirical fit of the 
models nevertheless constitutes an important means of evaluating the validity of the results. 
If the models do poorly in terms of explaining variations in the data, then it indicates that the 
models have limited explanatory power. Here, I rely on three heuristics to assess the in-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In fact, leaving out GDP per capita gives significant results (5%-level) in all models for Urban population. 
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sample predictive power of the main models: Aikake’s Information Criterion (AIC), Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves, and separation plots. Furthermore, three models are 
selected for detailed comparison: Model 2 (the baseline model), Model 3 (the full model), 
and Model 8 (the conditional model). These three models are also compared with one model 
containing only the lagged dependent variable (“Previous campaign only”), as well as a 
model that includes only the control variables from Model 3 (“Controls only”).60  
The AIC is a commonly used to evaluate the overall efficiency of a model for a given set 
of data. It is similar to the Log-Likelihood, except that it punishes the inclusion of additional 
variables. Thus, it addresses the trade-off between the goodness of fit of a model and the 
complexity of the model. Crucially, it also permits comparison across models based on 
different samples. All else being equal, the model with the smallest AIC is considered the 
better fitting model (Long 1997: 109-110). Comparing the AICs in Table 5.3 and Table 5.5 
reveals that the baseline model performs much better once it excludes territorial campaigns. 
Furthermore, the extensive model (Model 3) contributes to a substantial increase in model fit 
compared to the baseline models. With an AIC value of 752 this model also offers a much 
smaller AIC than the Campaigns only model (AIC=896), and a substantially lower AIC than 
the Controls only model (AIC=758). Finally, judging by AICs and Log-likelihood values, we 
also see that Model 8 provides a considerably better fit than Model 3. This improvement is in 
large part due to the inclusion of the interaction term between regime duration and multiparty 
autocracies. 
Comparing the ROC curves for the selected models also indicate that the explanatory 
variables make positive, albeit moderate contributions to in-sample prediction. ROC plots 
visualize the relationship between the rate of false positives (defined as the number of 
incorrectly predicted onsets divided by the total number of cases where nonviolent campaigns 
did not occur) and the rate of true positives (defined as the number of correctly predicted 
onsets divided by the total number of cases where nonviolent campaigns did occur) at 
different thresholds (Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke 2010).61 Models with more predictive 
power will tend to produce a higher rate of true positives (on the y-axis) than false positives 
(on the x-axis), generating curves that appear to be pulled toward the upper-left corner of the 
plot. The size of the area under the ROC curve (the “AUC score”) can then be used as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Both of these models exclude territorial campaigns to permit comparison. 
61 In contrast to contingency tables, which have to assign an arbitrary predicted probability for which an event is 
deemed to occur or not, the ROC curve evaluates the relationship between false positives and true negatives 
across all possible thresholds (from 0 to 1). 
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indicator of the model’s predictive power.62 A perfect model that perfectly predicts all true 
positives at the expense of no false positives receives an AUC of 1.0, while a model that gets 
just as many cases wrong as right for each possible threshold receives an AUC of 0.5 
(Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 2011).  
Figure 5.5 plots the ROC curves for the three selected models and the two comparison 
models. Again, we see that the selected models perform far better than the model with only a 
lagged dependent variable. Moreover, both Model 3 and Model 8 are associated with an 
increase in predictive power compared to Model 2 and the “Controls only” model. 
Admittedly, the increase is quite marginal, which normally signals that the increase in 
predictive power is accompanied 
by added complexity. However, 
here we also have to bear in mind 
that the returns in predictive power 
are going to diminish as we 
approach an AUC score of 1.00. 
Overall, the increases in AUC 
scores therefore indicate that the 
main models fare quite well in 
terms of in-sample performance. 
Crucially, comparing Model 3 and 
Model 8 to the “Controls only” 
model also suggests that the 
explanatory variables make fair 
contributions to the model’s 
predictive power. Judging by the AUC scores, Model 8 seems to provide the best fit.63  
As a final indicator of the models’ predictive power, I also present separation plots for the 
respective models in Figure 5.7. The separation plot is a quite recent innovation for 
evaluating the fit of regression models with binary outcomes (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 
2011). It provides a much more intuitive indicator of the performance of a model than the 
ROC plot or AIC scores. Separation plots are created by arranging all country-years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In particular, the AUC score denotes the probability that a randomly selected positive case will have been 
assigned a higher probability than a randomly selected negative case (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 17). 
63 Again, this is to a large extent due to the inclusion of the interaction term. For instance, Model 6 receives an 
AUC score of 0.897, which only makes up half of the increase in AUC score from Model 3 to Model 8.  
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according to their predicted probability of nonviolent campaign onset, from lowest on the left 
to highest on the right. The black line that runs through the center of the graph represents this 
probability. Each red line corresponds to an observed positive outcome (nonviolent campaign 
onset), and light yellow lines represent negative outcomes (no onset). Red panels on the left 
are false negatives, while yellow panels on the right are false positives. Good models are thus 
the ones that are able to place most of the red panels at the right end of the separation plot.64 	  
Figure 5.7 Separation plots of selected models  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
The separation plots in Figure 5.7 indicate that the selected model do quite well in assigning 
higher probabilities to events and lower probabilities to non-events, particularly compared to 
the model with only a lagged dependent variable.65 The plots also show that the extensive 
model fits the data better than the baseline model. Moreover, although less noticeable, a 
larger fraction of the observed outcomes are clustered to the right in Model 3 than in the 
“Controls only” model, which indicates that including the party restrictions dummies is 
associated with a gain in predictive ability. Model 3 seems to do particularly well in terms of 
avoiding false positives towards the edge of the graph, i.e. among those observations that 
have been assigned a high probability. Again, Model 8 appears to be superior in terms of 
model fit. The model does remarkably well in separating the red panels from the yellow ones. 
In sum, we see that the selected models seem to describe the data rather well. 
Nevertheless, some potential pitfalls remain. One danger is overfitting, in which case the data 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The separation plots were estimated in R. 
65 Note that the peculiar behavior of the “Previous campaign only” model in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 is a 
product of predictions only being based on whether there was a campaign in the previous 3 years or not. This 
generates only two predicted probabilities: one for the group that experiences a campaign in the previous 3 
years, and another prediction for the group that did not. This results in a straight line in both plots.  
Previous campaign only
Model 2
Model 3
Controls only
Model 8
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will do poorly in out-of-sample predictions. Moreover, it is questionable whether some of the 
observed patterns bear any relevance today. For instance, according to Wahman et al.'s 
(2013) data there were only 8 single-party regimes left in 2010. As such, much of this thesis 
describes what arguably is a historical phenomenon rather than a contemporary one. The 
conditional model seems to hold greater promise in this regard, given that it deals more 
specifically with dynamics within multiparty autocracies and no-party regimes. In particular, 
it would be useful to consider whether this model carries any relevance for some of the more 
recent uprisings, such as the nonviolent campaigns that occurred during the Arab Spring. In 
lack of data, I leave this task to future research. 
 
Additional concerns 
Aside from the model’s predictive power, we also have to consider two remaining issues that 
relate to the fit of the model. The first concern is multicollinearity. High correlations among 
some of the covariates may produce imprecise standard errors and lead me to accept false 
null hypotheses (type-II error). Judging by the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score of the 
respective variables in Model 3 and Model 8, multicollinearity does not seem to be a 
troubling issue (see Table C.1 in Appendix C). VIF scores measure how much the variance of 
an estimated regression coefficient is increased due to collinearity. As a rule of thumb, 
multicollinearity is considered a problem if VIF scores exceed 10 (Kennedy 2003: 213). In 
my case, all VIF values are below 5, except in Model 8 where the inclusion of the interaction 
term lead Multiple parties and Multiple parties*regime duration to obtain VIF scores of 7.11 
and 5.88. Hence, I consider this a minor threat to the validity of my results. 
A second concern relates to whether my results are driven by outliers and influential 
observations. Outliers are observations that have unexpected values on the dependent 
variable given their predicted values from the estimated regression models. Influential 
observations are observations that have particularly large effects on the regression results. 
Outliers and influential observations can unduly influence the parameter estimates, a problem 
that is particularly severe in logistic regression models (Pregibon 1981).  
To spot outliers, I look at the standardized residuals. All units that have standardized 
residuals of ±2 are considered outliers. Both Model 3 and Model 8 have 6 outliers: one case 
in each model that was assigned a high probability of onset but experienced no event, and 
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five cases that experienced onsets despite being assigned low probabilities of an event.66 It is 
hard to detect any particular pattern among these cases, although one notable similarity is that 
a majority of these cases were unexpected onsets in multiparty autocracies (three 
observations in model 3 and four observations in model 8). Excluding these cases produces 
much stronger and more significant coefficient estimates for both multiparty and no-party 
autocracies when single-party regimes is left as the reference category (see Table C.2 in 
Appendix C). Thus, my findings seem robust to outliers. 
In order to assess the models’ vulnerability to influential units, I rely on Pregibon’s 
(1981) influence statistic dbeta. This statistic is a measure of the change in coefficient 
estimates that would be incurred by deleting an observation. A dbeta greater than one is a 
sign that an observation has a large effect on the estimated coefficients (Menard 2009: 135-
136). In my case, the observation with the highest dbeta received a score of 0.72 (Argentina 
1977), and there are very few observations with dbeta scores greater than 0.4 (see Figure C.1 
in Appendix C). As such, influential units do not appear to be driving my results. 
 
5.3.2 Robustness checks 
In order to ascertain that my findings are not merely a product of model specifications, the 
method used or the data, I run a series of robustness tests to evaluate the sensitivity of the 
results. Here, I will concentrate in particular on missing data, operationalizations of the 
dependent and independent variables, and omitted variable bias. These robustness checks are 
conducted on the two main models, Model 3 and Model8, and reported in Appendix D.  
I start by conducting some basic sensitivity analyses. First, I test the implications of 
including Democracy as a control variable. Both models remain robust and largely unaltered 
(see column 1 in Tables D.1 and D.2). Next, I analyze whether the regression results are 
sensitive to omitting one and one control variable from the analysis (not reported here). The 
results are robust, with two exceptions: when Ln oil and gas value is left out of the analysis 
the coefficient for Multiple parties just falls below significance in Model 3 (p-value: 0.12). 
The coefficient for No parties stays almost unchanged. This appears to be due to the higher 
proportion of single-party regimes than multiparty autocracies with substantial natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Outliers in Model 3 with standardized residuals in parentheses: Chile 1984 (-2.01), Guyana 1990 (15.65), 
Senegal 2000 (10.62), Madagascar 2001 (10.82), Kyrgyzstan 2005 (10.72), and Nepal 2006 (11.52). Outliers in 
Model 8: South Korea 1988 (-2.21), Iran 1977 (11.19), The Philippines 1983 (9.86), Zambia 2001 (10.39), 
Ukraine 2001 (10.48), and Nepal 2006 (10.76). 
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resource revenues.67 This is largely in line with the theoretical argument presented in Chapter 
3, which stipulates that autocracies will depend on lower levels of institutionalization when 
they are less dependent on the opposition. Thus, the lower vulnerability to nonviolent 
campaigns among this subgroup of single-party regimes is arguably not attributable to their 
institutional framework, but instead other covariates associated with these regimes. 
Furthermore, when Previous campaign is omitted from the analysis both the coefficients for 
Multiple parties and No parties lose significance in Model 3. This is as expected in the case 
of multiparty autocracies. As discussed in Chapter 4, many autocracies have made transitions 
to multiparty regimes as a direct consequence of nonviolent campaigns. Thus, excluding 
Previous campaign could potentially introduce a significant endogeneity bias, as some 
multiparty regimes would be the outcome rather than a cause of these campaigns. However, 
why No parties loses significance is not quite as evident. In the cases of Mali (1990-1992), 
Niger (1991-1992) and Myanmar (1988-1990), popular mobilization – at least initially - led 
to authoritarian reversals and the banning of opposition parties. Thus, these instances were 
quite clearly cases of reverse causation. Yet, this explanation only accounts for a small 
fraction of the campaign onsets in no-party regimes. A second explanation may be that no-
party autocracies have experienced more lengthy campaigns than single-party autocracies. 
While the average duration of nonviolent campaigns in single-party regimes is 2,38 years, the 
average campaign duration in no-party regimes is 2,60 years. Counting every campaign-year 
as a new onset would therefore make no-party regimes appear more vulnerable to nonviolent 
campaigns.68 Given that these cases are not really new campaign onsets, I consider this lack 
of robustness as a minor threat to the validity of my results. 
I investigate the impact of missingness by replacing the missing units with imputed data. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the high level of missing data among single-party regimes may 
significantly bias my results. Running Model 3 and Model 8 with the imputed data from 
Amelia II confirm this assertion (see column 2 in Tables D.1 and D.2) (Honaker and King 
2010). In Model 3, the difference between multiparty autocracies and single-party regimes 
becomes considerably larger and more significant (p-value of 0.002) when I replace the 
missing values with estimated values. On the other hand, the difference between single-party 
regimes and no-party regimes is slightly reduced but still very significant (5%-level). By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Among non-communist one-party regimes the mean value on Ln oil and gas value is 0.212 (0.160 for all one-
party regimes). In comparison, the mean value for multiparty autocracies on this variable is 0.131. Studying 
density estimates also reveals the same picture (not shown here). 
68 To some extent this also explains why omitting Previous campaign makes Multiple parties lose significance, 
given that the average campaign duration in these regimes is 2,54 years for governmental campaigns.  
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these estimates, single-party regimes are 3,3 times more likely to experience nonviolent 
campaign onsets than multiparty autocracies and 2,5 times more likely to experience an onset 
than no-party regimes.69 Model 8 is also strongly supported with the imputed data, although 
the coefficient for the interaction term is slightly smaller than in the original sample. Hence, 
the findings remain robust when I replace the missing values. If anything the imputed data 
appear to give my hypotheses increased support. 
I now proceed to examine alternative specifications of the dependent variable and 
independent variables. First, I investigate the effect of employing stricter inclusion criteria for 
nonviolent campaigns, increasing the threshold from 1,000 to 10,000 participants. The results 
are highly robust to this specification (see column 3 in Tables D.1 and D.2). In fact, they 
indicate that single-party regimes are even more prone to campaigns of this size relative to 
multiparty and no-party autocracies. For instance, the predicted probability of such a large-
scale onset in single-party regimes is 3.2 times higher than in multiparty autocracies, and 3.8 
times higher than in no-party autocracies. 
Second, employing Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) original typology also offers an 
alternative classification of the explanatory variables. The strength with this classification is 
that it allows me to investigate whether the results hold when we focus on pure single-party 
and multiparty autocracies, instead of all dictatorships with one party or all dictatorships with 
several parties. Column 4 in Table D.1 and Table D.2 reports the results from this analysis. 
Again, we see that single-party regimes have a significantly higher probability of onset than 
multiparty autocracies. Furthermore, the positive coefficient for Monarchy and Other 
dictatorship corroborate the finding that no-party regimes have a lower risk of campaign 
onset than single-party regimes.70  
Third, I consider the effects of replacing the regime dummies from Wahman et al. (2013) 
with data from Cheibub et al. (2010), who employ different coding criteria for democracies, 
military regimes and the three levels of institutionalization. The results remain substantially 
unaltered from this alternative classification (see column 5 in Tables D.1 and D.2). 
Fourth, I consider two alternative ways of operationalizing Previous campaign: a log-
transformed measure of time since last campaign and a decay function of the proximity of 
nonviolent conflict. The first approach is concomitant to the one applied in Hegre and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 I used Clarify to obtain these predictions. 
70 Admittedly, the Monarchy dummy does not reach significance. However, this appears to be a product of the 
low number of observations on this variable. The only nonviolent campaigns to take place in a monarchy with 
no parties – which constitute 85% of all monarchies - were the two campaigns in Nepal in 1990 and 2006. 
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Nygård's (2014) study of armed conflict recurrence, and is simply the log of the number of 
years without a campaign (or since independence) up to t - 1. The second approach is 
equivalent to the one taken by Hegre et al. (2001) and Fjelde (2010), and specifies an 
exponential function of the time that has passed without the onset of a nonviolent campaign, 
which is given by 2(-time since last transition/α), where α is the half-life parameter. In my case, a half-
life parameter of 2 years provided the best fit.71 By combining either of these measures with a 
one-year lag of the dependent variable, one can account for both ongoing campaigns and 
long-term path dependency (Hegre and Nygård 2014).72 As shown in Column 6 and 7 in 
Tables D.1 and D.2, the significance and impact of the explanatory variables remain 
substantially unaltered with either of the two approaches. Moreover, the two measures of 
time dependence do not reveal any consistent or significant temporal effects, which suggest 
that there is little evidence that previous campaigns have an impact on the onset of new 
campaigns. This is compatible with Dahl et al.’s (2014) findings. 
Fifth, it is possible that multiparty autocracies face fewer nonviolent campaigns because 
they experience more small-scale armed conflicts (Fjelde 2010). I therefore replace the 
measure on civil wars from NAVCO 1.0 with UCDP/PRIO’s measure of internal armed 
conflicts (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014) This lowers the threshold for armed conflicts from 
1,000 to 25 battle-related deaths. The results indicate that this only leads to a minor reduction 
of the coefficient for Multiple parties in Model 3. Otherwise, the main estimates remain 
largely unaltered for both Model 3 and Model 8 (see column 8 in Tables D.1 and D.2). As 
such, the lower risk of nonviolent uprisings in multiparty autocracies does not seem to reflect 
their higher vulnerability to armed conflict. 
Sixth, the results remain robust if I substitute the binary logit models with probit models 
or multinomial logit models (see Tables D.3 and D.4). In the latter case, the dependent 
variable is extended to four categories: (0) no event, (1) nonviolent campaign, (2) violent 
campaign, and (3) both nonviolent campaign and violent campaign.   
Finally, it is perfectly conceivable that country-specific effects not accounted for could 
affect both regime type and the risk of campaign onset, leading to biased results and invalid 
inferences. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 4, logistic regression models are particularly 
sensitive to omitted variable bias, regardless of whether the excluded variables are related to 
the explanatory variables or not (Mood 2010). A common way of addressing the problem of 
omitted variable bias is to run fixed effects models, controlling for all country-specific and/or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 This was established by comparing the log-likelihood values of Model 3 with various half-life parameters.   
72 Note that both measures were backdated to 1946. 
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time-specific effects. However, because the majority of countries never have experienced a 
nonviolent campaign between 1972 and 2006, running regressions with country fixed effects 
is equivalent to discarding all information from these countries when estimating effects (Beck 
and Katz 2001; Knutsen 2014: 927).73 Similarly, there are some years with very few 
observations on the dependent variable, which complicates time fixed effects regressions 
(Stock and Watson 2012: 400-403). Instead, to control for unobserved heterogeneity, I 
estimate random effects models for Model 3 and Model 8. This estimation method allows 
both intercepts and slope coefficients to vary across groups of observations, capturing the 
effects of unobserved or omitted country-level factors. Crucially, the estimated effects remain 
very robust to this specification. In fact, the coefficients for No parties and Multiple parties 
increase substantially in size and significance in Model 3 (both significant at the 1%-level) 
(see column 1 in Table D.5). The same happens with the interaction term for 
Multiparty*regime duration in Model 3 (see column 1 in Table D.6). Thus, running random 
effects models only strengthens the credibility of my results.  
Moreover, the results remain robust when I control for other factors that could affect the 
association between regime type and nonviolent campaign onsets, including the proportion of 
revolutions globally, the length of the chief executive’s tenure, the level of active repression, 
the level of welfare spending, economic growth, the Cold War, the level of civil liberties and 
the level of democracy (see columns 2-4 in Tables D.5 and D.6).74  
In sum, the findings appear to be robust to a broad range of model specifications and 
operationalizations. H2 and H3 receive consistent and strong support in all of the robustness 
checks, and H1 receives solid backing through the vast majority of alternative 
specifications.75 It therefore seems safe to conclude that the results are not to driven by the 
choice of method, variables or data. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Note, however, that running a fixed effects leaves strong support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, producing 
stronger and more significant estimates for all of the explanatory variables (not shown here). 
74 The proportion of revolutions globally captures the proportion of other countries experiencing a nonviolent 
campaign globally. The variable on the length of the chief executive’s tenure is drawn from Cheibub et al. 
(2010), and has here been log-transformed. The variable on repression is drawn from the US State Department’s 
Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2010). The variable on welfare spending is retrieved from 
(Taydas and Peksen 2012) and measures the level of expenditure on welfare policies (i.e. education, health, and 
social security) to GDP. The variable is imputed and log-transformed. Finally, I have also included Freedom 
House’s measure of civil liberties, as well as a centered and a squared term of the level of democracy generated 
from the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) (Gates, Hegre, Jones, and Strand 2006). The SIP index is used as an 
alternative to the Polity index, given that the Polity index includes factionalism in the midrange categories.  
75 Although not shown here, the difference between no-party and multiparty autocracies is insignificant through 
all specifications.  
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5.4 Assessing the Evidence:  
 Do Institutions Channel Contention? 
 
To summarize, the findings of this empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical 
stipulations made in Chapter 3. First, dictatorships with one party run a significantly higher 
risk of nonviolent campaign onset than both no-party and multiparty autocracies. Second, I 
also find strong evidence that multiparty autocracies run no higher risk of onset than 
dictatorships that ban political parties. Third, we also see that the likelihood of campaign 
onset is highly conditioned on the duration of a regime. Dictatorships with multiple parties 
run a significantly higher risk of onset as time progresses.  
The effects are also relatively robust and comparatively strong. Thus, there appears to be 
considerable evidence that institutions matter in channeling contention. Despite featuring 
conditions that should make it easier to mobilize popular resistance, multiparty autocracies 
still experience a comparatively low exposure to nonviolent uprisings. In comparison, single-
party regimes have experienced a relatively high frequency of nonviolent campaign onsets, 
which appears to support the notion that these regimes will tend to underinstitutionalize to 
maintain internal stability.  
The odd case here is dictatorships with no parties. As hypothesized, these autocracies 
seem to be much less vulnerable to nonviolent uprisings than single-party regimes. This 
finding goes to show that the relationships covered do not simply reflect an association 
between the level of democracy and the risk of nonviolent conflict. No-party regimes tend to 
be staunchly authoritarian, yet feature no higher risk of uprisings than dictatorships with 
multiple parties. Arguably, this demonstrates the importance of opposition strength for 
mobilizing nonviolent action.  
Alternatively, no-party regimes may experience a lower risk of campaign onset because 
they are more capable of suppressing dissent. Following this logic, no-party regimes ban 
opposition parties not because they face a weak opposition, but because they have strong 
confidence in their ability to repress mobilization before it escalates. However, I have 
controlled for several of the most common proxies of regime capacity, including GDP per 
capita, military personnel and the level of democracy. Most likely, the effects of opposition 
strength and regime capacity are likely to work in conjunction. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
these two factors are often two sides of the same coin: if the regime is strong, we also tend to 
find that the opposition has limited leverage and mobilization strength. 
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Although the finding that no-party regimes experience a relatively low likelihood of 
uprisings may be discouraging from an activist’s point of view, these regimes are far from 
invulnerable to popular uprisings. In fact, no-party autocracies appear to be particularly 
susceptible to revolutionary contagion. The only interaction effect between the explanatory 
variables and the control variables that appeared positive was one between neighboring 
campaigns and no-party regimes (see Table B.2 in Appendix B). The results also show that 
dictatorships with no parties experience a much higher risk of nonviolent uprisings than 
democracies. 
Finally, the fact that multiparty autocracies become more exposed to nonviolent 
campaigns over time supports the notion that it is first of all the presence of opposition 
parties and multiparty elections that precludes popular mobilization in multiparty autocracies. 
A competing explanation is that multiparty autocracies dampen dissent by providing more 
public goods (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). However, the findings here are 
highly significant also when I control for the level of welfare spending to GDP. Moreover, 
economic productivity tends to increase over time, and hence also welfare provisions (Bueno 
de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Gandhi 2008). Thus, the previous line of reasoning would lead 
us to expect multiparty autocracies to face a lower risk of onset over time, not a higher risk. 
Admittedly, regime duration could be indicative of more personalized regimes, which are 
associated with lower levels of economic growth and public service provision (Wright 2008). 
Yet, I still find a very strong interaction effect even when controlling for executive tenure. 
Thus, it does appear that permitting opposition parties does play a role in channeling 
contention, even if this effect is highly contingent on the duration of the regime. Conversely, 
failing to respond with the appropriate level of institutionalization could significantly 
heighten the risk of a nonviolent uprising. 
 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has empirically tested the effects of restrictions on political parties on nonviolent 
uprisings. Consistent with the expectations from Hypothesis 1, the analysis showed that 
single-party regimes are more likely than both no-party and multiparty autocracies to 
experience nonviolent campaigns over regime change. Furthermore, in the absence of 
external shocks, dictatorships with no parties and dictatorships with multiple parties 
experience the same risk of governmental campaign onsets, thus confirming Hypothesis 2. 
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Finally, we also see that the effect of restrictions on political parties is highly dependent on 
the time since regime change. As stipulated in Hypothesis 3, multiparty autocracies 
experience a substantial increase in the risk of onset over time compared to other autocracies. 
In general, I therefore find strong support for all three hypotheses, even if their relevance is 
restricted to governmental campaigns. Hence, the findings suggest that differentiating 
between dictatorships with no parties, one party and several parties makes a valuable 
contribution to mapping the onset of nonviolent campaigns. 
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6  Conclusion 
 
None of us know all the potentialities that slumber in the spirit of the population, 
or all the ways in which that population can surprise us when there is the right 
interplay of events. 
Václav Havel (1990: 109) 
 
In this thesis, I have investigated one hitherto unexplored question in quantitative research on 
civil resistance: what are the effects of political party restrictions on the initiation of 
nonviolent campaigns in authoritarian regimes? Previous studies have largely ignored the 
considerable institutional differences that exist between dictatorships, thereby juxtaposing the 
risk of nonviolent uprisings in these regimes. Building on previous work on authoritarian 
survival, I have advanced three major arguments. 
First, I have argued that single-party regimes should be particularly prone to nonviolent 
uprisings because the internal power-sharing dynamics of these regimes make them liable to 
‘underinstitutionalize’ in the face of stronger popular opposition. If the dictator responds with 
greater levels of institutionalization, he also risks being overthrown by members of his ruling 
coalition.  
Second, I have suggested that the presence of multiparty competition makes key segments 
of the opposition more inclined to pursue change through institutional channels over 
nonviolent direct action. Consequently, multiparty autocracies should face no higher 
likelihood of nonviolent uprisings than no-party regimes, despite the fact that no-party 
regimes tend to face weaker opposition movements.  
Third, I have argued that the ability of multiparty autocracies to co-opt the opposition is 
highly conditioned on the proximity to the last regime change, and that the stabilizing 
properties of allowing multiple parties should decline over time. Hence, the effects of regime 
duration should be higher in multiparty autocracies than in other autocracies, which generally 
tend to experience more instability at the initial stages of their tenure.  
The evidence presented here provides significant support for all three arguments. First, 
single-party regimes experience a significantly higher risk of nonviolent uprisings than both 
multiparty autocracies and no-party regimes and this difference appears to be quite 
substantial. Second, multiparty autocracies and no-party regimes experience practically the 
same likelihood of nonviolent uprisings throughout all model specifications, and the 
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differences between the two regime types are never statistically significant. Third, the effect 
of regime duration on the likelihood of a nonviolent campaign onset was found to be much 
higher in multiparty autocracies than in autocracies without opposition parties. Although their 
relevance appears to be restricted to governmental campaigns, these associations appear to be 
robust and provide fair contributions to in-sample performance. As such, I conclude that there 
is credible evidence of a ‘channeling effect’: political party restrictions do appear to matter 
for whether, when and why opposition movements pursue regime change through nonviolent 
direct action. The high levels of civil resistance in authoritarian regimes can thus at least in 
part be attributed to their inability to channel contention, as compared to democracies – an 
effect that is exacerbated by the fact that autocracies generally tend to generate more 
disputes. In the remaining sections I highlight some of the main implications and limitations 
of the main arguments, and suggest some potential directions for future research. 
 
 
6.1 Implications 
 
The arguments presented here have several implications both for academic research on the 
subject and for policy. First, my results suggest that scholars should exercise more caution 
when discussing the stability of different regime types. A recurring tendency in the literature 
on authoritarian survival has been to highlight the resilience of single-party regimes and the 
volatility of multiparty autocracies on the basis of aggregate survival rates (Hadenius and 
Teorell 2007; Magaloni 2008). However, the fact that single-party regimes experience a 
higher likelihood of nonviolent uprisings than multiparty autocracies demonstrates the 
importance of specifying the sources of instability. Because dictators rely on different co-
optation and repression strategies, they are also likely to struggle with different threats to 
their rule. Importantly, more recent studies have acknowledged this possibility, and have 
started to compare different sources of autocratic breakdown (e.g. Geddes et al. 2014; 
Goemans et al. 2009; Svolik 2012). Certainly, this is a fruitful area for future research. 
Another set of implications relates to the role of temporal dynamics. How long a regime 
has lasted seems to play significant roles in conditioning the effects of political institutions on 
nonviolent uprisings. Previous accounts of the effects of political party restrictions are often 
highly static, and offer little consideration of how these effects vary over time (Magaloni 
2008; Svolik 2012). This implies that the effects of regime duration may be far more complex 
than what has previously been assumed (see also Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  
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The finding that multiparty autocracies experience a higher risk of nonviolent uprisings 
over time also leads to an important policy implication: Unless dictators find new and 
innovative ways to counter popular opposition, I do not expect the current wave of nonviolent 
uprisings to subside anytime soon. Given that multiparty autocracies now constitute about 
75% of all dictatorships (Wahman et al. 2013), the dynamics in these regimes should carry 
significant relevance for future trends in nonviolent uprisings. Moreover, a relatively large 
fraction of these regimes have only quite recently made transitions from other autocracies.76 
Hence, in the absence of democratic progress, it is quite conceivable that opposition 
movements in these countries will mobilize nonviolent direct action. Commenting on the 
upsurge in popular uprisings witnessed in the last few decades, Kendall–Taylor and Frantz 
(2014: 35) ask whether these “revolts [are] evidence that autocrats are becoming increasingly 
vulnerable to the masses? Or are they short-term exceptions to a longer-standing rule of 
autocratic ouster?” Although the findings here obviously cannot offer any conclusive 
evidence, they support the notion that these episodes are indicative of a more long-term trend. 
Finally, my study also suggests that opposition movements in no-party regimes may be 
particularly dependent on outside assistance to facilitate the mobilization of nonviolent 
campaigns. These movements can benefit substantially from aid such as material assistance 
to recruitment purposes, technical capacity building and the distribution of information - all 
factors that can help strengthen the membership base of these movements (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011). Without numbers the movements are unlikely to accomplish any major policy 
change. With numbers, however, they can constitute significant forces, regardless of whether 
the regime needs their support or not. Moreover, the risk of violent repression is likely to 
decrease as these movements extend their membership base. As the head of the East German 
security apparatus allegedly said to the party leader, Erich Honecker, during the uprisings of 
1989: “Erich, we can’t beat up hundreds of thousands of people” (Przeworski 1991: 64). 
 
 
6.2 Limitations 
 
Some notable limitations with my study also warrant attention. As noted in Chapter 5, the 
NAVCO 2.0 dataset only provides coverage until 2006. As such, the recent wave of 
nonviolent uprisings during the Arab Spring is not included in this analysis. The factors that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 For instance, in 2010 about 33% of all multiparty autocracies had lasted less than 7 years if we exclude 
transitions from democratic regimes (Wahman et al. 2013). 
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precipitated these campaigns may have been quite different from those that led to most of the 
campaigns included in NAVCO 2.0, a subject that has been hotly debated in recent years (e.g. 
Bellin 2012; Chenoweth and Stephan 2014; Goldstone 2011; Lynch 2013). This is a potent 
issue, which can only be properly assessed through more detailed analysis. 
Overall, it is unclear whether all of the findings have relevance for recent developments. 
This point becomes even more salient in the light of the current composition of most 
autocracies, as only ¼ of dictatorships retain de facto bans on opposition parties. These 
regimes may be more robust than many of the single-party and no-party regimes in the period 
under study. For instance, the majority of single-party regimes that still exist are communist 
regimes (Cheibub et al. 2010), which appear to be less vulnerable to popular pressures than 
noncommunist single-party regimes.  Similarly, the majority of today’s no-party regimes are 
monarchies, which have been highlighted as particularly resilient to domestic demands (e.g. 
Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Herb 1999). On the other hand, the predictions related to 
multiparty autocracies appear to carry significant relevance given the increasing prevalence 
of multiple parties in authoritarian regimes.  Again, the only way to address these questions is 
by studying new data. Hence, I leave this task to future research. 
Another limitation with this study is that if focuses solely on contextual variables. Several 
of these variables, such as level of economic development or the level of military 
involvement in politics, can often be highly static and not subject to much change. I have 
tried to address this problem by considering the interaction between regime duration and 
political party restrictions. This allows for a more dynamic model. Nevertheless, there are 
palpable reasons to expect agency to play a central role in the onset of nonviolent campaigns 
(see Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015 for a more detailed discussion). As such, I contend that 
the patterns studied here do not predetermine the site or timing of nonviolent uprisings. 
However, they reveal some strong tendencies that merit more attention. 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, endogeneity constitutes the greatest threat to the 
validity of my results. This threat is practically inescapable in studies of political institutions 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2005; Pepinsky 2014), but this does not make it less of a pressing 
issue. Identifying an appropriate instrument that is both highly correlated to the explanatory 
variables and exogenous to the dependent variable would leave even greater confidence in 
my results if they remain robust (Stock and Watson 2012). However, tracking such as 
instrument is cumbersome, and despite my best efforts at identifying one, it has simply not 
been achievable within the scope of this study. Still, there are tenable reasons to expect the 
results to hold also in an instrumental variable approach. As previous studies have shown, 
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dictatorships tend to rely on a higher level of party institutionalization in conditions where 
the opposition is strong and the regime is more dependent on cooperation (Gandhi 2008; 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Wright 2008). Thus, if the results were solely a product of 
endogeneity we would expect regimes with greater levels of institutionalization to be 
associated with a greater risk of nonviolent uprisings. Yet, the findings here reveal no such 
association. Thus, I argue that there is credible evidence that the influence of political 
institutions on nonviolent uprisings is not merely epiphenomenal. 
 
 
6.3 Future Research 
 
Overall, the onset of nonviolent campaigns still remains uncharted territory. Several 
dynamics are worth further exploration. One area that appears to be especially ripe for more 
research is the association between elections and nonviolent uprisings in multiparty 
autocracies. Electoral revolutions have received some attention in the literature on civil 
resistance (e.g. Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Nepstad 2011). Yet, quantitative work on these 
events has been practically absent.77 As argued in this thesis, elections in authoritarian 
regimes are often more than empty displays, and can lower the incentives of opposition 
movements for nonviolent action. Still, if elections are revealed as outright shams and 
opposition movements are unable to make progress through these institutions, then the 
opposition may be inclined to pursue change through other means. Thus, elections can both 
provoke and preclude nonviolent action. 
A second area that merits further exploration is the dynamics of no-party regimes. 
Previous studies of political party restrictions have tended to highlight the properties of party 
regimes, and have offered less attention to the inner and outer workings of dictatorships that 
ban opposition parties (e.g. Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Svolik 2012). The go-to reference for 
this question has typically been the works by Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi 
(2008). Yet, compared to all of the work that has been done on political party regimes, the 
dynamics of no-party regimes has received limited attention.  
Finally, the prospects of democratic consolidation following nonviolent campaigns has 
started to receive more attention (e.g. Geddes et al. 2014), but remains relatively 
underexplored compared to the immediate success of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Partial exceptions include Butcher and Svensson (2014) and Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015). Yet, none of 
these studies have elections as their primary interest, and offer only brief considerations of its effects. 
	   101	  
Stephan 2011; Shaykhutdinov 2010; Svensson and Lindgren 2011).78 Furthermore, how a 
regime’s institutional heritage plays into this calculation has not received any attention. For 
instance, it is conceivable that nonviolent campaigns not only improve the prospects of 
democratic consolidation in general, but that these events also ease consolidation in countries 
with a difficult institutional heritage.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Note, however, that the subject is briefly addressed in Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). 
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Appendix A 
Additional statistics  
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Table A.1 Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 1973-2006, all regimes 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Missing 
Ln Regime durationt-1 2.212 0.999 0 3.850 5752 0 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 8.341 1.212 4.889 13.237 5651 101 
Urban populationt-1 48.229 24.151 2.716 100 5531 221 
Ln Natural resourcest-1 0.251 0.615 0 4.502 5191 561 
Ln Population 15.471 1.987 9.756 21.006 5675 77 
Democratic neighborhoodt-1 0.383 0.330 0 1 5706 46 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.441 0.264 0 0.930 5539 213 
Religious fractionalization 0.434 0.240 0.002 0.860 5578 174 
Ln Military personnelt-1 3.357 1.920 0 8.466 5598 154 	  
	  
Table A.2 Frequency tables for binary variables 1973-2006, all regimes 
Variable 0 1 Total Missing 
Nonviolent campaign onset 5516 236 5752 0 
No-party regimet-1 4597 1155 5752 0 
Single-party regimet-1 4761 991 5752 0 
Multiparty autocracy-1 4468 1284 5752 0 
Democracyt-1 3430 2322 5752 0 
Military regimet-1 4468 888 5752 0 
Election-year 3745 1278 5023 224 
Neighboring campaign t-1 4127 1583 5710 42 
Communist t-1 5381 361 5742 10 
Civil wart-1 4914 838 5752 0 	  	  
Table A.3 Frequency of country-years for decades, all regimes 
Decade Absolute frequency Relative frequency 
1973-79 1,042 0.18 
1980s 1,618 0.28 
1990s 1,793 0.31 
2000-2006 1,299 0.23 
N 5,752 	  	  
Table A.4 Frequency of country-years for regions, all regimes 
Region Absolute frequency Relative frequency 
W. Europe & N. America (incl. AU & NZ) 782 0.14 
E. Europe & ex. Soviet Union 568 0.10 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,567 0.27 
Asia & the Pacific 1,067 0.19 
MENA 697 0.12 
Latin America & the Caribbean 1,067 0.19 
N 5,752 	  	  
	  112	  
	  
Table A.5 More than 5 country-years missing, selected variables 
 Urban 
population 
Natural resource 
revenue 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Religious 
fractionalization 
Czechoslovakia X  X X 
Ethiopia   X X 
Germany, East X X X X 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
X X X X 
Taiwan X X   
USSR X X X X 
Yemen, North X X X X 
Yemen, South X X X X 
Yugoslavia X    
Excluding following microstates: Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Maldives Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Seychelles, and Vanuatu. 	  
Figure A.3 Density Plots of observed and imputed values 
 
	   	  
	   	  
	   	  
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Observed and Imputed values of al_ethnic
al_ethnic   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.039
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Observed and Imputed values of al_language
al_language   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.076
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
Observed and Imputed values of al_religion
al_religion   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.033
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Observed and Imputed values of al_ethnic
al_ethnic   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.039
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Observed and Imputed values of al_language
al_language   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.076
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
Observed and Imputed values of al_religion
al_religion   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.033
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
Observed and Imputed values of ln_pop
ln_pop   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.008
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0 50 100
0.
00
0
0.
01
0
0.
02
0
Observed values of regime1ny
N = 5752   Bandwidth = 7.695
De
ns
ity
4 6 8 10 12
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
Observed and Imputed values of ln_gle_gdp
ln_gle_gdp   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.013
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Observed and Imputed values of ln_oilgasvalue_pc
ln_oilgasvalue_pc   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.093
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
Observed and Imputed values of ln_pop
ln_pop   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.008
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0 50 100
0.
00
0
0.
01
0
0.
02
0
Observed values of regime1ny
N = 5752   Bandwidth = 7.695
De
ns
ity
4 6 8 10 12
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
Observed and Imputed values of ln_gle_gdp
ln_gle_gdp   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.013
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Observed and Imputed values of ln_oilgasvalue_pc
ln_oilgasvalue_pc   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.093
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
Observed and Imputed values of ln_pop
ln_pop   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.008
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0 50 100
0.
00
0
0.
01
0
0.
02
0
Observed values of regime1ny
N = 5752   Bandwidth = 7.695
De
ns
ity
4 6 8 10 12
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
Observed and Imputed values of ln_gle_gdp
ln_gle_gdp   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.013
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Observed and Imputed values of ln_oilgasvalue_pc
ln_oilgasvalue_pc   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.093
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
Observed and Imputed values of wdi_popurbper
wdi_popurbper   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.032
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
4 6 8 10 12 14
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
Observed and Imputed values of ln_gle_gdp_lag
ln_gle_gdp_lag   −−  Fraction Missing: 0.018
Re
lat
ive
 D
en
sit
y
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
2
4
6
8
Observed values of mon_lag
N = 5752   Bandwidth = 0.04177
De
ns
ity
	   113	  
Appendix B  
Auxiliary regression tables 
Table B.1 Region & Decade dummies 
 Model 2 Model 5 Model 8 
No partiest-1  -0.823** -1.229*** -1.042*** 
 (0.407) (0.407) (0.403) 
Multiple partiest-1  -0.890** -1.146*** -3.617*** 
 (0.389) (0.414) (0.867) 
Ln regime durationt-1   0.0938 
   (0.204) 
Multiparty*regime duration   1.162*** 
   (0.345) 
Controls    
Military regimet-1 0.624** 0.528* 0.292 
 (0.262) (0.293) (0.330) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.475 0.212 -0.196 
   (0.303) (0.305) (0.275) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -1.135* -1.534* -1.259 
 (0.590) (0.834) (0.955) 
Urban populationt-1 0.00198 0.0113 0.0173 
 (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0121) 
Populationt-1 0.251** 0.464*** 0.443*** 
 (0.113) (0.106) (0.115) 
Democratic neighborst-1  -0.329 0.0748 
  (0.662) (0.677) 
Neighboring campaignt-1  0.607** 0.674** 
  (0.280) (0.270) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.176 0.270 
   (0.634) (0.686) 
Religious fractionalization  -1.560*** -1.539*** 
    (0.554) (0.507) 
Communistt-1  -0.882 -1.164* 
  (0.661) (0.653) 
Civil wart-1  -0.600* -0.610* 
  (0.314) (0.353) 
Previous campaign 3.560*** 3.362*** 3.368*** 
 (0.286) (0.266) (0.289) 
1970s -1.146** -0.868 -0.478 
 (0.582) (0.649) (0.662) 
1980s -0.603 -0.331 -0.0786 
 (0.429) (0.434) (0.450) 
1990s -0.523 -0.373 -0.111 
 (0.393) (0.399) (0.373) 
W. Europe & N. America (incl. AU & NZ) -0.211 -0.109 1.124 
 (0.687) (0.696) (0.901) 
E. Europe & ex.-Soviet -1.201** -0.897 -0.00351 
 (0.545) (0.567) (0.587) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.137** -1.099* -0.994* 
 (0.457) (0.578) (0.522) 
Asia and the Pacific -1.706*** -2.010*** -2.272*** 
 (0.589) (0.545) (0.590) 
MENA -1.363*** -1.610*** -1.272** 
 (0.456) (0.482) (0.510) 
Intercept -7.860*** -7.444*** -5.214*** 
 (2.217) (2.378) (1.976) 
	  114	  
Log-likelihood -368.28 -348.24 -328.77 
AIC 770.57 742.48 707.54 
Observations 3,066 3,010 3,010 
Countries 128 127 127 
Notes: All models are logit models with Single party as ref. cat. For the decade and region dummies, the 
reference categories are the 2000s and Latin America & The Caribbean. Territorial campaigns are 
excluded and none of the models include region or decade dummies. Clustered robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table B.2 Interaction between No parties and neighboring campaign 
No partiest-1  -0.494 
 (0.478) 
Multiple partiest-1  0.911** 
 (0.389) 
Controls  
Military regimet-1 0.620** 
 (0.278) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.152 
   (0.211) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -1.715*** 
 (0.607) 
Urban populationt-1 0.0177* 
 (0.00912) 
Populationt-1 0.448*** 
 (0.102) 
Democratic neighborst-1 1.124** 
 (0.569) 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.326 
 (0.316) 
No-party*neighboring campaign 1.046** 	   (0.441) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.855 
  (0.569) 
Religious fractionalization -0.985** 
   (0.489) 
Communistt-1 -0.691 
 (0.564) 
Civil wart-1 -0.390 
 (0.283) 
Previous campaign 3.400*** 
 (0.223) 
Intercept -10.41*** 
 (2.076) 
Log-likelihood -394.12 
AIC 820.24 
Observations 3,039 
Countries 127 
Notes: The estimates are based on a logistic regression model with Single 
party as the reference category. None of the models include region or 
decade dummies. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C 
Model Diagnostics  
 
 
 
Table C.1 VIF values for variables in Model 3 and Model 8 
 
Variable 
VIF 
Model 3 Model 8 
No partiest-1 2.00 2.04 
Multiple partiest-1 2.21 7.11 
Ln Regime durationt-1  1.86 
Multiple parties*regime duration  5.88 
Military regimet-1 1.37 1.38 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 4.15 4.26 
Ln urban populationt-1 2.57 2.99 
Oil and gas valuet-1 2.85 2.60 
Populationt-1 1.36 1.41 
Democratic neighborst-1 1.32 1.33 
Neighboring campaignt-1 1.05 1.05 
Ethnic fractionalization 1.43 1.44 
Religious fractionalization 1.13 1.13 
Communistt-1 1.59 1.59 
Civil wart-1 1.14 1.15 
Previous campaign 1.09 1.09 
Mean VIF 1.80 2.40 	  	  	  
Figure	  C.1	  Influential	  units	  (dbeta)	  
Model 3 Model 8 
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Table C.2 Excluding outliers in Model 3 and Model 8 
 Model 3 Model 8 
No partiest-1  -1.121*** -1.239*** 
 (0.408) (0.393) 
Multiple partiest-1  -1.245*** -3.811*** 
 (0.432) (0.686) 
Ln Regime durationt-1  -0.235 
  (0.195) 
Multiple parties*regime duration  1.280*** 
  (0.263) 
Controls   
Military regimet-1 0.706** 0.795*** 
 (0.321) (0.305) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.156 -0.0223 
   (0.239) (0.253) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -1.906*** -1.723*** 
 (0.700) (0.619) 
Urban populationt-1 0.0256** 0.0212* 
 (0.0101) (0.0111) 
Populationt-1 0.406*** 0.317*** 
 (0.108) (0.107) 
Democratic neighborst-1 0.758 0.863 
 (0.608) (0.634) 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.735** 0.728** 
 (0.297) (0.300) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.481 0.334 
  (0.648) (0.583) 
Religious fractionalization -1.193** -0.836 
   (0.601) (0.621) 
Communistt-1 -0.962 -0.575 
 (0.596) (0.567) 
Civil wart-1 -0.783** -0.762** 
 (0.340) (0.339) 
Previous campaign 3.586*** 3.744*** 
 (0.260) (0.260) 
Intercept -10.50*** -6.614*** 
 (2.301) (2.124) 
Log-likelihood -333.63 -321.04 
AIC 697.26 676.07 
Observations 3,004 3,004 
Countries 127 127 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models with Single party as reference category. Territorial 
campaigns are excluded and none of the models include region or decade dummies. Clustered 
robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	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Appendix D 
Robustness checks 
 
Table D.1 Alternative operationalizations and sensitivity analyses for Model 3 
 Democracy 
included 
Imputed 
data 
Higher 
threshold 
Original 
typology 
Cheibub et  
al.’s (2010) 
regime data 
Prev. camp 
(alt.1) 
Prev. camp. 
(alt.2) 
UCDP/ 
PRIO 
No partiest-1 -0.904** -0.936** -1.366***  -0.808** -0.853** -0.879** -0.945** 
 (0.387) (0.389) (0.486)  (0.360) (0.379) (0.377) (0.392) 
Multiple partiest-1  -0.830** -1.190*** -1.173***  -0.940** -0.786** -0.804** -0.892** 
 (0.412) (0.378) (0.454)  (0.382) (0.372) (0.373) (0.404) 
Multiparty 
autocracyt-1 
   -1.037**     
       (0.433)     
Military regimet-1    -0.332     
    (0.419)     
Monarchyt-1    -1.375     
    (1.044)     
Other autocracyt-1    -1.332*     
    (0.686)     
Controls         
Military regimet-1 0.571* 0.437 0.582  0.703** 0.572** 0.571** 0.595* 
 (0.307) (0.299) (0.379)  (0.301) (0.271) (0.272) (0.318) 
Ln GDP per  0.0910 0.201 0.338 0.0971 0.140 0.198 0.190 0.118 
  capitat-1 (0.219) (0.214) (0.275) (0.210) (0.271) (0.234) (0.226) (0.225) 
Ln oil and gas  -1.519*** -1.778*** -2.462*** -1.354** -1.661*** -1.548*** -1.551*** -1.662*** 
  incomet-1 (0.521) (0.599) (0.750) (0.608) (0.592) (0.525) (0.534) (0.598) 
Urban pop.t-1 0.020** 0.017* 0.022** 0.0215** 0.0207* 0.015 0.016* 0.021** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.00975) (0.0116) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Populationt-1 0.400*** 0.314*** 0.258** 0.360*** 0.466*** 0.378*** 0.369*** 0.376*** 
 (0.100) (0.093) (0.118) (0.0890) (0.114) (0.081) (0.079) (0.098) 
Democratic  0.382 1.271** 1.080* 0.590 0.360 0.705 0.711 0.641 
  neighborst-1 (0.581) (0.551) (0.562) (0.563) (0.727) (0.543) (0.533) (0.586) 
Neighboring  0.608** 0.539** 0.749** 0.635** 0.615** 0.477* 0.501* 0.633** 
  campaignt-1 (0.272) (0.264) (0.300) (0.278) (0.300) (0.265) (0.270) (0.280) 
Ethnic  0.727 0.196 1.155 0.663 0.706 0.379 0.376 0.553 
  fractionalization  (0.607) (0.589) (0.758) (0.590) (0.637) (0.549) (0.544) (0.628) 
Religious  -1.398*** -0.813 -1.242* -1.291** -1.567*** -0.901* -0.911* -1.368** 
  fractionalization (0.534) (0.540) (0.637) (0.556) (0.582) (0.531) (0.523) (0.553) 
Communistt-1 -0.578 -1.251** -1.050 -0.778 -0.259 -0.480 -0.475 -0.746 
 (0.567) (0.527) (0.682) (0.532) (0.487) (0.546) (0.539) (0.549) 
Civil wart-1 -0.766** -0.584* -0.764** -0.710** -0.933** -0.320 -0.308  
 (0.325) (0.309) (0.369) (0.342) (0.373) (0.278) (0.276)  
Previous  3.313*** 3.502*** 3.507*** 3.365*** 3.441***   3.450*** 
  campaign (0.223) (0.227) (0.288) (0.248) (0.270)   (0.256) 
Democracyt-1 -3.965***        
 (0.753)        
Ongoing campaignt-1      4.504*** 4.541***  
      (0.493) (0.403)  
Ln time in peace      0.160   
      (0.175)   
Decay function of 
time 
      -0.649  
   in peace       (0.517)  
Armed conflictt-1        -0.962*** 
        (0.296) 
Intercept -8.436*** -8.290*** -9.593*** -8.062*** -9.535*** -9.543*** -8.885*** -8.407*** 
 (1.986) (1.823) (2.672) (1.839) (2.258) (2.147) (1.909) (2.060) 
Log-likelihood -406.65 -403.63 -307.50 -361.72 -324.90 -326.98 -326.77 -358.93 
AIC 845.30 837.27 645.01 755.44 679.80 685.95 685.55 747.85 
Observations 4,970 3,361 3,010 3,010 2,842 3,010 3,010 3,010 
Countries 164 142 127 127 119 127 127 127 
Notes: All models are logit models with Single party as ref. cat. Territorial campaigns are excluded and none of the models include region or 
decade dummies. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table D.2 Alternative operationalizations and sensitivity analyses for Model 8 
 Democracy 
included 
Imputed 
data 
Higher 
threshold 
Original 
typology 
Cheibub et  
al.’s (2010) 
regime data 
Prev. camp. 
(alt.1) 
Prev. camp. 
(alt.2) 
UCDP/ 
PRIO 
No partiest-1  -0.875** -0.934** -1.387***  -0.815** -0.889** -0.894** -0.964** 
 (0.366) (0.384) (0.486)  (0.341) (0.368) (0.366) (0.375) 
Multiple partiest-1  -2.961*** -3.171*** -3.123***  -3.274*** -2.707*** -2.682*** -3.179*** 
 (0.725) (0.806) (0.841)  (1.037) (0.740) (0.736) (0.754) 
Ln regime  -0.0326 -0.0334 -0.0867 -0.010 0.117 -0.080 -0.0699 -0.0888 
   durationt-1 (0.147) (0.208) (0.216) (0.217) (0.163) (0.185) (0.180) (0.191) 
Multiparty*regime 0.958*** 0.911*** 0.877*** 1.149*** 0.896*** 0.825*** 0.813*** 1.021*** 
   duration (0.280) (0.310) (0.329) (0.363) (0.339) (0.293) (0.293) (0.298) 
Multiparty     -3.378***     
   autocracyt-1    (0.913)     
Military regimet-1    -0.350     
    (0.415)     
Monarchyt-1    -1.310     
    (1.091)     
Other autocracyt-1    -1.447*     
    (0.764)     
Controls         
Military regimet-1 0.340 0.340 0.511  0.732** 0.529* 0.525* 0.515 
 (0.301) (0.301) (0.384)  (0.302) (0.286) (0.286) (0.315) 
Ln GDP per  0.100 0.100 0.203 -0.137 0.101 0.0706 0.0699 -0.0171 
  capitat-1 (0.235) (0.235) (0.272) (0.232) (0.268) (0.237) (0.234) (0.238) 
Ln oil and gas  -1.468*** -1.468*** -2.204*** -1.286* -1.552*** -1.447** -1.453** -1.410** 
  incomet-1 (0.534) (0.534) (0.767) (0.733) (0.596) (0.578) (0.586) (0.603) 
Urban pop.t-1 0.0142 0.0142 0.0190* 0.0212* 0.0178 0.0154 0.0156 0.0178 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0113) 
Populationt-1 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.193 0.312*** 0.377*** 0.356*** 0.349*** 0.321*** 
 (0.0917) (0.0917) (0.120) (0.0926) (0.106) (0.0872) (0.0863) (0.103) 
Democratic  1.501*** 1.501*** 1.307** 0.905 0.494 0.937 0.935 0.819 
  neighborst-1 (0.558) (0.558) (0.631) (0.606) (0.727) (0.576) (0.570) (0.642) 
Neighboring  0.629** 0.629** 0.825*** 0.725*** 0.576* 0.531** 0.547** 0.707** 
  campaignt-1 (0.267) (0.267) (0.293) (0.278) (0.317) (0.261) (0.265) (0.282) 
Ethnic  0.0525 0.0525 0.934 0.541 0.677 0.244 0.240 0.333 
  fractionalization  (0.566) (0.566) (0.711) (0.537) (0.621) (0.546) (0.546) (0.575) 
Religious  -0.533 -0.533 -0.994 -1.397*** -1.159* -0.819 -0.819 -1.047* 
  fractionalization (0.557) (0.557) (0.629) (0.483) (0.614) (0.548) (0.544) (0.575) 
Communistt-1 -1.176** -1.176** -0.927 -0.654 -0.532 -0.387 -0.387 -0.639 
 (0.544) (0.544) (0.708) (0.571) (0.492) (0.575) (0.573) (0.565) 
Civil wart-1 -0.490 -0.490 -0.645* -0.581 -0.813** -0.233 -0.228  
 (0.313) (0.313) (0.376) (0.375) (0.380) (0.281) (0.279)  
Previous  3.641*** 3.502*** 3.608*** 3.476*** 3.615***   3.571*** 
  campaign (0.241) (0.227) (0.297) (0.257) (0.280)   (0.265) 
Democracyt-1 -3.882***        
 (0.754)        
Ongoing campaignt-1      4.317*** 4.373***  
      (0.485) (0.375)  
Ln time in peace      0.0920   
      (0.178)   
Decay function of        -0.422  
   time in peace       (0.501)  
Armed conflictt-1        -0.874*** 
        (0.317) 
Intercept -7.044*** -7.074*** -7.750*** -5.872*** -8.766*** -8.001*** -7.654*** -6.646*** 
 (1.944) (1.878) (2.482) (1.800) (2.133) (2.025) (1.914) (1.991) 
Log-likelihood -391.75 -403.63 -297.25 -344.40 -311.93 -319.85 -319.72 -343.95 
AIC 819.51 837.27 628.49 724.80 657.85 675.70 675.45 721.90 
Observations 4,970 3,361 3,010 3,010 2,842 3,010 3,010 3,010 
Countries 164 142 127 127 119 127 127 127 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models with Single party as reference category. Territorial campaigns are excluded and none of the 
models include region or decade dummies. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   119	  
Table D.3 Alternative estimations for Model 3 
 Probit Multinomial logit 
  Nonviolent Violent Both 
No partiest-1  -0.430** -0.801* -0.367 -1.198 
 (0.187) (0.424) (0.297) (0.891) 
Multiple partiest-1  -0.426** -0.991** -0.435 -0.823 
 (0.185) (0.464) (0.331) (1.048) 
Controls     
Military regimet-1 0.261* 0.531 0.346 1.144 
 (0.144) (0.339) (0.249) (0.793) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.0938 0.222 0.0303 -0.774 
   (0.107) (0.260) (0.160) (0.787) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -0.767*** -1.455*** -0.294 -5.555* 
 (0.277) (0.516) (0.280) (3.006) 
Urban populationt-1 0.008* 0.0227** -0.0108 0.0247 
 (0.005) (0.0100) (0.00810) (0.0257) 
Populationt-1 0.179*** 0.369*** 0.281*** 0.963*** 
 (0.046) (0.0993) (0.0912) (0.317) 
Democratic neighborst-1 0.355 1.088* 0.560 -3.513 
 (0.275) (0.589) (0.497) (2.872) 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.281** 0.428 0.102 1.088 
 (0.125) (0.312) (0.251) (0.840) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.194 1.045 0.126 -0.835 
  (0.281) (0.702) (0.558) (0.913) 
Religious fractionalization -0.471* -1.008* -0.782 -5.639*** 
   (0.261) (0.543) (0.483) (2.080) 
Communistt-1 -0.328 -0.627 -1.046 -13.79*** 
 (0.260) (0.599) (0.837) (1.198) 
Civil wart-1 -0.327** 0.850 6.022*** 17.95*** 
 (0.146) (0.561) (0.271) (0.454) 
Previous campaign 1.797*** 3.665*** 1.523*** 3.982*** 
 (0.136) (0.307) (0.472) (0.796) 
Intercept -4.469*** -9.756*** -5.812*** -21.47*** 
 (0.937) (2.488) (1.511) (7.670) 
Log-likelihood -362.34 -739.60 
AIC 754.68 1569.20 
Observations 3,010 3,010 
Countries 127 127 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models with Single party as reference category. Territorial 
campaigns are excluded and none of the models include region or decade dummies. Clustered 
robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	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Table D.4 Alternative estimations for Model 8 
 Probit Multinomial logit 
  Nonviolent Violent Both 
No partiest-1  -0.436** -0.709* -0.302 -1.906* 
 (0.175) (0.395) (0.341) (1.145) 
Multiple partiest-1  -1.599*** -3.021*** -0.0394 -4.864** 
 (0.377) (0.789) (0.670) (1.946) 
Ln regime durationt-1 -0.0324 0.0560 0.0989 -0.736* 
 (0.0890) (0.203) (0.194) (0.389) 
Multiparty*regime duration 0.516*** 0.930*** -0.182 1.702*** 
 (0.152) (0.316) (0.235) (0.596) 
Controls     
Military regimet-1 0.210 0.459 0.370 1.158 
 (0.144) (0.315) (0.250) (0.767) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.0269 0.0742 0.0446 -1.222 
   (0.117) (0.262) (0.161) (0.788) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -0.696** -1.190** -0.317 -8.048** 
 (0.301) (0.519) (0.298) (3.761) 
Urban populationt-1 0.00719 0.0188 -0.0115 0.0367 
 (0.00546) (0.0115) (0.00781) (0.0305) 
Populationt-1 0.165*** 0.301*** 0.280*** 1.320*** 
 (0.0478) (0.101) (0.0958) (0.400) 
Democratic neighborst-1 0.461 1.364** 0.566 -4.315 
 (0.302) (0.634) (0.499) (2.744) 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.329*** 0.524* 0.0824 0.903 
 (0.127) (0.315) (0.255) (0.914) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.127 0.820 0.145 -0.430 
  (0.270) (0.634) (0.545) (1.037) 
Religious fractionalization -0.382 -0.738 -0.775 -6.280*** 
   (0.276) (0.566) (0.488) (1.986) 
Communistt-1 -0.301 -0.577 -1.054 -14.21*** 
 (0.268) (0.626) (0.835) (1.607) 
Civil wart-1 -0.286** 0.967* 6.044*** 18.76*** 
 (0.145) (0.567) (0.277) (0.501) 
Previous campaign 1.857*** 3.829*** 1.545*** 4.241*** 
 (0.137) (0.319) (0.485) (0.879) 
Intercept -3.755*** -8.157*** -6.155*** -20.84*** 
 (0.938) (2.342) (1.527) (7.229) 
Log-likelihood -403.63 -721.67 
AIC 837.27 1545.34 
Observations 3,361 3,010 
Countries 127 127 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models with Single party as reference category. Territorial 
campaigns are excluded and none of the models include region or decade dummies. Clustered 
robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	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Table D.5 Investigating the effects of omitted variable bias, Model 3  
 Random 
effects 
Glob. camp. 
average 
Executive 
tenure 
Repression 
(PTS) 
Welfare 
spending 
No partiest-1  -1.614*** -0.919** -0.811** -1.044** -1.072*** 
 (0.489) (0.394) (0.401) (0.432) (0.399) 
Multiple partiest-1  -1.413*** -0.933** -0.861** -0.941** -0.853** 
 (0.517) (0.391) (0.418) (0.430) (0.406) 
Controls      
Military regimet-1 0.935** 0.610** 0.605* 0.659** 0.634** 
 (0.400) (0.300) (0.311) (0.331) (0.314) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.139 0.130 0.129 0.260 0.0621 
   (0.293) (0.224) (0.233) (0.264) (0.227) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -1.797** -1.687*** -1.719*** -1.644** -1.505** 
 (0.835) (0.615) (0.603) (0.668) (0.589) 
Urban populationt-1 0.0224* 0.0224** 0.0215** 0.0178* 0.0254** 
 (0.0131) (0.00984) (0.0100) (0.0107) (0.00997) 
Populationt-1 0.502*** 0.380*** 0.378*** 0.294** 0.327*** 
 (0.141) (0.105) (0.103) (0.128) (0.100) 
Democratic neighborst-1 1.274* 0.611 0.678 0.751 0.571 
 (0.749) (0.570) (0.576) (0.574) (0.603) 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.662** 0.519* 0.602** 0.552* 0.669** 
 (0.327) (0.309) (0.284) (0.287) (0.287) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.638 0.505 0.506 0.884 0.626 
  (0.773) (0.609) (0.637) (0.711) (0.650) 
Religious fractionalization -1.156* -1.185** -1.170** -1.270** -1.145* 
   (0.685) (0.555) (0.576) (0.642) (0.607) 
Communistt-1 -0.322 -0.714 -0.746 -0.747 -0.563 
 (0.710) (0.551) (0.557) (0.792) (0.571) 
Civil wart-1 -0.564 -0.748** -0.763** -0.752** -0.859** 
 (0.371) (0.316) (0.325) (0.380) (0.354) 
Previous campaign 3.075*** 3.392*** 3.496*** 3.526*** 3.577*** 
 (0.300) (0.254) (0.247) (0.281) (0.249) 
Nonviolent campaign  4.636    
   average, globallyt-1  (6.358)    
Ln executive tenuret-1   0.148   
   (0.122)   
Repressiont-1    0.267**  
    (0.118)  
Ln welfare spendingt-1     -0.0297 
     (0.0405) 
Intercept -10.18*** -9.756*** -5.812*** -9.399*** -7.696*** 
 (2.714) (2.488) (1.511) (2.205) (1.977) 
Log-likelihood -354.25 -360.49 -360.03 -317.39 -335.23 
AIC 740.50 752.98 752.06 666.79 702.47 
Observations 3,010 3,010 3,010 2,479 2,770 
Countries 127 127 127 125 123 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models with Single party as reference category. Territorial 
campaigns are excluded and none of the models include region or decade dummies. Clustered 
robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.5 Investigating the effects of omitted variable bias, Model 3 (continued) 
 Growth Cold war FH CL SIP 
No partiest-1  -0.966** -0.924** -1.215*** -0.785* 
 (0.399) (0.389) (0.420) (0.437) 
Multiple partiest-1  -0.970** -0.861** -1.178*** -0.838** 
 (0.404) (0.420) (0.416) (0.396) 
Controls     
Military regimet-1 0.589* 0.445 0.715** 0.421 
 (0.307) (0.308) (0.322) (0.355) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 0.129 0.0421 0.103 0.131 
   (0.223) (0.238) (0.226) (0.308) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -1.694*** -1.582*** -1.539** -1.657*** 
 (0.606) (0.585) (0.630) (0.621) 
Urban populationt-1 0.0218** 0.0237** 0.0210** 0.0232** 
 (0.00974) (0.0100) (0.00971) (0.0113) 
Populationt-1 0.371*** 0.389*** 0.344*** 0.357*** 
 (0.0995) (0.0961) (0.0998) (0.107) 
Democratic neighborst-1 0.667 0.881 0.636 1.054* 
 (0.572) (0.580) (0.570) (0.611) 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.612** 0.680** 0.561** 0.576* 
 (0.279) (0.297) (0.279) (0.299) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.568 0.680 0.591 0.270 
  (0.610) (0.608) (0.616) (0.722) 
Religious fractionalization -1.182** -1.087* -1.100* -0.732 
   (0.560) (0.556) (0.565) (0.554) 
Communistt-1 -0.746 -0.842 -0.556 -1.055* 
 (0.557) (0.554) (0.584) (0.560) 
Civil wart-1 -0.737** -0.763** -0.690** -0.557 
 (0.318) (0.315) (0.330) (0.343) 
Previous campaign 3.433*** 3.422*** 3.430*** 3.544*** 
 (0.246) (0.254) (0.256) (0.274) 
GDP Growth -0.0230    
 (0.809)    
Cold War  0.448   
  (0.321)   
FH Civil Libertiest-1   -0.182  
   (0.151)  
Cen. SIP scoret-1    -2.461** 
    (1.148) 
SIP score squaredt-1    -3.893 
    (3.070) 
Intercept -8.543*** -8.554*** -7.086*** -8.788*** 
 (2.006) (1.944) (2.408) (2.754) 
Log-likelihood -361.03 -359.49 -346.73 -332.98 
AIC 754.07 750.98 725.45 699.96 
Observations 3,010 3,010 2,916 2,721 
Countries 127 127 127 121 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models with Single party as reference category. Territorial 
campaigns are excluded and none of the models include region or decade dummies. Clustered robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D.6 Investigating the effects of omitted variable bias, Model 8 
 Random 
effects 
Glob. camp. 
average 
Executive 
tenure 
Repression 
(PTS) 
Welfare 
spending 
No partiest-1  -1.798*** -1.005*** -1.007*** -1.162*** -1.114*** 
 (0.464) (0.384) (0.386) (0.424) (0.384) 
Multiple partiest-1  -4.770*** -3.348*** -3.329*** -3.431*** -3.296*** 
 (1.024) (0.755) (0.771) (0.748) (0.803) 
Ln regime durationt-1 0.0822 -0.139 -0.114  -0.0809 
 (0.245) (0.194) (0.195) -0.189 (0.205) 
Multiparty*regime duration 1.523*** 1.063*** 1.049*** (0.186) 1.105*** 
 (0.411) (0.303) (0.302) 1.078*** (0.318) 
Controls    (0.289)  
Military regimet-1 0.520 0.531* 0.508 0.561* 0.529* 
 (0.408) (0.305) (0.309) (0.337) (0.306) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 -0.153 -0.00944 -0.0102 0.0866 -0.133 
   (0.347) (0.241) (0.238) (0.270) (0.231) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1 -1.802* -1.432** -1.444** -1.353** -1.165** 
 (1.040) (0.607) (0.607) (0.646) (0.574) 
Urban populationt-1 0.0243 0.0197* 0.0189* 0.0165 0.0217* 
 (0.0161) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0119) (0.0115) 
Populationt-1 0.581*** 0.331*** 0.322*** 0.256* 0.284*** 
 (0.178) (0.109) (0.105) (0.136) (0.106) 
Democratic neighborst-1 1.801** 0.820 0.872 1.032 0.720 
 (0.824) (0.633) (0.630) (0.630) (0.657) 
Neighboring campaignt-1 0.809** 0.614** 0.691** 0.651** 0.786*** 
 (0.361) (0.296) (0.281) (0.278) (0.285) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.215 0.322 0.370 0.736 0.384 
  (0.893) (0.569) (0.572) (0.683) (0.583) 
Religious fractionalization -1.239 -0.908 -0.897 -0.931 -0.826 
   (0.830) (0.573) (0.576) (0.658) (0.605) 
Communistt-1 -0.616 -0.596 -0.634 -0.611 -0.467 
 (0.736) (0.577) (0.573) (0.814) (0.582) 
Civil wart-1 -0.500 -0.636** -0.626* -0.628* -0.765** 
 (0.405) (0.320) (0.320) (0.381) (0.362) 
Previous campaign 2.949*** 3.519*** 3.558*** 3.612*** 3.730*** 
 (0.337) (0.262) (0.254) (0.288) (0.264) 
Nonviolent campaign  3.940    
   average, globallyt-1  (6.000)    
Ln executive tenuret-1   0.013   
   (0.120)   
Repressiont-1    0.085  
    (0.143)  
Ln welfare spendingt-1     0.002 
     (0.035) 
Intercept -8.842*** -6.931*** -6.792*** -6.994*** -5.843*** 
 (2.989) (2.016) (1.957) (2.176) (1.855) 
Log-likelihood -354.25 -360.49 -360.03 -303.88 -318.59 
AIC 740.50 752.98 752.06 643.77 673.19 
Observations 3,010 3,010 3,010 2,479 2,770 
Countries 127 127 127 125 123 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models with Single party as reference category. Territorial 
campaigns are excluded and none of the models include region or decade dummies. Clustered 
robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	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Table D.6 Investigating the effects of omitted variable bias, Model 8 (continued) 
  GDP Growth Cold war FH CL SIP 
No partiest-1   -1.006*** -0.902** -1.261*** -0.847** 
  (0.386) (0.372) (0.396) (0.416) 
Multiple partiest-1   -3.332*** -3.095*** -3.668*** -3.027*** 
  (0.757) (0.815) (0.783) (0.858) 
Ln regime durationt-1  -0.106 -0.0378 -0.0383 -0.142 
  (0.194) (0.196) (0.202) (0.206) 
Multiparty*regime duration  1.051*** 1.011*** 1.078*** 0.944*** 
  (0.301) (0.314) (0.310) (0.315) 
Controls      
Military regimet-1  0.500 0.335 0.641** 0.418 
  (0.310) (0.321) (0.317) (0.350) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1  -0.0181 -0.107 -0.0503 0.00782 
    (0.239) (0.251) (0.238) (0.314) 
Ln oil and gas incomet-1  -1.478** -1.335** -1.228** -1.452** 
  (0.601) (0.574) (0.610) (0.642) 
Urban populationt-1  0.0192* 0.0210* 0.0172 0.0205* 
  (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0119) 
Populationt-1  0.326*** 0.335*** 0.282*** 0.313*** 
  (0.102) (0.101) (0.104) (0.109) 
Democratic neighborst-1  0.868 1.076* 0.813 1.081* 
  (0.631) (0.626) (0.624) (0.617) 
Neighboring campaignt-1  0.693** 0.761*** 0.639** 0.630** 
  (0.280) (0.294) (0.285) (0.299) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.361 0.513 0.370 0.121 
   (0.560) (0.556) (0.555) (0.663) 
Religious fractionalization  -0.909 -0.789 -0.743 -0.549 
    (0.578) (0.563) (0.575) (0.601) 
Communistt-1  -0.633 -0.756 -0.377 -0.835 
  (0.578) (0.578) (0.599) (0.574) 
Civil wart-1  -0.626** -0.652** -0.550* -0.459 
  (0.319) (0.322) (0.319) (0.345) 
Previous campaign  3.546*** 3.550*** 3.549*** 3.630*** 
  (0.256) (0.268) (0.269) (0.273) 
GDP Growth  -0.451    
  (0.655)    
Cold War   0.504*   
   (0.297)   
FH Civil Libertiest-1    -0.273**  
    (0.134)  
Cen. SIP scoret-1     -1.485 
     (1.098) 
SIP score squaredt-1     -1.832 
     (2.903) 
Intercept  -6.758*** -6.920*** -4.753** -7.034*** 
  (1.943) (1.874) (2.213) (2.665) 
Log-likelihood  -345.69 -343.99 -329.14 -323.92 
AIC  727.39 723.98 694.29 685.83 
Observations  3,010 3,010 2,916 2,721 
Countries  127 127 127 121 
Notes: All models are logistic regression models with Single party as reference category. Territorial 
campaigns are excluded and none of the models include region or decade dummies. Clustered robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  
 
